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 PREFACIO
A pesar de encontrarnos en un mundo globalizado con alta movilidad 
financiera, los países en vías de desarrollo han atraído tradicionalmente un 
porcentaje relativamente pequeño de los flujos internacionales de capital. Si bien 
muchas economías en desarrollo, como Turquía o los países latinoamericanos, 
liberalizaron su cuenta de capital en los años noventa, bajo la promesa de que 
eso contribuiría en gran medida a un desarrollo más rápido, en muchos casos 
esto generó inestabilidad macroeconómica, y no siempre fue suficiente para 
incrementar de manera notable la llegada de capital extranjero.
Dentro de los diferentes flujos de capital (inversiones en cartera, en deuda 
 FOREWORD
In spite of the fact that we are living in an increasingly globalized world with 
high levels of capital mobility, developing countries have traditionally attracted a 
relatively small percentage of international capital flows. Whether it is true that 
numerous developing economies, such as Turkey or Latin American countries, 
liberalized capital account in the nineties, under the promise that it would 
contribute to a faster economic development, in many cases this generated 
macroeconomic instability, and was not always sufficient to noticeably increase 
foreign capital inflows. 
Among the different types of capital flows (portfolio equity, short term debt, 
etc.), foreign direct investment (FDI) is considered to have a more stable nature. 
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a corto plazo…), se considera que la inversión extranjera directa (IED) tiene 
una naturaleza más estable. Mientras que las inversiones en cartera tienen a 
menudo propósitos de diversificación de riesgos o especulación, se mantiene 
que la IED son inversiones de largo plazo motivadas por la necesidad de 
acceder a un mercado de destino (IED horizontal), establecer una plataforma 
productiva para exportar a terceros países (IED vertical), o explotar recursos 
estratégicos (como materias primas, una tecnología determinada, etc.). Además 
de inversiones duraderas que generan riqueza y empleo, la IED teóricamente 
conlleva otros beneficios, como puede ser el incremento de la productividad 
a través de procesos de aprendizaje “learning by doing” y transmisión de 
conocimiento, a medida que empleados que trabajan para la multinacional 
extranjera se incorporan a otras empresas locales. También, de acuerdo con la 
teoría de la organización industrial, se generar un sin número de externalidades 
positivas, incluyendo encadenamientos hacia atrás (proveedores locales) y hacia 
While `portfolio investment usually have speculation or risk diversification 
purposes, it is argued that FDI implies long term investment motivated 
by the aim of accessing a destination market (horizontal FDI), establish a 
production platform to export to third countries (vertical FDI), or exploit 
strategic resources (such as raw materials or a certain technology). In addition 
to being long termed investments that generate wealth and employment, FDI 
theoretically brings other benefits to economic agents in the host economy, 
such as productivity increases derived from learning by doing processes 
and diffusion of knowledge, as employees working in the foreign subsidiary 
eventually move to other local companies. Moreover, according to the theory 
of industrial organization, a number of positive externalities are generated 
by FDI, including backward and forward linkages, demonstration effects and 
technology transfers. 
It is also worth mentioning that FDI does not always bring the expected 
TESISrevision miguel1.2.indd   18 19/05/2014   22:06:46
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delante (empresas que incorporan a su proceso productivo insumos intermedios 
comprados a la multinacional ,con mayor calidad y/o menor coste), efectos de 
“demostración”, transferencia de tecnología, etc.
Cabe aclarar que no siempre la IED conlleva los beneficios esperados, que 
existen diferencias en cuanto a las externalidades generadas dependiendo del 
tipo de FDI y el sector y país de destino, y que no siempre las autoridades en 
países en desarrollo cuentan con el poder de negociación suficiente para sacar el 
máximo partido a la inversión extranjera. Pero, a pesar de esto, la proliferación 
en las últimas dos décadas de tratados de libre comercio que incluyen cláusulas 
sobre inversión extranjera y protección intelectual, la explosión del número 
de agencias de atracción de inversiones, o las reformas conducentes a la 
reducción de costes salariales, dan una idea clara de que hay una auténtica 
competición a nivel global y regional por conseguir la implantación de empresas 
multinacionales. 
benefits. There are differences in the externalities achieved depending on the 
abovementioned types of FDI, the sector of the investment and the destination 
country. In addition, authorities in developing countries do not always count 
with sufficient bargaining power to make the most of foreign investments. In 
any case, the proliferation of free trade agreements including investment clauses 
and intellectual protection clauses we have witnessed in the past two decades, 
the explosion in the number of investment attraction agencies, or the observed 
reforms conducting to reduced labor costs, led us to conclude that there is 
clearly a global (and also regional) contest to attract multinational companies. 
In this sense, the main purpose of this thesis is identifying what are the 
determinants of foreign direct investment, as well as understanding to which 
extent FDI can be influenced by public policies. In a few words, we try to 
contrast the existing theories discussing the determinants of FDI at the light 
of the recent experience in some emerging economies. This way, apart from 
TESISrevision miguel1.2.indd   19 19/05/2014   22:06:46
THE DETERMINANTS OF FDI IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES20
En este sentido, el propósito principal de esta tesis es identificar cuáles son 
los factores determinantes de la inversión extranjera directa, así como entender 
hasta qué punto pueden ser influidos por políticas públicas. Se procura, en 
definitiva, contrastar las diferentes teorías existentes sobre los determinantes 
de la IED a la luz de la experiencia reciente en varias economías emergentes. 
Con esto, además de contribuir a la literatura existente sobre los determinantes 
de la IED con un enfoque eminentemente pragmático y de economía aplicada, 
centrado en economías en desarrollo, pretendemos informar a los decisores 
de política en dichos países sobre cómo conseguir un mayor atractivo de cara 
al inversor extranjero. Los artículos que aquí se presentan también son útiles 
para empresarios y gerentes que tengan la intención de invertir en países en 
desarrollo. 
Más concretamente, se trata de responder a las preguntas de investigación 
siguientes: (1) ¿hasta qué punto un mejor manejo macroeconómico ha ayudado 
contributing to the existing literature with an eminently pragmatic applied 
economics approach, focused in developing economies, we try to inform 
policy makers in those economies about the ways to increase their appeal to 
the foreign investors. The papers included in this volume are also useful for 
entrepreneurs and managers that are willing to invest in developing economies. 
More concretely, we try to respond to the following research questions: 
(1) to which extent a better macroeconomic management has helped certain 
developing economies attracting FDI?; are economic growth rates, inflation, 
current account deficits or debt levels influential?; (2) what is the role of 
enhanced and more transparent institutions in FDI attraction?; to which extent 
transparency and accountability, rule of law or investment protection help 
increasing FDI inflows?; (3) what are the factors determining the degree of 
foreign participation in a subsidiary?; here the idea is to better understand why 
some multinationals opt for joint ventures when entering a developing country, 
TESISrevision miguel1.2.indd   20 19/05/2014   22:06:46
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a ciertas economías en desarrollo a atraer inversión extranjera directa?; ¿hasta 
qué punto son factores influyentes las tasas de crecimiento, la inflación, los 
déficits de cuenta corriente o los niveles de deuda?; (2) ¿qué papel juegan 
mejores y más transparentes instituciones en la atracción de IED?; ¿en qué 
medida influyen los niveles de rendición de cuentas y transparencia, estado de 
derecho o protección del inversor extranjero en un país de cara a recibir IED?; 
(3) ¿cuáles son los factores que determinan el nivel de participación extranjera 
en una filial?; se trata aquí de entender por qué unas multinacionales optan por 
establecer joint ventures  en países en desarrollo, mientras que otras prefieren 
máximo nivel de control sobre su filial; por último (4), se discute el efecto 
que los tratados de integración regional tienen sobre los flujos de IED hacia los 
estados miembros. 
Cada artículo de los incluidos en esta memoria de tesis enfrenta una o varias 
de estas preguntas de investigación partiendo de una rigurosa revisión de la 
whereas others prefer to retain the maximum degree of control over the 
subsidiary; (4) lastly, we discuss the effect of regional integration agreements 
on FDI flows to member countries. 
Each of the articles included in this thesis addresses one or several of these 
research questions. As a departure point, we perform a rigorous literature 
review for each of these questions, whose consolidated findings have been 
summarized in the conclusion. This has allowed us to identify a series of research 
methods that are suitable to test the different hypotheses. Nevertheless, as we 
were looking at these issues in the case of developing economies, a series of 
limitations emerged; for instance, in the case of Latin America we do not count 
with a bilateral FDI flow matrix, which prevent us from using gravity models 
(commonly applied to analyze the potential of export or import flows). We have 
finally opted for applying three different but complementary research methods. 
In chapter 2 we employ a series of cross-country regressions under fixed effects, 
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literatura, cuya discusión se presenta de manera consolidada en el capítulo 
de conclusiones. Esto nos ha permitido identificar una serie de métodos de 
investigación adecuados para tratar de probar las diferentes hipótesis que aquí 
se plantean. No obstante, el hecho de trabajar con países en desarrollo ha puesto 
en evidencia algunas limitaciones de datos; por ejemplo, el hecho de no contar 
con una matriz de flujos bilaterales de IED en Latinoamérica nos ha impedido la 
aplicación de modelos gravitacionales (comúnmente utilizados para analizar el 
potencial de los flujos de exportación o importación). Finalmente, hemos optado 
por aplicar tres enfoques metodológicos diferentes pero complementarios. En 
el capítulo 2 se emplean regresiones multi-país con técnicas de efectos fijos, 
efectos aleatorios y Método de Momentos Generalizados para analizar un panel 
de datos a nivel “macro” para 19 países latinoamericanos, entre 1990 y 2010. 
En el capítulo 3 se parte de observaciones a nivel “micro”, en el marco de las 
Encuestas de Empresas del Banco Mundial, y se aplican una serie de regresiones 
random effects and Generalized Method of Moments, to analyze a panel of 
macroeconomic data for 19 Latin American countries between 1990 and 2010. 
In chapter 3 we depart from observations at the micro level, in the context 
of World Bank Enterprise Surveys, and we apply binary logit regressions to 
two cross sections of data (for different developing countries in 2005-2006 
and 2009-2010); the objective is to identify the determinants of the degree of 
foreign ownership in the FDI subsidiary. Finally, in chapter 4 we complement 
the previous econometric analyses with a case study approach: drawing from 
our reading of the economic and institutional context, a review of regional 
trade agreements, and a geopolitical discussion around energy, we try to assess 
to which extent the relation with the European Union has increased FDI levels 
in Turkey.
In sum, departing always from a literature review and from the selection 
of suitable and complementary research methods, we have elaborated an 
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binarias logit a dos secciones transversales (observaciones en 2005-2006 y 
2009-2010); el objetivo es identificar los factores determinantes del nivel de 
participación foráneo en la subsidiaria (IED). Finalmente, en el capítulo 4 se 
complementan los análisis econométricos con un enfoque de estudio de caso: a 
partir de una lectura del contexto económico e institucional, una revisión de 
los acuerdos de integración regional, y una discusión geopolítica alrededor del 
tema de la energía, se discute hasta qué punto la relación con la Unión Europea 
ha incrementado los niveles de IED en Turquía. 
En definitiva, partiendo siempre de una revisión de la literatura existente, y 
de la selección de métodos de investigación complementarios, se han elaborado 
un capítulo introductorio y tres artículos independientes pero íntimamente 
relacionados, que tienen como hilo conductor único la identificación de los 
factores determinantes de la inversión extranjera directa en países en vías de 
desarrollo. 
introductory chapter and three independent but intimately related papers 
around the common story of the identification of factors influencing foreign 
direct investment in developing economies. 
Chapter 1 presents the wider and more general context that functions as 
the framework for this investigation: a globalized world in which developed 
countries have traditionally attracted most international capital flows, whereas 
developing countries compete among themselves to improve their appeal to 
the foreign investors. Whether in the aftermath of the global economic crisis 
of 2008 it is observed how certain emerging economies (Brazil, China, Russia, 
Indonesia, etc.) have climbed already to the top in the FDI recipients rating, 
poorer and smaller developing economies, in general, continue to struggle 
when trying to attract foreign investors. In this context, we present some of 
the alternative explanations to this paradox, as it is the case of differences of 
human capital between the “North” and the “South”, market imperfections, 
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El capítulo primero presenta el contexto más amplio y general que sirve 
de marco para la investigación: un mundo más globalizado en el que los 
países avanzados han atraído tradicionalmente la mayor parte de los flujos 
internacionales de capital, mientras los países en desarrollo compiten entre sí 
por mejorar su atractivo de cara al inversor extranjero. Si bien es cierto que 
desde la crisis internacional del 2008 se observa cómo algunas economías 
emergentes (Brasil, China, Rusia, Indonesia, etc.) se han colocado ya entre 
los países del mundo que reciben mayores f lujos de IED, otras economías 
en desarrollo de menor tamaño continúan teniendo problemas para atraer al 
inversor extranjero. En este caso, presentamos algunas de las explicaciones 
alternativas que se han dado a esta paradoja, como es el caso de diferencias 
en el capital humano entre el “Norte” y el “Sur”, imperfecciones de mercado, 
limitaciones institucionales en los países menos desarrollados, o la existencia 
de controles de capital y otro tipo de trabas. La revisión general de la literatura 
institutional limitations in least developed economies, or the existence of 
capital controls and other kind of barriers. The review of the literature on 
capital flows we perform in this chapter leads to the intuition that some of these 
limitations are also influential in the concrete case of FDI. As abovementioned, 
within capital flows, FDI seems to contribute more substantially to economic 
development than short term flows, as it is alleged to bring positive spillovers 
over the economy. The question is, thus, what are the most influential factors 
when trying to attract FDI. 
In the second chapter, with title Do changes in the rules of the game affect 
FDI flows in Latin America?, we depart from this premise of identifying the 
determinants of FDI. From a “macro” (country level) perspective, we try 
to identify what are the macroeconomic and institutional factors that have 
influenced FDI flows to Latin America in 1990-2010. For this purpose, we 
undertake a series of panel data econometric exercises for this region. Results 
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sobre los flujos de capital que hacemos en este capítulo nos deja intuir que 
algunos de estos factores potencialmente limitantes pueden ser igualmente 
relevantes en el caso de la IED. Como ya se ha mencionado, dentro de los 
diferentes flujos de capital, la inversión extranjera directa parece contribuir 
en mayor medida al desarrollo económico que los capitales de corto plazo, por 
presentar una serie de externalidades positivas. La cuestión está en identificar 
cuáles son los factores más influyentes a la hora de atraer IED. 
En el segundo capítulo, con título Do changes in the rules of the game affect FDI 
flows in Latin America? , partimos de esta premisa de identificar los determinantes 
de la IED. Desde una perspectiva “macro”, tratamos de identificar cuáles son 
los factores macroeconómicos e institucionales que han influido la atracción 
de inversión extranjera directa por parte de los países latinoamericanos en el 
período 1990-2010. Para ello, hacemos una serie de análisis econométricos 
con datos de panel para la región. Los resultados señalan que aquellos países 
point that those countries with the lowest short term debt levels (respect to 
reserves), and those economies with larger current account deficits tend to 
attract more FDI; on the other hand, inflation and exchange rate variability are 
not significant determinants of FDI. There is also evidence that institutional 
improvements matter, although certain dimensions such as corruption levels or 
the quality of bureaucracy do not seem to have influenced the decisions taken by 
foreign investors when choosing a host country in the region. At the same time, 
it is possible to observe that those countries in which the investment protection 
framework has become more instable over the past decade, and those in which 
the implementation and execution of law has been deteriorated, have lost the 
favor of foreign investors, receiving less FDI inflows than in the nineties. This 
is the case of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela. On the other hand, 
Peru or Costa Rica have been able to noticeably increase investment climate, 
and to attain a higher degree of political stability, which allowed then to attract 
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con menores niveles de deuda a corto plazo respecto a reservas en moneda 
extranjera, y aquellas economías con mayores déficits por cuenta corriente 
tienden a atraer más IED; en cambio, la inflación o la variabilidad en el tipo de 
cambio no han sido determinantes significativos de IED. También hay evidencia 
de que las mejoras institucionales son importantes, si bien dimensiones como 
los niveles de corrupción o la independencia de los funcionarios públicos no 
parecen haber influido las decisiones de inversores extranjeros en la región, 
a la hora de elegir país de destino. En cambio, sí que es posible observar que 
aquellos países en los que el marco de protección al inversor se ha hecho 
más inestable a lo largo de la pasada década, y en los que se ha deteriorado la 
implementación y ejecución de la ley, han perdido el favor de los inversores 
extranjeros, recibiendo menores flujos relativos de IED que en los años noventa. 
Este es el caso de Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador y Venezuela. Por otro lado, 
países como Perú o Costa Rica han sido capaces de mejorar notablemente el 
annual FDI inflows averaging more than 5 per cent of GDP in 2000-2010. This 
paper has been recently published at the European Journal of Political Economy.
From the country level approach with macroeconomic and institutional 
variables, in chapter 3 we descend to investment decisions at the microeconomic 
level, using a firm level approach. This chapter, with title Do foreign multinationals 
prefer joint or solo ventures in Latin America?, focuses in analyzing the determinants 
of the degree of participation of foreign multinationals in their subsidiaries, 
when they decide to invest abroad. In this case we observe how international 
investment decisions do not only have to do with perceived risks or institutions 
in the host country, but also with the characteristics of the multinational and the 
expansion strategy she has adopted. For instance, companies that own specific 
technologies or have a license to exploit certain patents, in general, prefer to 
maintain a degree of participation in the social capital of the new subsidiary 
of 100%, to better defend their intellectual property. Entering a new market 
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clima institucional y alcanzar un mayor grado de estabilidad política, lo que les 
ha llevado a atraer flujos de inversión extranjera anuales por encima del 5 por 
ciento del PIB en 2000-2010. Este artículo ha sido recientemente publicado en 
el European Journal of Political Economy.
Del enfoque a nivel país, con variables macroeconómicas e institucionales, 
bajamos en el tercer capítulo a las decisiones de inversión a nivel 
microeconómico, desde una perspectiva de empresa. Este capítulo, con título 
Do foreign multinationals prefer joint or solo ventures in Latin America? , se centra en 
estudiar los factores de los que depende el nivel de participación en la empresa 
subsidiaria que decide tener una empresa multinacional cuando invierte en el 
extranjero. En este caso observamos cómo las decisiones internacionales de 
inversión no sólo tienen que ver con el riesgo percibido o las instituciones en 
el país de destino, sino también con las características de la multinacional y la 
estrategia de expansión que ésta adopta. Por ejemplo, las empresas que cuentan 
with a local partner could somehow imply ceding the exclusiveness over that 
technology, with the partner eventually becoming a competitors. We also find 
evidence that international investors and managers usually prefer a high degree 
of participation in the subsidiary when they have decided that they will get the 
inputs for the production process from third countries different to the host (in 
which the subsidiary has been established), as well as when the objective of the 
investment is to create a platform aimed at exporting to third countries; this 
guarantees them a greater degree of flexibility when choosing their suppliers 
and distribution channels abroad. Conversely, when the subsidiary with foreign 
capital plans to buy inputs in the host country and to sell most of its production 
in that market, it usually adopts a joint venture form, given that counting with a 
local partner may be key when identifying suppliers and clients in the domestic 
market.
Chapter 4, is titled How regional integration and transnational energy networks 
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con tecnologías específicas o licencias de explotación de ciertas patentes, por 
lo general, prefieren participar al 100% en el capital social de la nueva filial 
para proteger su propiedad intelectual. Entrar en un nuevo mercado de la 
mano del socio local podría resultar en perder la exclusividad sobre dicha 
tecnología, con el socio eventualmente convirtiéndose en competidor. También 
encontramos evidencia de que los inversores internacionales y gerentes suelen 
preferir un alto grado de participación en la filial cuando tienen previsto que 
ésta se aprovisione de insumos para el proceso productivo en terceros países 
distintos del de implantación, así como cuando el objetivo de la inversión es 
crear una plataforma para exportar a terceros países; esto les garantiza mayor 
flexibilidad a la hora de seleccionar sus proveedores y canales de distribución. 
Por el contrario, cuando la subsidiaria de capital extranjero compra insumos 
en el país de implantación y dirige la mayor parte de sus ventas al territorio 
nacional, normalmente se establece en forma de joint venture, dado que contar 
have boosted FDI in Turkey (and may cease to do so). On this occasion, drawing from 
a qualitative case study approach, we analyze how regional integration processes 
may help increasing the level of foreign investment attraction. More concretely, 
this chapter discusses why Turkey was not able to significantly increase FDI 
inflows during the 90s and early 2000s, in spite of the signature of the Customs 
Union Agreement for manufactured products with the European Union (EU) 
in 1996. In turn, we argue that the boost on FDI inflows to Turkey observed 
from 2005 onwards was caused by the signaling effect of the beginning of 
official EU accession conversations that year. Contrary to the Customs Union 
Agreement, in this case regional integration was influential for attracting FDI 
because accession negotiations entailed reforms in a number of chapters of the 
so called acquis communitaire, which international investors understand is 
going to result in a significant improvement in business climate. We also discuss 
how diplomatic relations, geopolitical decisions and strategic industries such 
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con un socio local puede ser clave de cara a identificar proveedores y clientes. 
El cuarto capítulo se titula How regional integration and transnational energy 
networks have boosted FDI in Turkey (and may cease to do so) . En esta ocasión, desde 
un punto de vista de estudio de caso a nivel cualitativo, se analiza cómo los 
procesos de integración regional pueden ayudar a incrementar la atracción 
de inversión extranjera. Concretamente, el capítulo discute por qué Turquía 
fue incapaz de incrementar significativamente sus flujos de IED durante los 
noventa y los primeros años de la década pasada, incluso a pesar de la firma del 
tratado de unión aduanera para manufacturas con la Unión Europea en 1996. 
En cambio, sostenemos que el fuerte incremento en los flujos de inversión a 
Turquía a partir del año 2005 se debe al efecto señalizador que tuvo el inicio 
de las conversaciones oficiales de adhesión a la Unión Europea ese mismo año. 
El motivo es que las negociaciones de adhesión implican reformas en un buen 
número de capítulos del acquis communitaire, que los inversores extranjeros 
as the energy sector, directly affect FDI. The slowdown in the progress made 
by Turkey in EU accession, and the fact that the Nabucco natural gas corridor 
(which would link Azerbaijan and Central Europe, through Anatolia) is no 
longer a priority in EU energy policy, may result in European investors in the 
energy field losing appetite for investing in Turkey. In this case, Turkey may 
need to recur to searching for new allies and investors (for example, in Russia). 
Finally, the conclusions chapter offers a consolidated reading of the different 
papers integrating this thesis. It synthesizes in a single piece the findings of the 
literature review, the identification of influential variables, methodological 
decisions, results and policy implications. The conclusions chapter may be also 
somehow considered an executive summary of this thesis, and discusses in a 
greater level of detail the issues highlighted in this Foreword.
In sum, this thesis comprises an introductory framework discussion on 
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entienden conllevará una mejora significativa del clima de negocios. También 
discutimos cómo en sectores estratégicos como el energético, las relaciones 
diplomáticas y las decisiones geopolíticas afectan directamente a la IED. La 
desaceleración del proceso de acceso a la Unión Europea (UE) de Turquía, así 
como el hecho de que el corredor de gas Nabucco (que uniría Azerbaiyán y 
Centro Europa, cruzando Anatolia) ha dejado de ser prioritario para la política 
energética de la UE ,puede resultar en un menor apetito de los inversores 
europeos en el ámbito energético por invertir en Turquía, que es probable que 
tenga que buscar nuevos aliados e inversores (por ejemplo, en Rusia). 
Finalmente, el capítulo de conclusiones ofrece una lectura conjunta de los 
artículos que integran esta tesis, sintetizando en una única pieza los hallazgos en 
la revisión de la literatura e identificación de variables influyentes, las decisiones 
metodológicas, los resultados, y las implicaciones pragmáticas. Dicho capítulo 
puede ser también considerado una especie de resumen ejecutivo de la tesis, y 
capital flows and three complementary chapters featuring different approaches 
and methodologies (macro-quantitative, micro-quantitative, and case study-
qualitative). They have the common aim of discovering the reader, the 
academician, the policy maker, or the entrepreneur, which are the factors that 
influence foreign direct investment decisions in developing economies. We 
try to contrast existing theories about the determinants of FDI at the light 
of the recent experience in several developing countries. This way, our work 
acquires an eminently empirical dimension, trying at the same time to generate 
a pragmatic debate around the different policy implications and options that are 
available for governments in emerging markets. 
 
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discute en mayor detalle los aspectos resaltados en este Prefacio. 
En definitiva, esta memoria de tesis presenta un marco introductorio y tres 
análisis complementarios con diferente enfoque y metodología (macro, micro, 
caso de estudio), con el objetivo común de descubrir al lector, académico, 
formulador de política pública o empresario, los diversos factores que influyen 
en las decisiones de inversión extranjera directa en países en vías de desarrollo. 
Se trata de contrastar las diferentes teorías existentes sobre los determinantes 
de la IED a la luz de la experiencia reciente en varias economías en desarrollo. 
De este modo, el trabajo adquiere una dimensión eminente empírica, que trata 
de generar un debate muy pragmático alrededor de las diferentes implicaciones 
y opciones de política a disposición de los gobiernos de economías emergentes. 

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TITULO TEMA
¿Por qué las naciones en 
desarrollo no atraen más 
flujos de capital?
¿Cómo afectan 
los cambios en las 
reglas del juego a los 
flujos de inversión en 
Latinoamérica?
¿Prefieren las 
multinacionales entrar 
en solitario o con joint 
venture?
¿Cómo la integración 
regional y las redes 
transnacionales 
de energía han 
incrementado la IED en 
Turquía?
CORRIENTES DE LITERATURA REVISADAS
*Flujos de capital globales  
*Diferencias en balanza 
de pagos 
*Teorías neoclásicas  
*Modelo OLI  
*Knowledge-Capital
*Institucionales   
*IED en Latinoamérica    
*Riesgo e histéresis
*Costes de transacción    
*Modelo OLI  
*Institucionales    
*Decisiones estratégicas
*Localización de IED en 
Turquía         
*Macro e institucionales
*Integración regional e IED
NIVEL DE ANÁLISIS
Macroeconómico, global Macroeconómico, multi-país
Microeconómico, multi-
país 
Único país. Análisis de 
tratados comerciales y 
sectores concretos
METODOLOGÍA
Revisión de la literatura
Cuantitativo, datos de 
panel con efectos fijos y 
modelo dinámico 
Cuantitativo, datos de 
panel. Logit binomial y 
mínimos cuadrados
Cualitativo, caso de 
estudio
HALLAZGOS / DETERMINANTES DE IED SIGNIFICATIVOS
La inversión extranjera 
directa se prefiere a otros 
flujos de capital por ser 
de largo plazo y conllevar 
externalidades positivas
Macro: Apertura 
comercial, bajos niveles 
de deuda, déficits de 
cuenta corriente.
Instituciones: estabilidad 
del ejecutivo, 
protección al inversor.                 
.
Regional: DR CAFTA no 
significativo
Instituciones: pagos 
informales, justicia en las 
cortes.                              
OLI y estratégicos: 
licencias de tecnología 
extranjera, % insumos 
comprados en el 
extranjero, % de ventas 
en mercado local
Macro: inflación (¿?)
Institutions: estabilidad 
del ejecutivo.
Regional: Negociaciones 
de adhesión a la Unión 
Europea, corredores 
energéticos
PREGUNTAS DE INVESTIGACIÓN
#01 #02 #03 #04
¿Cuál 
es el rol 
de mejores y 
más transparentes 
instituciones en la at-
racción de flujos 
de IED?
¿Cuáles 
son los facto-
res que influyen en 
el nivel de partici-
pación extranjera en 
las filiales?
¿Ayudan los acu-
erdos de integración 
regional a incremen-
tar la IED?
¿Hasta 
qué punto 
un mejor manejo 
macroeconómico 
ayuda a atraer más 
IED?
Tabla 0-1. Cuadro sinóptico resumen del contenido de los capítulos, métodos empleados, hallazgos, y preguntas 
de investigación a las que alude cada capítulo.
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CHAPTER TITLE
Why developing nations 
can not get enough 
capital flows?
Do changes in the rules 
of the game affect FDI 
flows in Latin America?
Do foreign multinationals 
prefer solo or joint ven-
tures in Latin America?
How regional integration 
and transnational energy 
networks have boosted 
FDI in Turkey (and may 
cease to do so)?
REVIEWED LITERATURE STRANDS
*Global capital flows
*Global imbalances
*Neoclassical theories
*OLI paradigm
*Knowledge-Capiital 
*Institutional
*FDI in Latin America   
*Risk and hystheresis
*Transaction costs   
*OLI paradigm
*Institutionals 
*Strategic decisions
*FDI location within Turkey   
*Macro and institutionals
*Regional integration and 
FDI
LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
Macroeconomic, global Macroeconomic, cross-country
Microeconomic, 
cross-country
Single country. Analysis 
of trade agreements and 
concrete sectors
METHODOLOGY
Literature review
Quantitative, panel data 
with fixed effects and 
GMM
Quantitative, panel data. 
Binomial logit and OLS Qualitative, case study
FINDINGS / SIGNIFICANT DETERMINANTS
Foreign direct investment 
is preferred to other cap-
ital flows for being long 
termed and entailing 
positive externalities
Macro: Trade Openness, 
low debt levels, current 
account deficits.
Institutional: government 
stability, investment 
protection
Regional: DR CAFTA is 
found insignificant
Institutions: informal pay-
ments, courts are fair.
OLI and strategic: foreign 
licensed technology, % of 
inputs of foreign origin, % 
of sales in the domestic 
market
Macro: inflation (?)
Institutions: government 
stability.
Regional: EU accession 
negotiations, energy 
corridors
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
What 
is the role of 
better and more 
transparent institu-
tions in attracting FDI 
inflows?
What 
are the 
factors influencing 
the degree of foreign 
ownership in subsid-
iaries?
Do regional inte-
gration agreements 
help increasing FDI?
To 
which 
extent better 
macroeconomic 
managemented 
helps boosting 
FDI?
Table 0-1. Summary of content, applied methodology, findings, and research questions we refer to in each 
chapter.
#01 #02 #03 #04
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being published in the European Journal of Political Economy and Real Instituto Elcano, and 
as a World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, respectively; Chapter 3 is under revision 
at the Journal of World Business. They were originally elaborated as part of the research 
activities of PhD candidate Miguel Eduardo Sánchez Martín, under the supervision of Rafael 
de Arce Borda and Gonzalo Escribano Francés. 
• Miguel Eduardo Sánchez-Martín, Rafael de Arce, Gonzalo Escribano, 2014. 
“Do changes in the rules of the game affect FDI flows in Latin America? A look at the 
macroeconomic, institutional and regional integration determinants of FDI”, European 
Journal of Political Economy, Volume 34, June 2014, Pages 279-299, ISSN 0176-2680, http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.02.001. 
• Sánchez, M.E., De Arce, R., and Escribano, R. 2014. “Do foreign multinationals prefer 
joint or sole ventures in LAC? An analysis of microeconomic determinants of entry mode 
using WB enterprise surveys”. Journal of World Business (under review). 
• Sánchez, M.E., Escribano, R. 2014, and De Arce, R., 2014. “How regional integration 
and transnational energy networks have boosted FDI in Turkey (and may cease to do so)”. 
World Bank Policy Research Working paper, 2014 (in press). 
• Sánchez, M.E., Escribano, R. and De Arce, R., 2013. “La inversión española directa 
en Latinoamérica: un enfoque de gobernabilidad y gestión de riesgo”. Revista ARI 13/2013. 
Real Instituto Elcano. Madrid, April 2013. 
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39WHY DEVELOPING NATIONS CAN NOT GET ENOUGH CAPITAL FLOWS 
1.1. Motivation: limited attraction of capital flows by developing 
nations
In spite of being compelled during the 1990s to open capital account and 
increase their degree of integration in global financial markets, as that was 
alleged to enhance economic growth, developing nations continue to attract 
just a small portion of international capital f lows. Over the past decade, 
developed nations still got more than 70% of global foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows, and more than 80% of global portfolio equity, confirming the 
so-called Lucas (1990) Paradox: flows are in general North-North or even 
South-North instead of being North-South, as envisaged in neoclassical trade 
theory. Even if in the aftermath of the global crisis of 2008 capital flowing to 
emerging economies has expanded very noticeably, and South-South flows have 
WHY DEVELOPING NATIONS CAN NOT 
GET ENOUGH CAPITAL FLOWS 
A GENERAL COMMENT ON EXISTING LITERATURE ON 
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS, AT THE LIGHT OF EVENTS 
IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS
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started to appear, most of it has concentrated in the large so-called BRIC s´ 
economies (UNCTAD, 2013), whereas lower middle income and low income 
economies of smaller size continue struggling to attract FDI. This may be 
partly explained by the fact that developing nations have less sophisticated and 
less depth financial markets, and have thus more difficulties to appeal to foreign 
investors (original sin hypothesis). At the same time, the flows developing nations 
were attracting often had a short term speculative nature that increased output 
volatility and have led to sudden stops (for example, Turkey and Argentina in 
1994-1995 and 2001). 
Departing from this initial puzzle, and drawing from recent literature, 
we aim at providing a general characterization of capital f lows in the new 
global context, starting with the fall of Leman Brothers in 2008 and the 
economic slowdown in developed nations. One of the lessons emerging from 
the literature review is that capital account liberalization, if not accompanied 
by other measures, does not necessarily result in deeper and more efficient 
domestic financial institutions, much larger attraction of international capital 
flows, and faster economic growth (see Prasad and Rajan, 2008). A second 
finding is that there is evidence that capital flow composition matters: Foreign 
Direct Investment is widely regarded as a type of f lows that encompass a 
series of positive externalities (knowledge spillovers, backward and forward 
linkages), and contribute to economic development due to its long term nature 
(Markusen and Venables, 1999); in turn, short termed debt flows may enlarge 
macroeconomic instability. 
The rest of this introductory chapter discusses the direction of global 
capital flows (section 1.2), to which extent have global imbalances contributed 
to the unexpected capital flows patterns (1.3), the distinction between FDI 
and portfolio flows (1.4), and the competition on foreign direct investment 
attraction (1.5). Our ultimate motivation is to flesh out a general view on 
global capital flows, as well as to provide the reader with an intuition on why 
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nations are especially keen on attracting foreign direct investment, even when 
this may imply a race to the bottom in labor, social or environmental standards 
(Hecock and Jepsen, 2013; Olney, 2013).
1.2. Financial openness and global capital flows
In an era of unstoppable globalisation, the intensity of the debate between 
supporters and detractors of financial liberalisation has escalated. Neoclassical 
economic theory stands that -with globally integrated financial markets- capital 
would flow from relatively rich countries to those with low capital per labour 
ratios. However, as Lucas (1990) observed, in reality capital flows are following 
a “North-North” pattern rather than a “North-South” one. 
It is widely believed that an economy well integrated in the global 
financial system will enjoy potentially higher growth and investment (taking 
advantage from foreign funds), improvements in its financial institutions 
and better macroeconomic management due to market discipline. On the 
other hand, however, open economies may suffer instability and crisis, loss of 
competitiveness due to excess inflows leading to exchange rate overvaluation 
(Dutch Disease, as defined by Corden and Neary, 1982), constraints in their 
currency policies and loss of certain degree of fiscal autonomy due to tax 
competition to prevent capital flight. In the current context of blurry economic 
prospects and financial turmoil, the consideration of capital controls and Tobin 
taxes to regulate capital flows and prevent speculative investment is again at the 
forefront of the international debate.  
Based on the compelling arguments in favour of financial liberalisation, 
such as the attraction of FDI inflows (Desai et al., 2006) or institutional 
improvement, many developing nations have adopted capital account openness 
and other measures seeking the attraction of international f lows in order 
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to enhance development porspects. In the neoclassical model, the Law of 
Diminishing Returns to Capital implies that new investment should take place 
in countries that have relatively low capital-to-labour ratios (see Markusen et 
al, 1995). 
Figure 1.2-1. A simple neoclassical model of efficiency gains from capital mobility, 
illustrates a setting in which the total amount of capital in the system 
(horizontal axis) is distributed between two economies (A and B).  Initially 
(at K), most of the capital is located in developed country A (represented by 
the distance between O
A
 and K), whereas developing country B counts with a 
smaller capital stock (OB and K). As the latter is likely to present higher risk for 
investors,  returns to capital are higher (rB> rA). According to the theory, with 
time, capital will start moving to country B, until the marginal prices of capital 
in A and B are equalized in position E, were returns to capital are at level r´ . In 
this final equilibrium country B would finally enjoy a lightly larger share of 
total capital than country A.
Figure 1.2-1. A simple neoclassical model of efficiency gains from capital mobility.
Source: Adapted from Markusen et al (1995) 
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In this setting, we should have witnessed how capital, widely accumulated in 
developed countries, started to massively flow to developing nations. However, 
as it is widely known, Lucas (1990) noted that in reality just a small proportion 
of international capital flows have traditionally been flowing to the South. 
 Prashad et al (2006) underline that, despite the upsurge of cross-border 
finance and investment in the past two decades, capital flows to developing 
countries are still far from the predicted theoretical levels. In fact, some 
emerging markets such as China or India are exporting capital to rich 
economies. By looking at Figure 1.2-2.  it is possible to observe that developed 
nations continue to hold the largest share of global FDI inflows, averaging 77% 
of total flows in 2000-2008. FDI flows to upper middle income countries 
were relatively low in the eighties (11.3% of total flows, on average), escalated 
in 1991-1997 (23.9%), declined during the Asian crisis (14.3% in 1998-2000) 
and expanded again during the last decade. Low income countries have just 
attracted 0.5% of yearly total flows, on average.
 In 2009-2012, global FDI flows have overall significantly contracted, and 
are far from the historical yearly levels attained prior to the 2008 crisis. At the 
same time, it is possible to observe some changes in the direction of flows, as 
foreign direct investment to developed nations decreased to around 63% of 
total flows, whereas flows directed to upper middle income countries have 
expanded from 18.8% of total flows in 2007 to 32.4% in 2012.  Basically means 
that the so-called BRIC s´4 are reaping their chance to enhance foreign direct 
investment in a new global order full of challenges but also full of opportunities 
for emerging nations. According to UNCTAD (2013:xiv), in 2012 eleven 
developing economies were already in the top twenty in terms of investment 
attraction (including China, Brazil, Russia, India and Indonesia). At the same 
time, most low income and lower middle income countries continue struggling 
to attract foreign investors. 
By, region, in 2001-2011, European Union member countries have attracted 
4.  
BRIC s´ refers to large 
emerging markets such 
as Brazil, Russia, China, 
and India. Some authors 
include also Indonesia 
and Turkey under this 
denomination. 
TESISrevision miguel1.2.indd   43 19/05/2014   22:06:48
THE DETERMINANTS OF FDI IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES44
on average 46% yearly global FDI inflows, whereas 16.5% went to the United 
States and Canada. East Asia and Pacific countries have averaged 16.9%, Latin 
America 7.7%, Middle East and North Africa 3.7%, South Saharan Africa 1.6% 
and South Asia 1.1%. 
Figure 1.2-2. Yearly FDI inflows by country income level.
Source: Global Development Finance BOP figures, the World Bank 
In the case of portfolio equity, the share of flows to high income countries 
is even larger, above 80% of total f lows. Flows to upper middle income 
countries (especially to the BRIC's) have largely expanded since the Leman 
and Brothers fall, in 2008, but remain small compared to those received by 
developed nations. Flows to lower middle income and low income countries 
are very modest, as in most of the cases the depth of their financial markets is 
just shallow. 
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Figure 1.2-3. Net portfolio equity inflows by country income level.
Source: Global Development Finance BOP figures, the World Bank
We may ask why, overall, capital has not been flowing in a larger proportion 
to poor countries despite their efforts to liberalise the financial sector. It is 
possible to find a bunch of dissimilar explanations that we try to summarize 
here.
Lucas (1990) elaborates some hypothesis to explain why capital is not 
flowing to poor countries despite the observed large return differentials with 
rich ones. The different quality of human capital and the existence of market 
imperfections (sovereign risk, difficulties to enforce international borrowing 
contracts, asymmetric information, etc.) could be the cause for this to happen. 
Another view stands that the existence of faulty institutions and financial 
sector impediments in poor countries is the reason why they are not able 
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to attract large capital f lows. This view is intimately related to the New 
Institutional Economics. It argues that, in order to fully benefit from financial 
globalization, countries must first undertake reforms aimed at achieving stable 
property rights, rule of law and reduced corruption (Alfaro et al, 2005). There 
is also some evidence that FDI from developed countries is more risk-averse 
than that from developing economies, thus not reaching relatively risky or 
complicated environments (Masron et al, 2012).  Interestingly, this approach 
contrasts with the traditional neoclassical argument that financial deepening 
and improved institutions would be the natural consequence of liberalisation. 
In the new consensus, institutional reforms seem to be a pre-requisite to 
achieve successful liberalisation. 
Related to this institutional view, Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), argue 
that the Lucas Paradox is well explained by the original sin hypothesis: more 
capital does not flow from rich to poor countries because it can only flow in a 
form that generates currency mismatches (see Jeanne and Zettlemeyer, 2005) 
which discourage lending and heighten the fragility of the financial system.
A third explanation is that developing countries maintain some capital 
controls fearing that liberalisation may bring increased economic volatility. 
The argument against financial market liberalisation is based in the bad 
experiences of some emerging economies in Latin America and Asia during 
the 1990s. Some critics of the risks entailed by capital account openness defend 
the need to control potentially damaging short term flows (Stiglitz, 2000; 
Aizenman and Pinto, 2011). Singh (2002) argues that even long term foreign 
direct investment may cause financial fragility. 
Kose et al (2006) review large strands of literature and reject this last view, 
arguing that there is little evidence that enhanced capital mobility increases 
volatility and vulnerability to crises. On the other hand, they acknowledge 
that there does not seem to be systematic evidence of a positive contribution 
of higher financial openness levels to economic growth either. They argue 
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that de facto measures of capital openness (the sum of gross stocks of foreign 
assets and liabilities as a ratio to GDP) are preferred to the more traditional 
de jure measures, as the latter are <<based on various restrictions associated with 
foreign exchange transactions that may not necessarily impede capital flows>>. A good 
example is China, where, in spite of the fact that capital restrictions are still in 
place, large and volatile capital flows could not be avoided. When comparing 
1980-84 with 2000-04, it is possible to observe that, while emerging economies 
have not increased de jure openness substantially, de facto integration of these 
economies in global capital markets has largely increased, even when their 
levels of openness still remain significantly below those of developed nations. 
In sum, when trying to answer the question to which extent is capital flowing 
to developing nations?, it is possible to observe that, even when large emerging 
nations have substantially increased their participation in global financial 
markets in the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008, 
and are nowadays receiving a larger share of global capital flows, developed 
economies continue to be the main poles of attraction of global financial 
flows. Some of the explanations given by the literature to these North-South 
differences in capital f low attraction are (i) differences in human capital 
endowments, and existence of market imperfections, (ii) that most developing 
nations do not count with transparent and efficient institutions, which does not 
help to call foreign investors, and (iii) that many developing nations continue 
using capital controls that restrict flows. These broad views on capital flows 
provide us with a first intuition of which could be some of the determinants of 
foreign direct investment attraction in developing nations, which is the focus 
of this thesis. The empirical evidence testing these theories is not conclusive 
but, overall, it can be argued that capital account liberalization, per se, does not 
necessarily result in deeper and more efficient domestic financial institutions, 
much larger attraction of international capital f lows, and faster economic 
growth. 
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The next section explains how existent differences in capital f lowing 
to developed and developing economies are to some extent related to the 
persistence of large macroeconomic imbalances in the global economy during 
the past decade.
1.3. Global imbalances were behind the stumble of 2008
The fact that global capital flows over the past decade were concentrated in 
developed nations had partly to do with the presence of large global imbalances. 
In the aftermath of the Asian crisis of 1998, many developing nations started 
to accumulate reserves denominated, mainly, in U.S. dollars. East Asian 
countries and oil exporters, as well as Central and Northern Europe have been 
increasingly running current account surpluses, whereas the United States and 
peripheral Europe enlarged their deficits. 
Why and when do these imbalances emerge? The basic macroeconomic 
identity5 of an open economy easily shows how the current account deficit 
(surplus) implies a negative (positive) net investment in the rest of world:
X + NTR - M ≡ CA ≡  ΔNFA ≡ ( Sp - I) + ( T - G )        
In principle, imbalances are neither good nor bad, current account and 
capital account do not need to be balanced. According to neoclassical economic 
theory, savings should go where they are most productive, so imbalances 
naturally emerge from differences in saving behaviour, in the rate of return on 
capital or in the degree of risk and liquidity of the different assets. 
One of the theoretical arguments to sustain a large capital account surplus 
and current account deficits over time is that an economy can this way increase 
its growth rate by attracting foreign capital and foreign direct investment. 
According to inter-temporal borrowing-lending models, accessing the 
 
5.  
Where X is exports; 
M, imports; NTR, net 
factor income and net 
unilateral transfers; 
CA, current account 
balance; Sp, private 
savings; I, investment; 
T, taxes; G, government 
expenditure; ΔNFA (Net 
Foreign assets) position, 
denotes the change the 
economy’s net foreign 
assets by aggregating  all 
sectors, including the 
central bank,  banking 
and non-banking 
financial institutions, 
the treasury and non-
bank private sector.
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international capital market, i.e. borrowing, allows a country to undertake 
extra investments, as well as to enjoy the extra first-period of consumption, 
which may have in some developing nations led to over-borrowing and debt 
overhang (Easterly 1999). Successful realization of the income-enhancing debt 
strategy requires the following conditions: additions to external debt are used 
for growth-enhancing productive investment, the growth rate targeted by this 
strategy exceeds a stable world interest rate, and the marginal domestic savings 
rate should exceed the investment ratio required by the target growth rate, 
so debt will eventually begin to decline, and the marginal product of capital 
should exceed the cost of borrowing. 
However, while external borrowing may allow faster economic growth, 
excessive reliance on foreign finance may increase fragility and lead to crisis. 
According to Mckinnon and Pill (1998), an internationally liberalised economy 
may face an “overborrowing-overinvestment” problem when there are euphoric 
expectations about liberalisation and the domestic regulation and supervision 
of domestic financial market and institutions is weak. This is more likely to 
be an issue in developing nations, but problems with “toxic assets” during the 
current crisis have also revealed vulnerabilities among financial institutions and 
oversight bodies in developed nations.
Additionally, as it has been noted by Prasad et al (2006), under certain 
circumstances <<a positive correlation between the current account surplus and a 
country’s growth rate>> may appear. Their counterintuitive explanation is that 
endogenously (productivity growth) or exogenously (population growth) 
generated savings may enhance economic performance, so it is not necessary to 
run large deficits.  
Structural global imbalances started to enlarge at the beginning of the past 
decade, with China and East Asian Countries, Central European countries 
(Germany) and oil exporters (Russia, the Middle East, South America) 
expanding their trade and current account surpluses. On the other hand, the 
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United States, peripheral Europe (Spain, Italy, Ireland) and non-commodity 
exporting developing economies (in Central America, for example) presented 
increasing current account deficits and increasing external financing needs.
Figure 1.3-1. Evolution of imbalances in selected countries.
Source: Global Development Finance BOP figures, the World Bank
How have imbalances evolved over time? According to Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2009), in the late 1990s imbalances seemed to be logically responding to 
differences in returns on investment across countries, as the US was presenting 
a high tech boom, whereas the Asian crisis and declining productivity in Japan 
led to a decrease in f lows to Asian countries. However, in the 2000s the 
nature of global imbalances turned “bad”, at least for Western economies, as 
household savings declined and increasing investment started to generate asset 
bubbles that not reflected economic fundamentals properly, and ultimately 
exploded during the 2008 global financial crisis (Blanchard et al, 2010). 
Bernanke (2005) considered that a “global saving glut” (a world increase in the 
supply of savings) was per se at the core of the explanation of both the increase 
in the U.S. current account deficit and the relatively low level of long-term 
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real interest rates in the world; however, other authors empathize the role U.S. 
financial institutions and regulators had in the enlargement of imbalances.  For 
instance, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) build a model that explains how 
global imbalances led to the U.S. securitization boom and ultimately helped 
to unleash the global financial crisis. Demand for risk-less assets coming from 
the rest of the world (e.g. investors from surplus China) provoked financial 
innovation: mortgages and some risky assets were pooled and packaged to form 
secure “AAA” senior tranches to be sold abroad. Thus, American financial 
institutions increased their leverage and the “toxic waste” was hold in the 
U.S. Therefore, according to the authors, external demand for U.S. assets has 
played a part in the build-up to the crisis. In the same fashion, Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2009) emphasize the role low interest rates played in the growth of U.S. 
foreign liabilities. Still, exchange rate and other asset price movements kept that 
debt growing below U.S. current account deficit growth rate. In addition to 
that, they argue that China was able to sterilize large currency purchases, thus 
keeping an undervalued currency and postponing the rebalance of its economy.
In spite of the fact that global external imbalances have naturally contracted 
with the outbreak of the global financial crisis, there seems to be agreement on 
the need of diminishing them further (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009; Blanchard 
and Milesi-Ferretti , 2009). However, it is very likely that net exporters such 
as China or Germany will continue running large current account surpluses, 
whereas the U.S. and Southern Europe are likely to continue presenting 
deficits, unless there are drastic economic policy changes. In Latin America, 
especial attention has to be paid to changes in the terms of trade: deteriorating 
terms of trade would negatively affect commodity exporters, whereas it could 
somewhat help Central American countries reducing their current account 
deficits. At the same time, this could potentially result in changing patterns in 
capital flows to the region.
It is also worth noticing that the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 put 
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to test some of the traditional policy-making myths. For example, Correia 
et al (2013) show that monetary policy is almost ineffective when interest 
rates are close to zero, a situation in which a fiscal expansion may be a better 
countercyclical measure. Reinhart and Rogoff (2013) also question the fiscal 
austerity approach European countries have adopted to get out of the crisis, 
claiming that using some of the solutions often applied by emerging markets 
(debt restructuring, financial repression and higher inflation) would have 
granted a faster recovery. Farhi and Werning (2013) argue that there is a case 
to implement capital controls to mitigate volatility on the capital account even 
under flexible exchange rate regimes. In addition, macro-prudential regulation 
has come to play a dominating role in the current policy toolkit (Claessens 
et al, 2013; Jeanne, 2013). Even the possibility of imposing a “Tobin tax” on 
international capital transactions (see Spahn, 1995) has revived as a popular 
idea in the aftermath of the crisis (Hanke et al, 2010). 
In sum, global imbalances and the motives behind them are closely related 
to the fact that, contrary to what would be expected, capital is not flowing 
from North to South, but rather in the opposite direction. The largest 
developed economy (U.S.) is a net borrower, where some emerging markets 
that could guarantee high return to foreign investment are in fact international 
creditors. Policy choices by certain developing nations (accumulation of savings 
and reserves for precautionary reasons, the alleged purposeful undervaluation 
of the Chinese currency to gain export competitiveness) are unlikely to be the 
sole explanatory factor behind these large imbalances and the distorted trends 
of capital flows. Thus, there is a need to complement neoclassical models by 
looking other sets of factors that may be preventing global capital flows to fuel 
the engine of developing nations. 
The global financial crisis of 2008 was partly provoked by the existence of 
these imbalances, and changed numerous preconceptions about policy making: 
macro-prudential regulation and capital controls are no longer excluded from 
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the range of suitable policies, as they may help mitigating volatility in the 
context of economies that are increasingly integrated in the era of globalization. 
Going forward, one of the main challenges lies in the need to reform some 
aspects of the international monetary system in order to eliminate perverse 
incentives forming asset bubbles and speculative runs (such as those witnessed 
in the U.S., Spain or Ireland prior to 2008), which may have limiting flows to 
developing nations (Nissanke and Stein, 2003). Emerging markets may need to 
be provided with some kind of safety net that allows them to stop accumulating 
currency reserves, as well as to better attract stable productive financing.
1.4. The composition of international capital flows. Why is FDI 
preferred? 
We have so far referred mainly to the international “circulation” of capital 
flows, but it is important also to look at their composition, as there is an on-
going debate regarding which kinds of capital flows are more beneficial for 
economic development. 
Firstly, it is worth noting that FDI is defined as those investments made 
by foreigners that reach at least 10% of the total social capital of a certain 
company; this includes not only Greenfield investments (e.g. establishment of 
new factories), but also merges and acquisitions. Below that 10% threshold, 
equity investments are categorised as portfolio equity. While initially thought to 
be relatively unstable short term investments, as opposed to FDI, there is an 
increasing number of papers that consider portfolio equity and FDI of similar 
nature (Hattari and Rajan, 2011).  
Among capital flows, foreign direct investment is considered to be a source of 
long term capital that reinforces economic stability and development. From a 
static point of view, the traditional trade theory approach predicts increases in 
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the marginal product of labour from the introduction of foreign capital, derived 
from knowledge spillovers and learning by doing processes. Additionally, the 
theory of industrial organisation considers that FDI may bring positive dynamic 
externalities such as backward and forward linkages, demonstration effects 
and improved human capital that will ultimately contribute to industrial 
development and economic growth (Venables, 2001; Markusen and Venables, 
1999). On the other hand, however, multinational enterprises may crowd-out 
domestic companies and lead to industrial restructuring and unemployment6.
In turn, portfolio debt f lows, which include portfolio bond f lows and 
commercial bank loans, are supposed to be short termed, instable and pro-
cyclical, accentuating in some cases macroeconomic volatility in developing 
countries. The portfolio choice (or “diversification finance”) concept can be 
understood as a mix of investment positions in several assets (stocks, bonds, 
options, futures), taken in order to shed risk. In this process, risk perception 
and expectations are very influential, and the pro-cyclical nature of portfolio 
flows may result in herd behaviour that leads to capital flight and “sudden stops” 
(see Calvo, 1998). 
Authors such as McKinnon and Pill (1998) describe how over-borrowing 
could follow financial liberalization should financial institutions not be 
adequately monitored and safeguards and provisions established. These kind 
of theoretical models were initially used to explain certain banking crises 
linked to capital flight in developing nations, such as that of Mexico in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. However, it can be argued that little was learned from 
past mistakes, as the real asset bubbles that burst in the United States, Spain 
or Ireland at the onset of the current global economic slowdown were also 
the product of private overborrowing. In these cases a moral hazard problem 
(see Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999) appears at two levels: a) inadequate 
management in domestic financial institutions generates unsustainable debt 
that is, however, implicitly guaranteed by the nation (as has been the case of 
6.
For a comprehensive 
presentation of the 
theoretical benefits 
and costs derived from 
FDI see MacDougall 
(1960), Caves (1974) and 
Dunning (1998).
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Bankia and other Cajas de Ahorros in Spain); and b) unsustainable sovereign debt 
leads to rescues by international financial institutions and supranational bodies 
such as the European Union (Greece, Portugal). 
For these reasons, developing nations cannot solely rely on short termed 
capital flows to achieve sustainable growth. Recent evidence seems to point 
to the fact that developing economies with a higher exposure to portfolio 
investments and foreign loans suffered a more severe liquidity crunch than 
those more exposed to FDI (Tong and Wei, 2011).
In the early 1980s both emerging markets and developing economies 
presented a composition of capital f lows very similar to that of advanced 
economies, with debt flows accounting for 83% of the total inflows. Some of 
these economies, which relatively underdeveloped financial markets and recent 
financial liberalization, suffered sudden stops and capital flows reversals. Some 
have argued that financial integration has made developing economies more 
vulnerable to external shocks (Stiglitz, 2000; Sighn, 2002; Demir, 2004).
 In turn, at the beginning of the new century, the weight of debt in emerging 
markets was of only 40%, contrasted to 48% of FDI inflows and 12% of portfolio 
equity. Other developing economies were also receiving an increasingly larger 
proportion of inflows in the form of FDI (Kose et al, 2006). Theoretically, this 
would be a good sign, given that FDI is alleged to be beneficial for growth, even 
if evidence remains inconclusive (Magnus and Kokko, 1997). 
In sum, not all kinds of capital flows may equally contribute to development. 
Certain kinds of f lows, such as portfolio bonds, often follow temporary 
“diversification” purposes instead of longer term “developmental” objectives. 
In the words of Wolf (2005), <<[t]he failure to create stable net f lows of 
development finance from the rich world to the poor one is arguably the greatest failure of 
the current wave of financial globalisation>>. 
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1.5. The race to attract foreign direct investment
 
To sum up, contrary to what neoclassical economics would predict, the 
majority of international capital flows are not being directed to developing 
economies (with theoretically higher rates of return). The international crisis 
starting in 2008 is partly explained by the existence of large global imbalances 
leading to bubbles in real estate and financial assets in developed economies 
(U.S., Spain, Ireland) that resulted in distorted capital flows patterns, which 
may have curtailed inflows received by developing economies.  Even when 
flows to emerging economies have increased substantially in the aftermath of 
the crisis, developed nations continue holding the share of the lion in capital 
flows, whereas low income countries struggle to attract foreign investors. 
Developing nations may want to continue pursuing international capital 
flow attraction, but not at any cost. One of the lessons emerging from the 
literature is that capital account liberalization, if not accompanied by other 
measures, does not necessarily result in deeper and more efficient domestic 
financial institutions, much larger attraction of international capital flows, and 
faster economic growth (Prasad and Rajan, 2008). A second finding is that 
there is evidence that capital flow composition matters: attention has to be 
paid to the nature of capital flows that are arriving. Whereas Foreign Direct 
Investment is widely regarded as a type of flows that encompass a series of 
positive externalities (knowledge spillovers, backward and forward linkages), 
and contribute to economic development due to its long term nature, on the 
other hand short term portfolio equity and, especially, short termed debt flows, 
may enlarge macroeconomic instability, provoking in some cases sudden stops 
(Hattari and Rajan, 2011). In this context,  and contrary to some traditional 
views, the more recent literature has argued that temporary capital controls 
and administrative measures (capital ratios, loan to value ratios) should not be 
ruled out, at least as a complement to responsible macroeconomic management 
in times of high financial volatility (IMF, 2012:19; Farhi and Werning, 2013; 
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Claessens et al, 2013; Jeanne, 2013). 
In conclusion, the current view is that the nature of financial integration 
may be more important that the degree of financial openness in achieving 
sustained economic growth (Aizenman and Pinto, 2011).  Even if evidence is not 
conclusive, maintaining sustained FDI inflows with long termed developmental 
purposes is believed to be more important to achieve economic progress than 
attracting short term portfolio flows with diversification purposes.
Given these differences in composition, developing nations, especially 
since the late nineties, have put the emphasis in the attraction of foreign direct 
investment. In many cases, they are competing among themselves in which 
could be a race to the bottom in labour standards (Brown, 2001; Baldwin, 2003; 
Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004; Singh and Zammit, 2004; Chau and Kanbur, 
2006; Olney, 2013), privileges granted to foreign companies establishing in free 
trade zones, tax exemptions, and environmental standards. At the same time, 
investment climate seems also to matter for FDI attraction (Kinda, 2010), and 
countries have initiated a race to the top in improving the business environment. 
Many economies also enhance intellectual property rights protection (Awokuse 
and Yin, 2010), investor protection, or trade preferences (Bagwell and Straiger, 
1999), with the expectation of attracting larger FDI inflows.
In this context, developing nations with similar characteristics and similar 
relative distance to core economies may be seen as alternative locations by 
potential foreign investors (Dunning, 1998), and for that reason they try 
to increase their appeal to them. However, not all abovementioned policy 
tools may be equally important in attracting FDI. In addition, other series of 
macroeconomic and institutional factors are likely to have a bearing on FDI. 
The papers included in this volume have the common aim to identify which 
are the factors that are influencing FDI flows the most. This way, we intend to 
(i) help policy makers in developing nations making the most efficient choices 
when competing for FDI, (ii) equally enhance the decision making process 
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by international investors, and (iii) contribute to the stream of literature on 
the determinants of FDI by bringing specific lessons from a set of developing 
economies. 
As we discuss in detail in the following chapters, there is some evidence 
that developing economies may first need to ensure certain macroeconomic 
and institutional stability to attract significant foreign direct investment 
flows. Not all institutions matter: there seems to be a need for government 
stability and a good legal framework to protect foreign investment (and limit 
expropriation), whereas the quality of bureaucracy and corruption levels do 
not seem to be significant determinants of FDI. There is some evidence that 
rule of law and the fairness of the court system do influence to some extent 
direct investment decisions. Within macroeconomic variables, short term debt, 
import and export levels and current account balance seem to significantly 
influence inflows, whereas inflation or growth in per capita income appear as 
insignificant. Finally, we argue that regional integration helps enhancing FDI 
attraction (see Medvedev, 2012), although the effectiveness will depend on the 
clauses included in the trade agreement, and the nature of the process. 
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DO CHANGES IN THE RULES OF THE 
GAME AFFECT FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA?
A LOOK AT THE MACROECONOMIC, INSTITUTIONAL AND 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION DETERMINANTS OF FDI
2.1. Introduction
Over the past two decades, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Latin 
America have increased significantly, causing the regional stock of FDI in the 
region to currently be approximately 30% of GDP, similar to that of East Asia, 
compared with just 5% of GDP at the beginning of the 1980s (one-third of 
that observed in East Asia). However, not all Latin American countries have 
been equally successful in appealing to foreign investors (see Table 2.7-1 in 
Appendix A. Stylized facts on global and regional FDI flows). The aim of this paper 
is to identify the determinants of FDI flows to Latin America in the period 
from 1990 to 2010, to understand which factors may have led to success and 
which policy measures could be enhanced to sustain the appeal of this region 
to foreign investors at a moment when the overall region still exhibits notable 
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economic dynamism. 
Contrary to previous papers on FDI in Latin America, we choose not to 
include the “lost decade” years, focusing instead on a more recent period of 
study. This article also contributes to the existing literature by going beyond 
the macro cross-country exercise, bringing “risk management” issues into the 
discussion (e.g., the institutional risk perceived by foreign investors, closely 
related to the political economy of the country) and trying to describe options 
for policy makers. Political economy-related determinants are also important 
because the government’s stability implies its ability to remain in office. 
However, governmental stability seems to be a necessary but not sufficient 
condition because attracting FDI requires substantial institutional changes. 
The main research questions addressed by this article are (i) to what extent 
better macroeconomic management has helped certain countries attract more 
FDI, (ii) what the role of improved and more transparent institutions has been 
and (iii) to what extent the DR CAFTA agreement may have contributed to 
the sharp increase in FDI inflows observed in Central America. It is worth 
mentioning that these hypotheses do not come from a single theoretical 
framework but rather represent a compilation of the dimensions that can be 
analyzed with macro-level data. It is also worth acknowledging that due to data 
limitations for Latin American countries, we do not use a bilateral FDI flow 
matrix, and for this reason, a gravity-model approach is not adopted.  
The results of the econometric analysis point to the previous stock of FDI, 
trade openness, low short-term debt levels, balance of payments deficits and 
governmental stability as the main (robust) determinants of foreign capital 
flowing to Latin America from 1990 to 2010. Contrary to expectations, the DR 
CAFTA agreement does not seem to have significantly enhanced FDI inflows to 
signing countries. There is also some evidence that foreign entrepreneurs show 
a greater propensity to invest in countries with sound legal frameworks and a 
low risk of expropriation. This evidence may also help explain why economies 
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that have improved their institutions over the last decade (e.g., Chile, Costa 
Rica and Peru, which were clearly grouped by cluster analysis techniques) are 
currently receiving larger FDI flows. In contrast, Argentina, Ecuador and 
Venezuela have made more frequent changes to the rules of the game, and today, 
these countries are receiving foreign inflows well below their potential because 
investors perceive greater risk.  
Other institutional variables considered here do not seem to be significant 
determinants of FDI. However, it is worth noting that under uncertainty (high 
exchange rate variability, institutional instability), potential investors may delay 
their entry into certain markets, or foreign subsidiaries already established in 
economies suffering from uncertainty may wait prior to making disinvestment 
decisions. These behaviors would lead to non-linearities in the relationship 
between FDI inf lows and their determinants. We discuss the literature 
addressing hysteresis effects under the effects of uncertainty in more detail in 
section 2.2.3 (see Dixit, 1989; Cross, 1994; Belke and Goecke, 2005; Belke, 
Goecke and Hebler, 2005). 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: section 2.2 reviews existing 
literature on the determinants of FDI; section 2.3 presents the empirical tests 
used in this work; section 2.4 draws policy implications for policy makers in 
Latin America; section 2.5 presents the conclusions.
2.2. The determinants of FDI: Theory and evidence
There are large strands of literature that try to establish what the 
determinants of FDI are. In this section, we brief ly summarize the main 
theoretical approaches used in an effort to identify the most influential variables 
for our analysis: (i) the neoclassical framework, (ii) Dunning s´ ownership, 
location and internalization advantage (OLI) framework, (iii) horizontal and 
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vertical FDI models and (iv) risk diversification and institutional views. We also 
discuss the findings of the literature empirically assessing this determinants in 
Latin America, as well as decision-making under uncertainty.
2.2.1. Theoretical approaches to the determinants of FDI
(i) Neoclassical economic theory holds that under perfect factor 
mobility, capital would flow from relatively rich countries to relatively poor 
countries. The Law of Diminishing Returns to Capital implies that new 
investment should take place in countries with relatively low capital-to-labor 
ratios. Similarly, the H-O model (Ohlin, 1933) argues that a country will 
export the commodity that intensively uses its relatively abundant production 
factor.  
This approach provides a preliminary intuition of the determinants of 
FDI, suggesting the importance of returns to capital and differences in factor 
endowments across economies. However, it is worth mentioning that these 
models do not perceive market imperfections and assume zero transaction 
costs. As observed by Lucas (1990), in reality, capital flows follow a “North-
North” pattern rather than a “North-South” pattern. Despite increased 
international flows in recent years, international capital mobility is far from 
perfect. In reality, the existence of economies of scale, backward and forward 
linkages, systemic distortions and dissimilar regulations across countries are 
some of the reasons why neoclassical trade theory fails to predict the patterns 
of global capital movements. 
(ii) From a microeconomic perspective, the OLI framework, initially 
formulated by Dunning (1973; 1980), examines the motivations of trans-
national companies to invest abroad rather than simply exporting their products. 
Dunning distinguishes between three groups of advantages: ownership 
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advantages refer to the existence of firm-specific assets and knowledge-
based assets such as patents, differentiated management formulas, marketing 
organizations and others that provide multi-national companies with advantages 
over local companies in foreign markets. Second, locational advantages such 
as different factor endowments, benefits from positive externalities or the 
avoidance of transportation costs or trade barriers can be obtained by investing 
abroad (see Dunning, 2001). Finally, internalization advantages are derived 
from the theory of the firm in institutional economics (see Coase, 1960; 
Williamson, 1989); instead of exporting or licensing, a company can save 
transaction costs and minimize the risk of imitation or suffering reputational 
losses by locating directly in the target market. According to this framework, 
knowledge-intense industries are expected to represent a larger share of 
international companies and foreign-owned capital. A common criticism of the 
OLI paradigm is that although it helps to explain the distinguishing features 
of multinational companies, it fails to account for some FDI trends such as the 
predominant North-North pattern or the observed intra-industry investment 
(Buch et al, 2001).
Dunning (1980) tested his own hypotheses using U.S. firm-level data from 
the 1970s, concluding that relative market size (location), wages (location), net 
income per sales (location) and the skilled employment ratio (ownership) had 
significant influences on the location of multinational enterprises. Following 
Dunning, rich empirical literature has tested the OLI framework in a variety 
of contexts, overall finding that FDI is influenced by factors such as ownership 
advantages, market size and specific market features, transportation costs, legal 
investment framework, infrastructure and property rights (see Faeth, 2009, for 
a review of this portion of the literature). 
(iii) The horizontal-vertical approach emerged in the 1980s in a New 
Trade Theory setting and joins part of the OLI framework with knowledge 
and country characteristics (Helpman, 1984; Markusen, 1984; Krugman and 
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Venables, 1995). This approach distinguishes between three different reasons 
for foreign capital to flow into an economy:
•	 Resource-seeking activities. In most cases, a multinational corporation 
establishes a plant in a developing country to obtain raw materials. A well-
known example is that of American and European companies investing in Latin 
America during the 1990s in the midst of economic liberalization processes. 
Although the host economy may benefit from the new job opportunities and 
industrial development related to the multinational’s activities (virtuous cycle), 
problems may arise, such as resource exhaustion or excessive dependence on 
commodity trade and “re-primarization” (leading to a vicious cycle such as the 
Dutch disease). To what extent the host country will benefit from foreign 
investment depends on the terms of the concessionary agreement signed with 
the multinational and the ability of local institutions to manage the income. 
Recent events such as the re-nationalization of YPF in Argentina illustrate the 
sensitivity toward allowing foreign investment in strategic resources. At the 
same time, nationalization also constitutes a negative signal to investors in 
other sectors. 
•	 Gain	access	to	local	markets	(horizontal	FDI).	As	we	have	observed,	
corporations tend to invest in countries where there is a large demand to serve 
and transportation costs from the company’s home maker are burdensome. 
Horizontal FDI is also used to avoid high tariffs or other import restrictions. 
Therefore, FDI is said to be a substitute for international trade, and it might 
increase competition for local industries. This type of FDI is usually called 
tariff-jumping FDI or domestic-consumption-oriented FDI.
•	 Enjoy	cheaper	 factor	prices	 (vertical	FDI).	Corporations	establish	
plants for labor-intensive processes in economies where wages are low and 
there is a sufficient transportation connection with developed nations. This 
type of FDI is normally export-oriented and can lead to the aforementioned 
backward and forward linkages, in some cases helping the local economy to 
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enter a virtuous cycle. 
Initially, general equilibrium models considering monopolistic competition 
were used to separately explain the behavior of vertical (Helpman, 1984) and 
horizontal FDI (Markusen, 1984). Markusen and Maskus (2001) developed a 
Knowledge-Capital model that combined both the vertical and horizontal models, 
allowing for multiple production facilities and separating cross-support 
centralized services from disperse production in some cases. According to 
this paradigm, horizontal multinationals tend to be established when the two 
countries are similar in size and total demand is high (large market). Conversely, 
vertical multinationals will appear when economies are dissimilar in size and 
endowments. In the same fashion, Shatz and Venables (2000) argue that FDI in 
rich economies is mainly horizontal, whereas in poor economies it tends to be 
vertical. Venables (2003) considers that horizontal FDI is likely to be a substitute 
for trade because firms use FDI instead of imports to supply the market. This 
form of FDI will probably result in competition with local industries. In 
contrast, vertical FDI is a complement to trade and may even create trade flows. 
This form of FDI is export-oriented so that it does not normally compete with 
local industries. These dissimilar characteristics are relevant because they 
imply that the impact of regional integration will vary depending on the type 
and motivations of FDI. Currently, it is generally accepted that FDI and trade 
are complements rather than substitutes, as has been demonstrated in most 
empirical tests (Dunning 1997a, 1997b). 
In the context of proliferating free-trade agreements (Baldwin, 2006), 
numerous authors have tried to theoretically link the horizontal-vertical 
approach with papers discussing the effects of regional integration on FDI (see 
Velde and Bezemer, 2006; Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997a; Stein et al., 2003). 
Empirical evidence seems to support the contention that enhanced regional 
integration increases inward FDI. However, existing studies are not always 
able to determine the causes of dissimilar performance across regions/treaties 
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(Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997b; Altomonte, 2007). Additionally, as Dee and 
Gali (2005) highlight, few studies in the literature have addressed the effects of 
preferential non-trade provisions included in these agreements. These caveats 
notwithstanding, this paper uses a dummy variable (following Wolf, 2002; 
Sayek, 2007) to capture the relevance of the DR CAFTA agreements in the 
attraction of FDI to Central America to assess whether this may have been a 
significant determinant of FDI for the countries involved in the agreement.
(iv) Finally, it is worth mentioning the emergence of a recent risk 
diversification hypothesis that aims to complement established theories 
(based on transaction costs and the knowledge capital model). According to 
this approach, vertical FDI is more common than Markusen (1984) suggested, 
and companies often open different production facilities and export platforms 
or even use outsourcing to diversify risks, including country-specific, political 
and economic risks (Grossman and Helpman, 2003).
Additionally, drawing from new institutional economics (Rodrik et al., 
2004), and given that FDI attraction is often presented as a “beauty contest” or 
even a “race to the bottom”, policy variables are often included as determinants 
of FDI because the host government can significantly influence investment 
decisions by altering taxation policies, industrial policies, the repatriation of 
dividends and other aspects of the legal and regulatory framework (see, for 
instance, Busse and Hefeker, 2007). 
In conclusion, drawing on these different theories, we argue that it is possible 
to distinguish at least four groups of variables influencing FDI: locational 
advantages (endowments, externalities, transportation costs, trade barriers, 
cultural similarities, language), ownership advantages (presence of strategic 
assets, patents), macroeconomic variables (GDP per capita, GDP growth, 
inflation, wage cost, interest rates, exchange rates, etc.) and institutional and 
policy variables (corporate tax rates, tax concessions, political risk, corruption, 
property rights or degree of financial liberalization).
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2.2.2. FDI determinants in Latin America: Empirical evidence
To the best of our knowledge, few papers have studied the determinants of 
FDI in Latin America at the macro level. One reason for this may be related to 
data limitations (e.g., the non-existence of a comprehensive bilateral matrix of 
FDI flows in the region). In this section, we briefly summarize the conclusions 
of the existing literature. 
Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2002) studied the inf luence of economic 
freedom, defined as the extent to which economic activities can be developed 
without interference from the government, on FDI. Using panel data for 18 
Latin American countries between 1970 and 1996, the authors conclude that 
economic freedom and GDP (market size) are positively correlated with FDI, 
whereas inflation and debt service have negative effects on foreign investment. 
Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006) analyze how various economic reforms have 
influenced FDI in 15 Latin American countries over the period from 1980 to 
1996, also controlling for macroeconomic and institutional variables. These 
authors conclude that Latin American governments that introduce privatization, 
capital account liberalization or tax reforms are not more likely to attract FDI. 
Only trade liberalization seems to have a positive effect on FDI attraction. 
On the other hand, the quality of institutions matters: countries presenting 
lower expropriation risks are significantly more likely to obtain higher FDI 
inflows. On the macro side, GDP per capita and government consumption 
variables exhibit significant but negative coefficients, whereas GDP growth is 
insignificant. Some of the explanations posed by the authors to account for the 
lack of impact of structural reforms on FDI attraction in the region include the 
relatively small size of privatization, the slow pace of reforms and the intuition 
that capital account liberalization has a greater inf luence on short-term 
portfolio flows. These results could be complemented with the analysis of more 
recent data (from 1997 onwards) to account for the delayed effects of reforms 
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or more recent trends in FDI determinants. 
Trevino et al (2002) assess the influence of macroeconomic determinants 
and market reform in seven Latin American countries between 1988 and 1992. 
Using root tests and co-integration analysis to control and correct for non-
stationary data, they find that rapid GDP growth, large current account deficits 
and privatization reforms positively affect FDI. They consider that potential 
investors may consider current account deficits as representing an opportunity 
to obtain better negotiating terms because this indicates that the country is 
in need of attracting capital inflows. In contrast, capital market liberalization 
reforms are found to have an insignificant effect on FDI; inflation and exchange 
rate volatility are also insignificant. A potential shortcoming of this study is 
that results may only reflect the determinants of FDI in LAC during the short 
data span considered (annual observations for 1988-1992). It is well known 
that this period featured large current account deficits in LAC countries, even 
among oil-exporting countries, inflation and exchange rate volatility were 
common in the region, and most of these countries were still in the process of 
liberalizing capital accounts. In this study, we try to offer more comprehensive 
conclusions based on a longer period and a larger group of countries. 
In a similar fashion, Montero (2008) observes 15 Latin American countries 
between 1985 and 2003, concluding that current account deficits have a 
positive and statistically significant impact on FDI attraction. On the other 
hand, financial reform, tax reform, privatization and, in this case, trade 
liberalization are found to have insignificant effects on foreign investors. 
Overall, these articles highlight the lack of significant effects of privatization, 
capital account liberalization, tax reforms and other restructuring policies on 
FDI. Institutional variables are significant in some cases, and current account 
deficits seem to be significant determinants of foreign investment inflows. 
This article contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, a 
more recent dataset that includes the last decade, during which Latin America 
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experienced a sharp improvement in FDI inflows, is used. Second, FDI data 
are obtained from the UNCTAD database, which includes both inflows and 
stock tables; this provides some advantages over studies lagging the dependent 
variable (FDI inflows), as FDI stock can be used as a proxy for the “initial 
level”. Third, we try to capture the effects of regional integration (DR CAFTA 
agreement) on FDI. 
2.2.3. Investment decisions under uncertainty
Finally, in this section, we review the literature discussing hysteresis effects 
on decisions under uncertainty because this has implications for the debate on 
the response of FDI to variations in exchange rates and the institutional setting 
in destination countries. 
Departing from a microeconomic foundation, Belke and Gokce (2005) 
elaborate an aggregated model that describes how the relationship between 
employment and its driving forces is affected by exchange rate volatility. 
Within an “inaction band”, exporters to a certain market may be less prone 
to leave the market and postpone the decision to fire workers when the local 
currency is depreciating (and benefits from selling abroad are declining). When 
depreciation is steep and goes beyond the band, a “spurt” occurs, a strong 
reaction resulting in a large number of exporting firms exiting the market and 
firing their workers. A similar inaction band would apply to potential exporters 
considering beginning to sell to a destination market (and hiring workers to do 
so) because these exporters will wait for the destination currency to appreciate 
to a certain level. In sum, these authors show how sunk costs generate hysteresis 
effects, which are amplified by uncertainty. At the core of the model presented 
by Belke and Gokce is a pioneering paper by Dixit (1989) that draws some 
analogies between real investment and financial investment decisions, using the 
concrete concepts of “call” and “put” options. In the field of labor economics, 
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Pissarides (2001) shows how suitable employment protection legislation can 
help to mitigate hysteresis effects.  
What are the potential implications of these findings from the point of 
view of determinants of FDI? FDI is characterized by large sunk costs and the 
long-term nature of decisions, which are often “irreversible”, as indicated by 
Dixit (1995). These conditions could amplify hysteresis because a ‘weaker’ 
relationship (i.e., “band of inaction”) would exist between FDI and its 
determinants due to exchange rate volatility and institutional uncertainty. Thus, 
intervals of weak response to reversals of the forcing variable (“play areas”) 
would emerge on the macro level, and ‘spurts’ in new FDI may occur after an 
initially weak response leading, for example, to currency depreciation in the 
destination market. Cross (1994) suggests that only the non-dominant extreme 
values of influential variables are used in investment decisions, resulting in 
the expectation of large adjustments when those values are surpassed, which 
has implications for time-series analysis. Thus, the relationship between FDI 
and exchange rate variability (as well as other variables related to institutional 
uncertainty) could be plagued with non-linearities.
At the same time, Belke and Gokce (2005) acknowledge the limitations of 
their partial equilibrium model because it assumes a lack of mobility of factors 
between the production of exports and the production of the local market and 
other real options for the entrepreneur that would reduce the importance of the 
non-linear persistent exchange rate effects. We would add to this the possibility 
that the exporter or the investor will acquire exchange rate hedge mechanisms 
or use forwards to mitigate exchange rate risks, which could also help to reduce 
hysteresis. Furthermore, a recent strand of the MNE literature (Cui and Jiang, 
2009; Dikova and van Witteloostuijn, 2007) states that in most cases, foreign 
direct investment by multinationals is a response to strategic decisions (asset 
seeking, market access, positioning in global value chains, etc.), which is likely 
to decrease the relevance of the hysteresis induced by exchange rate variability. 
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For example, investing in a destination economy before a direct competitor 
reaches the same market may have more weight on the investment decision than 
prospects or expectations of depreciation in the destination currency. 
Overall, it is difficult to determine a priori whether the hysteresis or 
the mitigation effects will dominate the relationships between FDI inflows, 
exchange rate variability and other institutional variables. For the purposes 
of this paper, and given the chosen approach and data limitations, we opt to 
conduct our analysis at a macro level, focusing on determining whether non-
linearities exist in the relationship between the institutional and FDI inflows 
variables of our dataset. Nonetheless, it would be worthwhile to further explore 
and test the microeconomic foundations of FDI decisions under uncertainty in 
future research.  
2.3. An empirical model to estimate drivers of foreign direct 
investment in Latin America
2.3.1. Variables, data and methodology
As discussed at the beginning of the paper, our objective is to identify the 
main determinants of FDI inflows to Latin America from 1990 to 2010. To do 
so, we do not embrace a single theoretical approach but rather proceed to test a 
series of hypotheses that have been drawn from the literature review presented 
in the previous section. 
First, Neoclassical theories argue that countries with lower capital 
endowments (developing economies) will enjoy higher returns to capital, thus 
making them more attractive to investors. Lucas (1990) showed that this 
hypothesis is not often met in reality. Nevertheless, the stock of foreign direct 
investment as a share of GDP and/or the stock of total investment as a share 
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of GDP is often considered in the empirical literature as a proxy of whether 
countries with higher capital endowments attract more FDI (see Kemegue and 
Mohan, 2009). In this case we include interest rates as a proxy for returns to 
capital. 
Secondly, Dunning s´ eclectic framework presents a series of ownership, 
location and internalization advantages that have usually been tested using 
firm-level data. At the macro aggregated level, some aspects of the location 
dimension noted by Dunning (1973;1980) (market size, labor costs and 
favorable tax treatment) can still be tested empirically. In our case, we include 
the market size (GDP per capita) and a proxy for human capital (secondary 
completion rates) to determine to what extent they significantly influence the 
location decision. Large markets are expected to attract market-oriented FDI. 
Counting with highly qualified human capital would be a decisive factor for 
foreign companies aiming to produce high value-added products, whereas it 
could be insignificant for the decisions of companies searching for cheap labor.
Third, the horizontal-vertical FDI approach contains some dimensions 
that cannot be tested without a bilateral FDI flow matrix, which is absent in 
the cases of Central and South America. However, we can still try to prove 
the proximity-concentration hypothesis, which argues that market size and 
trade barriers increase foreign direct investment (expected positive correlation 
between tariffs and FDI). On the other hand, vertical and resource-seeking 
FDI will be attracted by cheaper factor costs (the proxy for capital could be 
interest rates), better infrastructures (approximated by mobile phone lines and 
electricity distribution losses) and innovation (scientific research articles per thousand), 
which would theoretically help to attract high value-added FDI. 
Fourth, risk diversification and institutional theories can be partially 
tested by considering the impact of control of corruption (+), rule of law (+), 
government stability (+), bureaucracy quality (+), investment profile (+) and exchange 
rate stability (+) on FDI inflows. The signs in parentheses above reflect the 
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expected signs of those variables in their interactions with FDI flows. We 
draw from the control of corruption index prepared by the PRS Risk Group in its 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, see Table 2.8-5 in Appendix B for 
complete variable definitions and data sources). This guide takes into account 
not only actual corruption (difficult to measure) but also <<potential corruption 
in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘ favor-for-favors’, secret 
party funding and suspiciously close ties between politics and business>>. Thus, the 
expected sign of the control of corruption coefficient is positive because less 
corruption would help to attract foreign investors (“grabbing hand” hypothesis, 
see Egger and Winner, 2006). A different theory states that corruption is not 
an impediment to FDI in developing countries (“helping hand” hypothesis); 
if this were true, the expected sign would be negative. Rule of law is one of 
the dimensions often quoted in the New Institutional Economics literature 
as contributing positively to ameliorate the investment climate; in this case, 
we also refer to the law and order ICRG index, a compound of two factors: an 
assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system and an assessment 
of the popular observance of law. We also consider the ICRG government 
stability variable, which is an assessment of both the government’s ability to 
carry out its declared program and its ability to stay in office. This variable 
consists of a scale from 1 to 12 (best) constructed from three subcomponents: 
government unity, legislative strength and popular support. Political instability 
is considered to be a deterrent to investment (Aisen and Veiga, 2013). The 
ICRG quality of bureaucracy variable is measured on a scale from 1 to 6; a high 
quality of bureaucracy has been reported to enhance the effectiveness of policy 
implementation, and it is expected to positively interact with FDI because most 
countries are introducing measures to attract investment. Investment profile 
measures the risk of expropriation, obstacles to profit repatriation, payment 
delays and risks posed to contract viability; a higher rating indicates a lower 
risk for investors. The inclusion of this variable is especially relevant in the case 
of Nicaragua, where past conflicts over land expropriation, property rights 
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and ownership have been severe. Finally, the ICRG exchange rate stability index 
takes the variability of exchange rate evolution over five years into account as 
well as current risk points, presenting results on a scale from 1 to 10, with 
higher values indicating more stability. FDI has been reported to be sensitive 
to exchange rate variations, especially in a region such as Latin America, 
where some countries have traditionally suffered from exchange rate volatility, 
leading to currency crises in some cases in the 1980s and 1990s. According to 
Belke and Gros (2002, 2003), in contrast to those in EU countries, exchange 
rates in emerging markets such as Argentina, Brazil or Uruguay usually reflect 
confidence in the institutional setting and perceived sovereign risk. In these 
countries, simultaneous movements in exchange rates (e.g., depreciation) and 
interest rates (increase) are observed. According to these authors, exchange 
rate levels and volatility will be considered by entrepreneurs when making 
decisions encompassing large sunk costs, such as hiring or investment. In 
principle, international investors would prefer less volatile environments. 
At the same time, it is worth mentioning that under uncertainty leading to 
hysteresis in investment and disinvestment decisions, the relationships between 
institutional variables and FDI may be ambiguous, presenting inconsistent 
signs or appearing to be statistically insignificant because there are delays in 
responses to change (Belke and Goecke, 2005). In this sense, we will test for 
the existence of non-linearities. 
A series of macroeconomic variables that are expected to have an impact 
on investment is also included. Investors are likely to be discouraged from 
bringing resources to countries with records of high inflation (-). High levels 
of short-term debt to reserves indicating potential government liquidity problems 
and a risk of sovereign default would also be negatively correlated with FDI (-). 
The ratio of the current account balance to GDP (-) is expected to have a negative 
impact on FDI, meaning that deficits attract foreign investors, as has been 
argued by the literature on the determinants of FDI in Latin America (Montero, 
2008; Trevino et al, 2002). 
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Finally, regional integration is alleged to have a 1) positive effect on 
extra-region inward FDI and an 2) indeterminate effect on intra-region FDI, 
3) with a positive overall effect on FDI attraction in most cases. For Central 
America, we try to test 3) by regressing inward FDI flows against a dummy that 
is expected to capture DR CAFTA effects. 
Given that most of the variables included in the analysis are driven by 
stochastic trends, we perform tests for time series co-integration to ensure that 
the results are not distorted. We use the panel data co-integration test developed 
by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) in most cases and that of Im-Pesaran-Shin when 
the sub-panel is unbalanced. In the presence of cross-section dependencies, 
which may be probable in a relatively integrated area such as that analyzed here 
(Latin America), these tests would result in excessive rejection of the non-
stationarity null because there would be common sources of non-stationarity 
interdependences (see Gengenbach et al, 2010). To mitigate the effects of 
cross-section dependencies, as proposed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), we 
use a modified version of the tests that subtracts cross-sectional means. The 
test results show that both the dependent variable, FDI flows, and most of the 
macroeconomic and institutional variables are stationary. Only the stock of 
FDI, the GDP per capita, trade openness and the proxies for infrastructure and 
human capital present unit roots. To solve potential problems, we take the first 
difference of these variables, after which all variables become stationary (see 
Table 2.8-1 in Appendix B).
The dependent variable and estimation method are based on the UNCTAD 
FDI database because this database enables counting not only with FDI inflows 
but also with FDI stock, an accurate proxy of the level of previous foreign 
investment. In our original specification, we assume that the dependent 
variable, yearly FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP (yit), is related to a series 
of macroeconomic, infrastructural and institutional determinants (xit), as 
discussed at the beginning of this section, based on theory. We also consider 
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the presence of both non-stochastic and normal errors (vi, uit).  
(i) y
it
=β0+β1 xit+β2 γit+vi+uit 
Following Kemegue and Mohan (2009), our initial assumption is that 
our dependent variable is likely to be related to the stock of FDI to GDP in a 
country (yiy), rather than to the inflows of the previous year. The idea behind 
this approach is that investment decisions in a concrete year are related to 
the existing level of foreign investment in a country (for which the stock of 
FDI is a good proxy), as risk-averse investors may be more prone to invest in 
economies with a greater foreign presence. On the other hand, FDI inflows are 
more volatile and may not be related to the FDI inflows of the previous period: 
for instance, record FDI inflows observed in the Dominican Republic in 2012 
were mainly due to investment in gold mining and the acquisition of the largest 
brewery in the country by a Brazilian company; these investments are discrete 
and unlikely to be repeated but led to large inflows in 2013. For this reason, 
we estimate the following specification using Generalized Least Squares (GLS)
with random effects as well as fixed effects for panel data and use the Hausman 
test to decide between the two approaches.
2.3.2. Regression results
Table 2.3-1 presents regression results for 19 Latin American economies 
over the period 1990-20107. We have estimated our model under both 
fixed effects and random effects. Estimation under fixed effects is known 
to yield consistent results but a greater variance, whereas random-effects 
estimations are inconsistent and have a smaller variance. In most cases, fixed 
effects is the most appropriate choice, as demonstrated by the results of the 
Hausman test. The fixed-effects model is usually the preferred method among 
macroeconomists because it takes country-specific characteristics into account. 
7 
Selected economies 
are Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brasil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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8. 
 Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries. A critical 
assessment of this 
initiative is presented in 
Nissanke (2010). 
Another advantage to using fixed effects in these types of exercises is that the 
panel usually contains the economies of interest (in this case, 19 Latin American 
economies) rather than being randomly defined (Judson and Owen, 1999). 
First, we find that the coefficient for the existing FDI stock in the country 
is highly statistically significant and robust across the different specifications. 
This could point to some extent to the existence of “agglomeration economies”, 
meaning that FDI inflows could positively interact with existing investments, 
generating externalities, or it could simply mean that foreign investors are more 
inclined to invest in countries with greater “experience” with FDI (risk-aversion 
hypothesis). 
The initial level of income in the economy (a proxy for market size) and the 
number of mobile phone lines only seem to be significant determinants of FDI 
in specifications I and II. However, this effect disappears when institutional 
variables are included. One reason may be that institutional variables are highly 
correlated with the level of economic development (per capita GDP) and thus 
would capture the influence of the latter (see Montes and Medina, 2009). 
Contrary to expectations, GDP per capita growth, a proxy for market growth 
rate or the growth of the host economy, does not seem to have been a significant 
determinant of FDI inflows to Latin America over the last two decades. This 
finding is consistent with the results of Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006) for the 
period 1980-1996. 
Maintaining high levels of short-term public debt discourages foreign 
direct investment in Latin America. Thus, countries such as Nicaragua that 
had overwhelming debt burdens in the 1990s and needed international help 
to manage their debt under the HIPC initiative are likely to have received FDI 
inflows below their potential, at least during the last decade8. The coefficient 
for current account balance is negative, highly significant and robust among 
the different specifications. This implies that countries with larger external 
financing needs seem to appeal to long-term foreign investors, which is in 
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agreement with the existing literature on FDI in Latin America (Montero, 
2008; Trevino et al, 2002). 
Other macroeconomic variables such as inflation and nominal interest rates 
do not seem to have had a significant impact on foreign investment decisions 
in Latin America over the last two decades. The empirical literature on the 
determinants of FDI does not offer conclusive evidence on inflation: Stein et 
al. (2003) find a statistically significant and positive effect of inflation on FDI, 
whereas TeVelde and Benzemer (2006) or Sayek (2007) find an insignificant 
effect. Exchange rate volatility does not seem to be a significant deterrent for 
FDI either, although, as discussed in section 2.2.3, this may have to do with 
the mitigated or delayed response of investment decisions in the context of 
exchange rate uncertainty, something we cannot fully test in our model. 
A higher degree of trade openness, measured as total exports plus imports 
as a percentage of GDP, seems to have a positive and significant effect on 
attracting FDI; this result contradicts the original horizontal FDI flows theory 
but is in line with the empirical literature (Dunning 1997a, 1997b). On the 
other hand, however, the coefficient for the average tariff is insignificant9, 
which does not seem to confirm the “tariff-jumping FDI” hypothesis. The 
proxies for scientific innovation and infrastructure (electricity distribution 
losses) are found to be insignificant. 
9. 
For the average most 
favored nation tariff, 
we rely on incomplete 
data from the World 
Development Indicators 
starting in 1996. For this 
reason, the table does 
not present the results 
for this variable because 
a different period is 
considered. 
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Table 2.3-1. Regression results. Original specification. 
 I II III IV V
 Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
unctad fdi stock
0.0484*** 0.0396*** 0.0989*** 0.0378*** 0.0352***
(6.21) (5.45) (6.64) (5.25) (4.84)
gdp per capita 
0.00128*** 0.000710** 0.0005 0.00036 0.00035
(4.53) (2.65) (1.19) (1.27) (1.24)
trade openness
0.0136 0.0328*** 0.0287** 0.0352*** 0.0370***
(1.56) (3.92) (3.09) (4.15) (4.34)
gdp per capita growth
0.0335 0.0239 0.0372 0.0417 0.0433
(1.07) (0.84) (1.10) (1.45) (1.53)
inflation
-0.00013 -0.0001 -1E-04 0.0000699 9.6E-05
(-0.44) (-0.40) (-0.40) (0.26) (0.36)
interest nominal
-0.000135 -3E-05 -5E-05 -0.000136 -0.0002
(-0.58) (-0.14) (-0.24) (-0.63) (-0.73)   
mobile phones
-0.0163** -0.0132** -0.0108 -0.0051 -0.0030
(-3.02) (-2.67) (-1.32) (-0.96) (-0.54)   
secondary completion 
1.998 3.854 -4.991 -0.263 -2.814
(0.51) (1.08) (-0.98) (-0.07) (-0.73)   
short term debt to reserves
-0.00466***  -0.00309* -0.00314* -0.0027
(-3.45)  (-2.17) (-2.19) (-1.93)   
current account balance 
(%GDP)
-0.201***  -0.215*** -0.185*** -0.158***
(-7.49)  (-6.85) (-6.90) (-5.74)   
scientific articles per 1000
  19.91                 
  -0.93                 
electricity losses (%)
  -0.004                 
  (-0.10)                 
bureaucracy quality
   0.142 -0.148
   (0.61) (-0.60)   
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Finally, specifications IV and V introduce institutional variables. Government 
continuity and its capacity to implement programs and reforms appears here as 
a highly significant and positive determinant of FDI. Foreign companies are 
also highly interested in avoiding countries with higher expropriation risks, 
as reflected by the positive and significant coefficient of the investment profile 
variable. The law and order variable, accounting for the impartiality of the legal 
system and the effective enforcement of the law, is barely significant at the 10% 
 I II III IV V
 Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
control of corruption
   -0.0493 -0.0104
   (-0.28) (-0.06)   
government stability
   0.287*** 0.249***
   (4.15) (3.58)
law order 
   0.289 0.313
   (1.69) (1.85)
risk for exchange rate stability 
   -0.0372 -0.0831
   (-0.55) (-1.22)   
DR CAFTA dummy
    0.164
    (0.32)
investment profile
    0.271***
    (3.46)
constant
-3.283** -2.916** -2.419 -4.321*** -4.949***
(-2.90) (-2.74) (-1.53) (-3.64) (-4.14)   
N 342 342 290 342 342 
Overall R-square 0.0608 0.3645 0.3598 0.4328 0.4144
Hausman p-value 0.00 0.0039 0.0217 0.00 0.00 
Source: Author's calculations. *, **, and *** refers to the statistical significance of the coefficient at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of confidence. The top value for each variable is the beta coefficient, 
and the bottom value in parenthesis refers to the t-test result.
→
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level of confidence; foreign entrepreneurs investing in Latin America do take 
the quality of the legal systems in the various countries into account, but this is 
not the main factor motivating their decision. The quality of bureaucracy and 
control of corruption have insignificant effects in the different specifications.
 In summary, empirical results indicate that the stock of FDI, trade openness, 
low short-term debt levels, balance of payment deficits and government 
stability are the main determinants of foreign capital flowing to Latin America 
over the period from 1990 to 2010. There is also some evidence that foreign 
entrepreneurs exhibit a greater propensity to invest in countries with sound 
legal frameworks and low expropriation risks, a finding that is in line with 
other analyses carried out at both the macroeconomic and firm levels for Latin 
American countries (Staats and Biglaiser, 2012). 
Contrary to expectations, the DR CAFTA agreement does not seem to 
have significantly increased FDI inflows to signing countries. One possible 
explanation for this result is that the agreement is still relatively recent, there 
are numerous transitory dispositions and investment clauses may not yet be 
fully in force. We also have to acknowledge the notable caveat that we use a 
dummy to capture the effects of the free-trade agreement, which is similar to 
using a “black box” because it is difficult to describe what is going on inside it, 
as noted by TeVelde and Bezemer (2006). Further research is needed to fully 
test whether the DR CAFTA agreement has had a significant impact on FDI. 
2.3.3.  Testing the robustness of results
 2.3.3.1. Testing for non-linearities
We use a basic tool developed by Jann (2008) to test the linearity assumption 
for the different predictors following estimation: <<[N]lcheck categorizes the 
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predictor into bins, refits the model including dummy variables for the bins, and then 
performs a joint Wald test for the added parameters.>> We are especially interested 
in using this test to observe whether exchange rate variability presents non-
linearities in its relationship with investment because the hysteresis under 
uncertainty approaches discussed above (Belke and Gokce, 2005) provides a 
theoretical foundation for the existence of such non-linearities. Similarly, the 
rest of the institutional variables could also interact in a non-linear manner 
with FDI under uncertainty. 
Table 2.3-2. Non-linearity test results.
 fd unctad fdi stock Prob > F =    0.0000***
fd gdp per capita Prob > F =    0.0755*
fd trade openness Prob > F =    0.9959
gdp per capita growth Prob > F =    0.1759
inflation Prob > F =    0.3458
interest nominal Prob > F =    0.8988
fd mobile phones Prob > F =    0.0755*
fd secondary completion Prob > F =    0.0126***
short term debt to reserves Prob > F =    0.7756
current account balance (%GDP) Prob > F =    0.8619
bureaucracy quality Prob > F =    0.0943*
control of corruption Prob > F =    0.5053
government stability Prob > F =    0.1163
law order Prob > F =    0.8896
risk for exchange rate stability Prob > F =    0.5678
investment profile Prob > F =    0.1456
Source: Author´s calculations using the Jann (2008) test for non-linearities. *, **, and *** refers to 
the statistical significance of the coefficient at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of confidence. FD refers 
to variables in first differences.
H0: the predictor follows a linear model.
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Test results show that only the stock of FDI and secondary completion rates 
seem to exhibit statistically significant non-linear interactions with FDI, which 
does not invalidate our main linear regression results. In any case, it is worth 
noting that the simple tests we have performed here with macro-level data are 
not sufficient to fully test the hysteresis under uncertainty approach presented 
in section 2.2.3. To thoroughly assess this framework in the case of FDI in Latin 
America, it would be interesting to carry out additional research exploring the 
exchange rate volatility-FDI decision relationship from a micro point of view 
using customized surveys for a controlled sample of multinationals investing in 
the region.
 2.3.3.2. Using an alternative GMM approach
Now, in contrast to our original specification (i) presented in section 2.3.1, 
we suppose that the dependent variable is conditioned by its past values and 
that there is an unobservable effect ( φi) correlated to the lag of the dependent 
variable (yit-1). 
(ii) y
it
=φ
i
+∑nj=1β0 yit-1+ β1 xit+vi+eit 
The presence of the lagged dependent variable among the regressors in 
equation (ii) leads to the autocorrelation of the error term with the lagged 
dependent variable and to heterogeneity, which results in inconsistent standard 
errors in the estimations (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Judson and Owen, 1999). 
Arellano and Bond (1991) build a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
difference estimator that uses lagged values of the explanatory variables 
as instruments and thus considers potential endogeneity problems in the 
regressors. This model should be used to estimate first differences, where  is a 
vector of endogenous variables:
(iii) ∆y
it
=∆β0 yi,t-1+∆β1 xit+ ∆β2 wit+∆eit
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To check whether the dependent variable is related to lagged FDI inflows 
and to take potential endogeneity into account, we depart from equation (iii) 
and use the Arellano and Bond (1991) one-step GMM estimator, including at 
least one instrument per variable10 (see results in columns VI and VII, table 
2.3-3). Note that following estimation, the p-value for the Sargan test using 
either one or two lags of the dependent variable is always <0.05, which leads 
us to reject the null hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions are valid. In 
this case, two different things may be occurring: (a) the equations may be 
insufficiently over-identified or (b) the presence of heteroskedasticity may 
make the rejection of the null under the Sargan test more likely. 
In response to (a), following Montero (2010), we use the two-step estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), as presented in specifications VIII and 
IX. We also perform a regression (X) with a robust version of the estimator 
because the computing software indicates that the standard errors may be 
biased in VIII and IX. Another problem we face is that the AR(1) test of first-
order residual autocorrelation presents a p-value>0.05 in specifications IX and 
X, which implies that in contrast to the desired result, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation in the first order differences. 
In this context, it seems that the most reasonable way to proceed is to use 
the one-step estimator but with robust standard errors, which would also help 
us to address the potential heteroskedasticity problem mentioned above in (b). 
In this case, for specifications XI and XII, the AR(1) and AR(2) tests point to 
an autocorrelation in the first-order differences but not in the second-order 
differences, which implies that our estimator is adequate. If we compare the 
results in specification XII with those presented in the previous subsection 
under fixed effects (V), it is possible to observe that the coefficients for trade 
openness and current account balance remain highly significant and present 
the same sign. Those associated with investment profile, short-term debt levels, 
government stability and law and order are not significant when estimated by 
10.  
In general, we use both 
GMM-type instruments 
(as described in in 
Arellano and Bond, 1991) 
using only lag 2, and the 
first difference of all 
the different exogenous 
variables (as standard 
instruments), to have 
roughly thirty to forty 
instruments. Following 
on STATA manual, 
<<GMM-type instruments 
use the lags of a 
variable to contribute 
multiple columns to 
the xtabond — Arellano–
Bond linear dynamic 
panel data instrument 
matrix, whereas each 
standard instrument 
contributes one column 
to the instrument 
matrix>>. In some cases, 
such as specification 
VII, we allow GMM-type 
instruments using lags 
2 and 3. System GMM 
specifications (XII and 
XIII) allow for a higher 
number of instruments, 
as they include GMM-
type ones both in the 
differenced equation 
and the level equation.
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the GMM, which is more efficient than the OLS and GLS and tends to reduce 
the confidence interval.
At this point, it is worth noting that there is no theoretical foundation to use 
GMM in a model in which we use the stock of FDI as a proxy of the initial level 
(as the one presented in section 2.3.1). GMM is justified only if we understand 
that FDI inflows in a given year depend on the amount of FDI received in the 
previous year, a case in which we would need to include the lagged FDI flows 
among explanatory variables; however, unlike GDP growth, for example, 
FDI flows do not necessarily depend on previous investment levels, and they 
are usually relatively unpredictable, with volatility caused by the presence 
or absence of large operations. In addition, GMM dynamic estimation was 
designed for “small T, large N” panels, while in our case we count with a 
balanced panel of intermediate size (19 countries, 21 periods), in which GMM 
may not necessarily work better than fixed-effects (Roodman, 2009:128). For 
these reasons, we stick to our Fixed Effects estimation (Table 2.3-1) as the most 
suitable in this experiment. 
Table 2.3-3. Estimation results using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).
 VI VII VIII IX X XI XII
 Abond Abond Abond Abond Abond Abond Abond
 1-step 1-step 2-step 2-step 2-step 1-step 1-step
     Robust Robust se Robust se
lag1 fdi inflows 0.292*** 0.143 0.230** -0.136 -0.136 0.269*  0.151
(3.37) (1.58) (3.04) (-0.53)   (-0.47)   (2.50) (1.83)
lag2 fd inflows 0.00655 -0.0991     -0.0657
(0.1) (-1.40)       (-1.31)   
gdp per capita
0.000392 -0.000499 0.000219 0.00672*  0.00672 -0.00058 -0.000177
(0.68) (-0.81)   (0.81) (2.19) (1.74) (-1.40)   (-0.38)   
trade openness
0.0542*** 0.0626*** 0.0497*** 0.105** 0.105*  0.0582*** 0.0695***
(3.62) (4.30) (4.86) (2.65) (2.38) (5.22) (5.95)
gdp per capita growth
-0.0121 -0.00829 0.0159 0.0151 0.0151 0.00586 -0.0148
(-0.36) (-0.26)   (0.81) (0.55) (0.50) (0.21) (-0.55)   c
o
n
tin
u
e
s 
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h
e
  n
e
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a
g
e
→
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 VI VII VIII IX X XI XII
 Abond Abond Abond Abond Abond Abond Abond
 1-step 1-step 2-step 2-step 2-step 1-step 1-step
     Robust Robust se Robust se
inflation -0.000431 -0.000419 -0.000922 0.00168 0.00168 -0.00029 -8.14E-05
(-0.12) (-0.12)   (-1.64) (0.71) (0.61) (-0.45)   (-0.07)   
interest nominal
0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0015 -0.0015 0.0001 0.0000
(0.07) (0.12) (1.13) (-1.27)   (-1.06)   (0.27) (-0.01)   
mobile phones
-0.0152 0.00266 0.00959 0.0472 0.0472 0.00138 -0.00145
(-1.77) (0.25) (0.76) (1.07) (1.27) (0.20) (-0.18)   
secondary completion
2.464 -4.803 -42.61 -336.7** -336.7** -2.952 -4.334
(0.34) (-0.63)   (-1.23) (-2.85)   (-2.70)   (-0.77)   (-0.84)   
short term debt to 
reserves
-0.00336 -0.00228 -0.00291 -0.0138*  -0.0138 -0.0025 -0.00135
(-1.42) (-1.00)   (-1.52) (-2.04)   (-1.63)   (-1.11)   (-0.56)   
current account bal-
ance (%GDP)
-0.119** -0.120** -0.0706** 0.102 0.102 -0.0995*** -0.137***
(-2.86) (-2.96)   (-2.70) (0.58) (0.47) (-3.53)   (-3.91)   
bureaucracy quality
 0.383  -21.44 -21.44 0.149 0.298
 (0.88)  (-0.88)   (-0.70)   (0.40) (0.75)
control of corruption
 0.0829  0.767 0.767 -0.144 0.193
 (0.28)  (0.47) (0.49) (-0.62)   (0.75)
government stability
 0.253*   0.176 0.176 0.194 0.266*  
 (2.51)  (0.54) (0.60) (1.26) (1.96)
law order
 0.372  -7.489*  -7.489 0.269 0.339
 (1.29)  (-2.02)   (-1.80)   (1.16) (1.28)
risk for exchange rate 
stability
 0.0112  -0.248 -0.248 0.0335 -0.0101
 (0.13)  (-0.73)   (-0.63)   (0.47) (-0.12)   
DR CAFTA dummy
 -0.0846  2.227 2.227 -0.0156 -0.209
 (-0.10)    (0.56) (0.51) (-0.06)   (-0.46)   
investmen tprofile  0.163  3.828 3.828 0.0874 0.158
 (1.42)  (1.14) (0.94) (0.72) (1.56)
constant
-2.674 -4.087 5.131 56.90*  56.90*  -2.328 -5.741*  
(-1.30) (-1.86)   (1.10) (2.33) (2.16) (-1.32)   (-2.55)   
       
N 296 296 313 313 313 313 296
Sargan “p” 0.0103 0.0104 0.8957 0.9999 - - -
AR(1) “p” - - 0.0144 0.3517 0.4084 0.007 0.0068
AR(2) “p” - - 0.8466 - - 0.7156 0.7848
Wald chi2 “p” 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Instruments 46 53 29 36 36 36 70
Source: Author´s calculations. *, **, and *** refers to the statistical significance of the coefficient at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of confidence
→
TESISrevision miguel1.2.indd   96 19/05/2014   22:06:53
97DO CHANGES IN THE RULES OF THE GAME AFFECT FDI FLOWS IN LATIN AMERICA?
 2.3.3.3. Using smoothed series
A distinguishing feature of FDI inflows is that they tend to be quite volatile 
across time. We also observe that most of the institutional variables used in this 
study are persistent over time; thus, the use of annual observations may not be 
a good choice.  In order to mitigate potential distortions in our results, we have 
alternatively smoothed the FDI inflows series (dependent) (see specifications 
XIII and XIV in Appendix B, section 2.8), regressed over consecutive and non-
overlapping periods of three years (XV), and used 3-years mobile averages (XVI 
and XVII). Overall, the stock of FDI, trade openness, current account balance, 
government stability and investment profile remain significant determinants of 
FDI.  
In addition, it could be argued that the evolution of institutional variables 
for each country could be highly interrelated, and it would be sufficient to test 
the influence of just one or two institutional indexes on FDI inflows. Following 
Jong-a-Pin (2009), we perform factor analysis to generate two institutional 
indexes that compile ICRG variables. However, factorial solutions are not 
satisfactory enough to integrate the informative content of ICRG variables, 
as the communalities of certain variables (changing across different periods 
and political cycles) show high information loses when using two factors. In 
addition, the common variance when using two factors would be barely over 
50%. For these reasons, we have decided to keep all the six ICRG institutional 
variables in our regressions.
 2.3.3.4. Introducing subsamples
Finally, given the widely acknowledged heterogeneity across Latin American 
countries, the presence of sub-regions, and potential distortions caused by the 
crises of the early nineties and the global slowdown of 2009, we select a series 
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of subsamples, in order to leave aside potential outliers and structural breaks 
and test the robustness of our results. 
In this sense, we have excluded the crisis period (specifications XX 
and XXI), excluded the early nineties, when a number of Latin American 
countries still suffered from high macroeconomic and political instability 
(XXII), considered only the largest eight Latin American countries (with 
population over 15 million, in XXIII and XXIV), excluded Argentina, Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela as institutional outliers (XXV), and regressed only for 
Central American countries (XXVI). Results are displayed in Table 2.8-4 (see 
Appendix B). In general, capital stock of FDI, trade openness, and current 
account balance are consistently significant. Short term debt and some of the 
institutional variables are barely significant in some of the specifications.
  
2.4. FDI policies in Latin America 
Next, we compare the Latin American countries studied here with respect 
to the dimensions identified as relevant factors for FDI attraction in the 
previous econometric analysis. This section uses the results presented above 
to understand the dynamics of the region and establish a basis for elaborating 
some implications for policy makers. 
First, most Latin American countries have improved in FDI attraction over 
the last decade compared to the levels observed in the 1990s (Figure 2.4-1). 
Only Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Argentina received less foreign 
direct investment flows during the 2000s than during the previous decade (in 
terms of GDP). As we will argue, this behavior may be related to changes in 
the institutional setting in those countries and to the increased expropriation 
risk during the last decade, among other factors. 
In the 1990s, the three top-performing countries in the region attracted 
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FDI amounting to more than 4% of GDP (Bolivia, Panamá and Chile). In the 
2000s, seven countries reached that level: Panama, Chile, Nicaragua, Jamaica, 
Honduras, Costa Rica and Uruguay. Guatemala and Paraguay have traditionally 
struggled to gain attention from foreign investors. It is worth observing the 
large heterogeneity in FDI attraction among Central American countries, with 
Panama and Costa Rica among the top performers, whereas El Salvador and 
Guatemala receive little investment. 
Figure 2.4-1. Country comparison. Trade openness and FDI inflows in Latin America.
Source: Author´s calculations 
Second, we consider the dimension of trade openness. In the 2000s, Latin 
American countries were slightly more open to foreign trade than in the 1990s. 
Except for Panamá, exports plus imports over total GDP have significantly 
increased in all Central American countries (excluding Mexico), which may 
partly explain the notable increase in FDI attraction observed in Central 
America over the last decade.  
Latin American countries have succeeded in reducing their short-term debt 
levels, which may have helped to attract foreign investors in some cases. This is 
the case for Nicaragua, which was the most indebted country in the world on 
a per capita basis in the 1990s and has since been able to significantly reduce 
public debt and increase FDI inflows. Honduras was also able to reduce short-
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term debt to reserve levels from an average of 141% in the 1990s to 18% in the 
2000s. However, the relationship between debt levels and FDI attraction is not 
clear-cut. The most indebted country over the last decade in terms of short-
term debt to reserves is the Dominican Republic (152%), which apparently is 
not a “poor performer” in FDI; nevertheless, it may be receiving investment 
flows below its potential. This may also be the case for Argentina and Ecuador.
Figure 2.4-2. Country comparison. Short-term debt levels and FDI inflows in Latin America.
Source: Author´s calculations 
Maintaining relatively large current account deficits, even if not commonly 
advisable, seems to favor an increase in FDI inflows, as highlighted by the 
regional literature and tested in the econometric exercise presented in this 
chapter. Because they are not commodity exporters, most Central American 
countries maintain structural current account deficits of approximately 5% of 
GDP. On the other extreme, Venezuela maintained an average current account 
surplus of 9.6% of GDP during the 1990s. Commodity exporters generally 
tend to suffer from pressures resulting from currency appreciation and internal 
inflation, which may discourage foreign investors to a certain extent. Under 
these circumstances, policymakers would need to make credible monetary 
policy commitments to mitigate the risks associated with exchange rate 
variability and increasing inflation. 
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Figure 2.4-3. Country comparison. Current account balance and FDI inflows in Latin America.
Source: Author´s calculations
Government stability, understood as the government’s ability to carry out 
its declared program and its ability to stay in office, has significantly improved 
in most Latin American countries over the past 20 years, and this is likely to 
have had a positive impact on FDI flows to the region. The Dominican Republic 
and El Salvador are two economies that have taken advantage of increased 
government stability over the last decade to appeal to foreign investors. 
However, it should be noted that government stability may not significantly 
contribute to increased FDI attraction if there are substantial changes to the 
rules of the game or if the policies implemented are not always investor-friendly, 
as may be the case for Venezuela. Thus, it may be a necessary but not sufficient 
condition.
Figure 2.4-4. Country comparison. Government stability and FDI inflows in Latin America.
Source: Author´s calculations
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To briefly analyze this issue, we consider the investment profile index, which 
assesses the stability of the investment framework and the risk of expropriation 
in the various economies. Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina have 
allegedly suffered from deterioration in their investment profiles over the last 
decade, which may partly help explain why they have received a lower level of 
FDI inflows than during the 1990s. On the other hand, most of those countries 
that have significantly improved their investment framework and have reduced 
the risk of expropriation (compared to the 1990s) have been able to somewhat 
improve their ability to attract FDI inflows. This has been the case for Panama, 
Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Colombia. 
Figure 2.4-5. Country comparison. Investment profile and FDI inflows in Latin America.
Source: Author´s calculations
Finally, keeping the abovementioned caveats in mind, the law and order 
index may still be a good proxy for the quality and enforceability of the legal 
framework in Latin American countries. Interestingly, the only countries with 
higher law and order indices in the 2000s than in the 1990s were Bolivia, Chile, 
Nicaragua, Panama and Peru. Peru and Bolivia were not successful in increasing 
FDI inflows over the last decade, but Panama, Nicaragua and Chile are among 
the region s´ top performers. This suggests that enforcing and maintaining law 
and order may have a positive effect on FDI attraction, but it is not per se a 
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sufficient requirement to appeal to foreign investors. The overall worsening in 
the law and order index observed for Latin America over the last 20 years may 
have kept increases in FDI inflows to the region below their potential. 
Figure 2.4-6. Country comparison. Investment profile and FDI inflows in Latin America.
Source: Author´s calculations 
On the institutional side, we also wonder which Latin American countries 
are most similar in terms of the following governance indicators (which were 
significant in at least some of the regressions): government stability, investment 
profile and law and order. Hierarchical cluster techniques under the Ward 
method using standardized Z scores are applied to our selection of 19 countries. 
The first group, characterized by average levels of government stability, 
strongly declining law and order indicators with respect to the 1990s and the 
lowest investment profile indices of the region, consists of Argentina, Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela. This group presents low FDI to GDP levels by regional 
standards (2.12% on average). 
At the other extreme, Costa Rica, Chile, Nicaragua and Peru present certain 
institutional similarities. Although they enjoy diverse degrees of governmental 
stability, this group of countries exhibits above-average investment profile 
indices and very high law and order ratings. Their average FDI to GDP level 
(5.26%) is well above the regional mean. 
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Figure 2.4-7. Latin American country clusters by similarity of institutional indicators. 2000-2010.
A more detailed study of the institutional arrangements and the investment 
framework in these four countries would be needed to determine their 
similarities and best practices, which could help other countries in the region 
to enhance their appeal to foreign investors. However, this is beyond the scope 
of this article, which simply intends to identify the relevant determinants of 
FDI attraction in Latin America over the last two decades to frame a more 
complex discussion: the policy-making of FDI attraction. Nevertheless, from 
this section, it is still possible to determine a series of tentative and general 
policy implications:
•	 Latin	American	economies	may	enhance	 their	 appeal	 to	 foreign	
investors by increasing their degree of trade openness. In this article, free-
trade agreements such as the DR CAFTA and tariff decreases have not proven 
to be per se significant determinants of FDI. Nonetheless, it can be argued that 
because FTAs and external tariff decreases contribute to increased trade flows 
and foster regional integration, they can facilitate a greater degree of trade 
Source: Author´s calculations 
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openness and thus indirectly attract foreign investors. 
•	 Latin	American	countries	are	more	likely	to	attract	larger	FDI	inflows	
by reducing their exposure to short-term debt, which is often linked to higher 
volatility. This would have been the case for Nicaragua and Honduras, whereas 
the Dominican Republic seems to be an exception. Argentina and Ecuador 
could benefit from this practice. 
•	 There	 is	also	some	evidence	that	 institutional	variables	such	as	 the	
degree of government stability, law and order and investment profile (related 
to expropriation risk) influence FDI attraction. Countries such as Argentina, 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, in which the investment framework has 
become less stable and law enforcement has deteriorated over the last decade, 
have lost the favor of foreign investors. At the other extreme, Nicaragua and 
Peru have been able to improve their institutional setting compared with that 
in the 1990s and to regain a certain degree of political stability, thus becoming 
relatively successful FDI performers. These findings have implications from a 
risk-management perspective because certain international investors are risk-
averse and would require guarantees (such as those provided by MIGA11) to 
hedge from sovereign and political risks prior to making investment decisions. 
•	 Additionally,	although	we	have	not	been	able	 to	 fully	 test	 it	 in	our	
model, the hysteresis under uncertainty approach presented in section 2.2.3 
(Pissarides, 2001; Belke et al., 2005) suggests that Latin American institutions 
may also have an insurance role in the context of switching investment costs 
(due to exchange rate variability or institutional instability, among other 
factors). For instance, capital market imperfections in certain Latin American 
countries may increase the perceived cost of entry for multinationals investing 
in those countries because the firms may be unable to recur to domestic bond 
issuances to finance or expand their subsidiary. Additionally, high firing costs 
or limitations on profit repatriation may be perceived as higher costs that may 
result in the postponement of entry (investment) and exit (disinvestment) 
11. 
 Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency. 
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decisions. The first set of issues could be addressed by introducing 
unemployment subsidies and reducing private compensation payments (as 
suggested by Pissarides, 2001). In this sense, both institutions (rules) and public 
sector actors (e.g., regulators, investment attraction agencies) have important 
roles in addressing market imperfections and reducing uncertainty to prevent 
hysteresis in entrepreneurial decisions while simultaneously preserving a 
flexible business environment that appeals to foreign investors.
2.5. Conclusion
This article tries to identify the determinants of FDI in Latin America 
during the period 1990-2010 to understand which factors have contributed to 
the increase in FDI inflows observed since the mid-1990s and to account for 
differences in performance among the various countries.
To this end, we conduct a literature review presenting five theoretical 
approaches to foreign direct investment: the neoclassical theory of capital 
f lows, the eclectic OLI paradigm, horizontal and vertical theories, recent 
risk-aversion approaches and institutional approaches. Drawing from these 
theories and from previous empirical evidence and concrete studies on FDI 
in Latin America, we identify three groups of factors that may influence FDI: 
endowments and infrastructure, macroeconomic variables and institutional 
and policy variables. 
The results of the econometric analysis point to the previous stock of FDI, 
trade openness, low short-term debt levels, balance of payments deficits and 
government stability as the main (robust) determinants of foreign capital 
flowing to Latin America from 1990 to 2010. There is also some evidence that 
foreign entrepreneurs show a greater propensity to invest in countries with 
sound legal frameworks and low expropriation risks. Contrary to expectations, 
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the DR CAFTA agreement does not seem to have significantly increased FDI 
inflows to signing countries.
Applying hierarchical cluster techniques to the three institutional variables 
identified as relevant (government stability, investment profile, law and order), 
some of the top performers in FDI attraction over the last decade (Costa Rica, 
Chile, Nicaragua, Peru) are clearly grouped, as are some of the worst performers 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela). Decreasing expropriation risks and 
enhancing law enforcement in the latter group could help those countries to 
increase FDI inflows. In this sense, public institutions play critical roles in 
reducing uncertainty, which may lead to a postponement of foreign investment 
decisions or even the deviation of flows to more stable environments. 
Finally, countries with high short-term debt levels need to try to reduce 
their exposure. Other general policy implications include the need to foster 
trade openness as an indirect way to contribute to regional FDI attraction. 
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2.7. Appendix A. Stylized facts on global and regional FDI flows
Figure 2.7-1. Evolution of FDI inflows by region.
Source: UNCTAD FDI database
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Table 2.7-1. Evolution of average FDI stock in Latin American countries.
FDI stock as a % of GDP 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010
Honduras 2.6 13.1 24.4 107.6
Panama 51.8 44.1 63.4 74.4
Jamaica 16.4 26.8 52.4 73.8
Chile 53.0 44.1 65.1 63.1
Nicaragua 5.4 18.1 48.3 62.5
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 16.8 31.9 64.1 39.1
Costa Rica 16.8 14.8 23.6 36.0
El Salvador 9.0 7.0 21.5 31.0
Uruguay 7.0 6.1 13.7 29.7
Colombia 4.6 9.9 21.1 28.9
Mexico 5.2 11.7 24.6 28.8
Argentina 5.1 12.9 34.7 25.3
Peru 5.2 11.3 20.8 25.2
Dominican Republic 5.1 5.2 15.6 23.7
Brazil 11.2 11.7 22.2 21.8
Ecuador 8.7 22.4 29.6 21.2
Paraguay 6.7 12.2 17.7 17.4
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 3.9 19.3 38.6 16.2
Guatemala 16.2 18.6 18.5 14.2
Cuba 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3
Latin America 9.0 14.2 30.7 31.2
 
Source: Author´s calculations using the UNCTAD FDI database
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2.8. Appendix B. Additional empirical results 
 
Table 2.8-1. Co-integration and unit root tests results.
 Test p-value feature
1st diff 
p-value
Dependent fdi inflows Levin-Lin-Chu 0.0005 Stationary  
unctad fdi stock Im–Pesaran–Shin 0.999 Unit roots 0
gdp per capita Levin-Lin-Chu 0.5645 Unit roots 0
trade openness Im–Pesaran–Shin 0.8823 Unit roots 0
gdp per capita growth Levin-Lin-Chu 0 Stationary  
inflation Fisher-type based on ADF 0 Stationary  
interest nominal Im–Pesaran–Shin 0 Stationary  
mobilephones Levin-Lin-Chu 0.6332 Unit roots 0
secondarycompletion Levin-Lin-Chu 0.417 Unit roots 0.0033
shorttermdebtto reserves Levin-Lin-Chu 0.0001 Stationary  
currentaccount balance (%GDP) Levin-Lin-Chu 0 Stationary  
bureaucracyquality Levin-Lin-Chu 0 Stationary  
controlofcorruption Levin-Lin-Chu 0.0057 Stationary  
governmentstability Levin-Lin-Chu 0 Stationary  
riskforexchangeratestability Levin-Lin-Chu 0.0002 Stationary  
investmentprofile Levin-Lin-Chu 0 Stationary  
scientificarticlesperthousandpeo Levin-Lin-Chu 0.9826 Unit roots 0
electricitylosses (%) Levin-Lin-Chu 0.856 Unit roots 0
Source: Author´s calculations
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Table 2.8-2. Results under smoothed series.
 XIII XIV XV XVI XVII
 Smoothed Smoothed 3 year per 3 year ma 3 year ma
 Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Random
unctad fdi stock
0.115*** 0.0432*** 0.0326** 0.0423*** 0.0407***
(11.42) (8.42) (3.16) (6.41) (6.43)
gdp per capita
0.000488 0.000376 0.000272 0.000284 0.000264
(1.75) (1.88) (0.67) (1.14) (1.87)
trade openness
0.0185** 0.0173** 0.0350*  0.0391*** 0.0261***
(2.96) (2.87) (2.49) (5.18) (4.38)
gdp per capita growth
-0.00948 -0.00604 0.119 0.118*** 0.125***
(-0.42) (-0.30)   (1.83) (3.54) (3.83)
inflation
-0.000149 0.0000381 -0.00015 0.0000374 0.0000124
(-0.81) (0.20) (-0.21)   (0.07) (0.02)
interest nominal
-0.0000893 -0.000179 -0.0000479 -0.000154 -0.000158
(-0.60) (-1.20)   (-0.09)   (-0.42)   (-0.44)   
mobile phones
-0.0099 0.0000 -0.0039 -0.0033 -0.0035
(-1.79) (0.01) (-0.47)   (-0.66)   (-0.83)   
secondary completion 
-5.707 -1.76 -0.0576 -0.0396 1.88
(-1.66) (-0.65)   (-0.01)   (-0.01)   (0.68)
short term debt to reserves
-0.00176 -0.000983 -0.00257 -0.00257 -0.00203
(-1.84) (-0.98)   (-1.07)   (-1.85)   (-1.54)   
currentaccount balance 
(%GDP)
-0.176*** -0.106*** -0.235*** -0.258*** -0.234***
(-8.30) (-5.45)   (-4.46)   (-9.40)   (-9.49)   
scientific articles per 1000
16.83                                                             
(1.17)                                                             
electricity losses (%)
-0.00893                                                             
(-0.39)                                                             
bureaucracy quality
 -0.00509 0.046 0.035 0.128
 (-0.03)   (0.13) (0.18) (0.69)
corruption
 0.00876 -0.0451 0.0258 0.0548
 (0.07) (-0.17)   (0.18) (0.40)
government stability
 0.237*** 0.293*  0.329*** 0.317***
 (4.83) (2.43) (5.25) (5.20)
law order
 0.275*  0.232 0.284 0.252
 (2.31) (0.84) (1.90) (1.82)
risk for exchange rate stability
 -0.0707 -0.16 -0.136*  -0.129
 (-1.47)   (-1.27)   (-2.00)   (-1.93)   
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 XIII XIV XV XVI XVII
 Smoothed Smoothed 3 year per 3 year ma 3 year ma
 Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Random
DRCAFTA
 0.211 0.323 0.256 0.447
 (0.58) (0.40) (0.57) (1.03)
investment profile
 0.272*** 0.235 0.196** 0.183** 
 (4.93) (1.92) (2.88) (2.83)
_cons
-1.917 -4.378*** -4.723** -5.841*** -5.196***
(-1.80) (-5.19)   (-2.67)   (-5.64)   (-5.78)   
N 290 342 117 316 316 
Overall R-square 0.4757 0.5493 0.547 0.5405 0.5856
Hausman p-value 0.00 <0 0.00 0.33 0.33 
Source: Author´s calculations. *, **, and *** refers to the statistical significance of the coefficient at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of confidence
Table 2.8-3. Logarithmic transformations of selected variables.
 XVIII XIX
Dependent: log of FDI inflows logs logs
 Fixed Fixed
ln unctad fdi stock
0.478*** 0.397***
(4.73) (3.97)
ln gdp percapita
-0.979 -1.413*  
(-1.87) (-2.42)   
ln openness
1.132*** 1.301***
(4.93) (5.60)
ln gdp per capita growth
-0.00523 0.00335
(-0.48) (0.31)
inflation
-0.00037 -0.000246
(-1.30) (-0.88)   
ln interest
-0.184* -0.223** 
(-2.23) (-2.78)   
ln mobile phones
-0.0405 0.0096
(-1.03) (0.21) c
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 XVIII XIX
Dependent: log of FDI inflows logs logs
 Fixed Fixed
ln secondary completion
-0.386 -0.494
(-1.31) (-1.61)   
ln short term debt
-0.0314 0.0173
(-0.56) (0.31)
current account balance (%GDP)
-0.0754*** -0.0539***
(-7.00) (-4.75)   
ln scientific articles per 1000
                
                
ln electricity losses (%)
                
                
ln bureaucracy quality
 -0.0565
 (-0.30)   
ln corruption
 0.417*  
 (2.51)
ln government stability
 0.425*  
 (2.29)
ln law order
 0.501** 
 (2.67)
ln risk for exchange ratestability
 -0.164
 (-1.10)   
DRCAFTA
 0.463** 
 (2.81)
ln investment profile
 0.486** 
 (2.65)
_cons
2.44 2.722
(0.59) (0.58)
N 277 277 
R2 0.1427 0.1374
Hausman 0.00 0.00 
Source: Author´s calculations. *, **, and *** refers to the statistical significance of the coefficient at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of confidence
→
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Table 2.8-4. Results of different subsamples.
 XX XXI XXII XXIII XXIV XXV XXVI
 1990-2007
1990-
2007
1995-2010 LAC8 LAC8
No out-
liers
Central 
America
 Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Random Fixed Random
unctad fdi stock
0.0989*** 0.0983*** 0.0268** 0.0817*** 0.0646*** 0.0222** 0.0114
(6.64) (6.25) (3.27) (4.19) (3.86) (2.97) (1.16)
gdp per capita
0.000491 0.00031 0.000286 0.000557 0.0000401 0.000737*  0.000166
(1.19) (0.73) (0.76) (1.45) (0.51) (2.17) (0.47)
trade openness
0.0287** 0.0348*** 0.0610*** 0.0463*  0.000207 0.0413*** 0.0309*  
(3.09) (3.67) (5.20) (2.06) (0.02) (5.18) (2.51)
gdp per capita 
growth
0.0372 0.041 0.0236 0.0184 0.0371 0.0649 0.186*  
(1.10) (1.26) (0.67) (0.65) (1.32) (1.87) (2.39)
inflation
-0.000111 0.000057 0.0172 -0.0000859 -0.0000902 -0.0000875 0.0413
(-0.40) (0.21) (1.30) (-0.40)   (-0.41)   (-0.35)   (1.09)
interest nominal
-0.0000542 -0.000221 -0.0131 -0.00015 -0.0000484 -0.0000125 -0.0545
(-0.24) (-1.02)   (-0.70)   (-0.87)   (-0.28)   (-0.06)   (-0.82)   
mobile phones
-0.0108 0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0142 -0.0122*  0.0008 0.0002
(-1.32) (0.09) (-0.13)   (-1.92)   (-2.33)   (0.13) (0.03)
secondary 
completion
-4.991 -10.23 -8.129 -2.466 4.136 -3.479 2.079
(-0.98) (-1.94)   (-1.47)   (-0.43)   (1.81) (-0.80)   (0.14)
short term debt to 
reserves
-0.00309* -0.00217 -0.00376 -0.0000472 -0.00293 -0.00398** -0.00639** 
(-2.17) (-1.47)   (-1.25)   (-0.02)   (-1.60)   (-2.88)   (-2.76)   
current account 
balance (%GDP)
-0.215*** -0.171*** -0.232*** -0.108** -0.0950** -0.159*** -0.153*  
(-6.85) (-5.37)   (-6.31)   (-2.88)   (-2.79)   (-4.65)   (-2.55)   
scientific articles per 
1000
19.91                                                                                            
(0.93)                                                                                            
electricity losses (%)
-0.00354                                                                                            
(-0.10)                                                                                            
bureaucracy quality
 -0.333 -0.623 -0.911*  -0.519*  -0.115 0.272
 (-1.24)   (-1.52)   (-2.38)   (-2.23)   (-0.41)   (0.56)
control of corruption
 0.279 0.201 0.162 0.0314 -0.0948 -0.00254
 (1.35) (0.97) (0.72) (0.15) (-0.50)   (-0.01)   
government stability
 0.215** 0.146 0.105 0.0965 0.191*  0.0339
 (2.80) (1.67) (1.41) (1.30) (2.27) (0.19)
law order
 0.317 0.177 0.472** 0.211 0.0522 0.272
 (1.65) (0.79) (2.71) (1.51) (0.26) (0.80)
risk forex change rate 
stability
 -0.0381 -0.0298 0.022 0.0385 -0.064 0.347
 (-0.50)   (-0.35)   (0.35) (0.58) (-0.73)   (1.54) c
o
n
tin
u
e
s 
in
 t
h
e
  n
e
xt
 p
a
g
e
→
TESISrevision miguel1.2.indd   124 19/05/2014   22:07:00
125DO CHANGES IN THE RULES OF THE GAME AFFECT FDI FLOWS IN LATIN AMERICA?
 XX XXI XXII XXIII XXIV XXV XXVI
 1990-2007
1990-
2007
1995-2010 LAC8 LAC8
No out-
liers
Central 
America
 Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Random Fixed Random
DR CAFTA dummy
 -0.00885 0.151 .   .   -0.187 0.198
 (-0.01)   (0.27) .   .   (-0.39)   (0.28)
investmentprofile
 0.154 0.357*** 0.101 0.133 0.125 -0.169
 (1.75) (3.80) (0.99) (1.69) (1.28) (-0.78)   
constant
-2.419 -4.775** -4.892*  -4.014*  -0.645 -4.139** -3.940*  
(-1.53) (-3.20)   (-2.41)   (-2.52)   (-0.62)   (-3.10)   (-2.31)   
N 290 290 262 147 147 259 106 
Overall R-square 0.3598 0.371 0.3174 0.1261 0.4323 0.4432 0.4477
Hausman p-value 0.02 <0 0.00 0.97 0.97 0.00 0.71 
Source: Author´s calculations 
Table 2.8-5. Definition of variables and data sources. 
Variable Definition Source
unctad fdi in flows
FDI inflows and outflows comprise capital provided (either directly or 
through other related enterprises) by a foreign direct investor to a FDI 
enterprise, or capital received by a foreign direct investor from a FDI 
enterprise. FDI includes the three following components: equity cap-
ital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans. Data on FDI flows 
are presented on net bases (capital transactions’ credits less debits 
between direct investors and their foreign affiliates).
UNCTAD
unctad fdi stock
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is defined as an investment involving a 
long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest in and control 
by a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent 
enterprise) of an enterprise resident in a different economy (FDI en-
terprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate). FDI stock is the value 
of the share of their capital and reserves (including retained profits) 
attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of 
affiliates to the parent enterprises.
UNCTAD
gdp per capita GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) WDI
trade openness
It is measured as the exports plus the imports divided the GDP of one 
particular country in a given year
World Develop-
ment Indicators 
(WDI)
gdp per capita 
growth
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant 
local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars.
WDI
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Variable Definition Source
inflation
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual 
percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquir-
ing a basket of goods and services
WDI
interest nominal
Lending rate is the bank rate that usually meets the short- and medi-
um-term financing needs of the private sector. 
WDI
mobile phones Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI
secondary 
completion
Percentage of Complete Secondary Schooling Attained in Popula-
tion
Barro and Lee 
(2010)
short term debt to 
reserves
Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity of one 
year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. This is divided by 
total reserves (including gold)
WDI
current account 
balance (%GDP)
Current account balance as % of GDP is the sum of net exports of 
goods and services, net primary income, and net secondary income, 
divided by GDP
WDI
scientific articles 
per 1000
Refers to the number of scientific and engineering articles published 
in a number of fields, in a given country and year
WDI
electricitylosses 
(%)
Includes losses in transmission between sources of supply and points 
of distribution and in the distribution to consumers, including pilferage.
WDI
bureaucracy 
quality
To what extent bureaucracy is autonomous from political pressure 
and has an established mechanism for recruitment and training. (1-4 
scale). 
PRS Group, ICRG 
www.prsgroup.
com
control of 
corruption
A measure of the ability to control both actual and potential corrup-
tion, including patronage, nepotism, etc. 1-6 scale). 
PRS Group, ICRG 
www.prsgroup.
com
government 
stability
This is an assessment both of the government’s ability to carry out its 
declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office.   (1-12 scale). 
PRS Group, ICRG 
www.prsgroup.
com
law order
The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impar-
tiality of the legal system, while Order deals with popular observance 
of the law. (1-6 scale). 
PRS Group, ICRG 
www.prsgroup.
com
risk for exchange 
rate stability
The appreciation or depreciation of a currency against the US dollar 
over a calendar year or the most recent 12-month period is calculat-
ed and compared in a table (see source). (0-10).
PRS Group, ICRG 
www.prsgroup.
com
DR CAFTA dummy
Dummy variable with value 1 for the different DR-CAFTA members 
since the adoption of this Free Trade Agreement (2005 in most of the 
cases). 
Authors´ calcu-
lations
investment profile
This is an assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment, includ-
ing risk of expropriation, repatriation of profits and payment delays. 
(1-12 scale). 
PRS Group, ICRG 
www.prsgroup.
com
Source: Author´s elaboration
→
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DO FOREIGN MULTINATIONALS 
PREFER SOLO OR JOINT VENTURES 
IN LATIN AMERICA?
3.1. Introduction
Multinational companies investing in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC) face a challenging decision when they have to choose the location of its 
affiliates in a very fecund and dynamic region that has overall escaped from 
the 2009 crisis in relatively good shape. Among other crucial issues, managers 
have to decide between establishing a joint venture with a local partner (JV) 
or a wholly owned enterprise (WOE), to keep a higher degree of control. This 
choice seems to be especially relevant in the case of LAC, a region in which 
entrepreneurs report informality and institutions are an obstacle for doing 
business in a significantly higher proportion than in other parts of the world12. 
The foreign market entry decision implies that a foreign f irm or 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE MICROECONOMIC DETERMINANTS 
OF FOREIGN ENTRY MODE USING ENTERPRISE SURVEY 
DATA
 12.
Based on average World 
Bank Enterprise Survey 
respondent perception. 
Please, refer to Table 
3.7 1 in Appendix C for 
detailed results.
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multinational bundles its know-how, processes and other intangible assets with 
domestic factors such as human capital, distribution channels, information 
about the domestic market, etc. (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007). According 
to Hennart (2000), when the value of paying back dividends to the owner of 
each of the different inputs (internalizing the factors of production under a 
unique organization) is higher than having the different companies exchanging 
ex ante inputs through the market, a joint venture formula will be the 
preferred choice. The foreign market entry decision is not trivial, as has direct 
implications on the profitability of the subsidiary; for instance, according to 
Chang, Chung and Moon (2013), WOEs perform better than JVs in industries 
intense in research and development. The foreign market entry decision does 
not have to be confounded with the greenfield investment versus acquisition 
of a previously existing company choice, which, according to Brouther and 
Hennart (2007:399), is implicitly embedded in the first. 
It is the aim of this paper to contribute to the literature on foreign market 
entry decision on the following ways: (i) showing empirical evidences from 
the recent worldwide World Bank Enterprise Surveys (firm level data), as a 
complement to the usual approach of country specific surveys of limited scope 
(for example, in recent papers, analysing a single Asian country is a predominant 
feature); (ii) combining and testing the different existing theories on the topic, 
thus presenting a larger set of hypotheses and dimensions to be analysed; and 
(iii) assessing entry mode decisions for foreign companies in Latin America, 
identifying distinctive determinants to draw evidence-grounded implications 
for policy makers and investors in the region. 
Results from our empirical exercise show that counting with a foreign 
licensed technology has a large and highly significant impact on opting for 
a wholly owned enterprise when investing in LAC, but not in other part of 
the world. This constitutes a partial validation of the “ownership” component 
in the OLI Eclectic Paradigm (Dunning 1973; 1980), in the sense that 
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multinationals tend to protect their specific assets (in this case, a differentiated 
technology) from potential replication by avoiding joint venture formulas; this 
may be an especially important consideration in LAC, a region characterized by 
wide variability in the enforcement of property rights across countries. Another 
interesting result is that in those countries in which foreign entrepreneurs 
perceive that the courts are not fair, they opt for establishing JV in a higher 
proportion, probably to count with a local partner who may help them dealing 
with potential legal, idiosyncratic and regulatory barriers. Similarly, Joint 
Ventures formulas seem to be chosen when the company is in a destination 
country in which it has to make a higher degree of informal payments as total 
annual sales, and when the political environment is perceived as more instable. 
Finally, following the knowledge capital model (Markusen and Maskus, 1999), we 
distinguish between market seeking (horizontal) and export oriented (vertical) 
FDI; there is evidence that the higher the percentage of exports over total sales 
(a proxy for vertical FDI) and the percentage of inputs of foreign origin, the 
more likely is that the subsidiary takes the form of a wholly owned enterprise; 
this finding is confirmed both for LAC and non-LAC countries.
Our results have very relevant implications for managers of multinational 
companies and investors that are considering to enter in Latin America. 
Also, policymakers in the region may want to consider enhancing the legal 
framework for industrial property and guaranteeing the quality and reliability 
local supplies (quality certificates, better supply contract enforcement) in order 
to guarantee the conditions for foreign subsidiaries to develop greater backward 
linkages with the rest of the economy, and potential positive spillover effects.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follow: section 3.2 reviews the 
different strands of literature relevant for the foreign market entry mode 
discussion; section 3.3 presents some stylized facts derived from the analysis 
of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys we use; section 3.4 describes the 
methodology applied, the choice of variables and regression results; section 3.5 
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discusses policy implications and concludes. 
3.2. The determinants of foreign market entry mode; theory and 
evidence
This section walks the reader through the literature analysing the foreign 
entry mode decision, which basically discusses the choice between joint 
venture and whole ownership for a multinational investing in a foreign country. 
Related strands of literature, which will not be extensively discussed here, deal 
with the establishment mode in foreign markets (greenfield investment versus 
acquisition; see, for instance, Dikova and van Witteloostuijn, 2007), the ex-
post performance of foreign subsidiaries (Ma, Tong and Fitza, 2013) and their 
influence on industry profitability (Tong and Reuer, 2010), and the location 
determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Amiti and Javorcik, 2008; 
Kang and Jiang, 2012). 
In principle, it can be argued that the mode of entry in foreign markets 
would be a decision made on the basis of existing trade-offs between risks 
and returns. Exporting would be the first choice in a context of high risk or 
unknown foreign markets, as the company bears less sunk cost exporting than 
under foreign direct investment. Within FDI, opting for a joint venture is 
expected to help mitigating certain risks (given the presence of a local partner 
with experience in the host economy and lower initial investment), but may 
have associated lower returns (as potential profits are shared). On the other 
hand, whole ownership is usually a higher return, higher risk alternative. At 
the same time, those companies that have a comparative advantage in the form 
of a unique production processes or a differentiated technology (respect to 
competitors) would in principle be less prone to establishing joint ventures (to 
avoid potential imitation or reverse engineering), especially in those countries 
where there is weaker enforcement of property rights. 
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Originally, it was established in the organizational literature that resource 
availability in the destination market (access to finance, managerial capabilities) 
and operational control are also part of the mode of entry decision function 
(Stopford and Wells, 1972, in Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992). Thus, the 
greater the degree of control the parent company would like to exert over 
systems and marketing in the host country (e.g. price and distribution strategies 
for the products), the more likely is that the preferred entry choice would be 
wholly owned enterprise over joint venture.
The OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1973; 1980) looks at the motivations 
trans-national companies have to invest abroad instead of just exporting their 
products. Dunning elaborated an eclectic framework that integrated the 
different existing theories and, more importantly, discusses how the inter-
linkages between factors (such as the above mentioned) ultimately affect the 
mode of entry decision. 
OLI stands for Ownership, Location and Internalization. Ownership 
advantages refer to the existence of firm-specific assets and knowledge-based 
assets such as patents, competitive management formulas, differentiated 
process organisation, or trademarks. These specific assets provide multi-
national companies with advantages over local companies in foreign markets 
to compete there. According to this framework, knowledge-intense industries 
would usually opt for a higher degree of ownership to maintain control (WOE 
preferred). Meyer, Wright and Pruthi (2009), in their resource based view of 
foreign entry, propose to complement this control dimension with resource 
augmentation: firms with geographically fungible comparative advantages 
and resources would prefer wholly owned greenfield investments, whereas 
firms for which local resources and host economy specific knowledge are more 
important would be more likely to use joint venture modes or tend to directly 
acquire local companies. 
If core competences are geographically fungible, foreign investors may attain 
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competitive advantages in new locations with few additional local resources, 
and enter by a resource-exploiting mode. Firms with core competences based 
on location-specific competences prefer modes that access complementary 
local resources.
Second, location advantages such as different factor endowments, benefiting 
from positive externalities, or avoiding transportation costs or trade barriers, 
can be obtained by investing abroad. As abovementioned, the higher the market 
potential and the lower the investment risk is, the larger the participation of 
foreign capital in the affiliate would in principle be. 
Finally, internalisation advantages are derived from theories of the firm: 
companies will be opting for market transactions or organization depending 
on existing transaction costs (Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1989). Exporting 
would in principle guarantee the parent company the possibility of reaching 
economies of scale, while avoiding the bureaucracy and procedures related 
to implementation; at the same, time, however, market imperfections and its 
implications, such as behavioural risk (e.g. wrong marketing mix choice by the 
importer when distributing the goods), may result in the need of elaborating 
costly contracts and monitoring systems to prevent undesired events (Agarwal 
and Ramaswami, 1992). If contractual risks are high, investment modes would 
be preferred over exporting or licensing, as the company can save transaction 
costs and minimize the risk of imitation or suffering reputational losses 
by directly locating in the target market. Thus, It could be expected that a 
WOE would be preferred over a JV in countries where enforcing contracts 
and property rights is more costly. At the same time, however, Agarwal 
and Ramaswami (1992) test the OLI framework for entry modes in the U.S. 
equipment leasing industry but they do not find that investment risks, product 
differentiation, and contractual risk have any bearing in the choice between JV 
and WOE, although the last two do have significant influence in the decision 
between exporting and investing. On the other hand, they find that larger 
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companies with longer international experience tend to prefer WOE over JV, 
especially when entering markets with high potential. Recently, Chen and 
Chang (2011) have confirmed most of the effects influencing mode of entry that 
were discussed by transaction cost theory, although their results do not confirm 
the contention that more experienced internationals opt for a WOE; they rather 
point to a dynamic “state dependency”, with firms only inclined to change their 
entry choice (from JV to WOE or vice versa) if they had a poor performance 
in the past. 
A third wave of studies introduced the effects of institutions and cultural 
distance when assessing location and entry mode choices in foreign markets. 
The underlying reasoning is that managers and owners from different countries 
of origin may approach a similar foreign market entry decision from diverse 
perspectives (and with dissimilar degrees of risk aversion), as it can be broadly 
argued in line with the new Institutional Economics Literature (North, 1990). 
At the same time, the intrinsic distinguishing features of institutions in the host 
country will have a bearing on the degree of foreign ownership chosen. 
Kogut and Singh (1988) pioneered the empirical assessment of the effect 
of cultural distance on entry modes, concluding that large cultural distance 
and uncertainty avoidance result in more propensity to constitute joint 
ventures. Brouthers (2002) also tested an extended theoretical model that 
added institutional and cultural considerations to transaction cost theory, and 
confirmed that MNEs opt for WOEs when there are higher perceived contract 
negotiation and monitoring costs, as well as in host markets with low investment 
risks and few legal restrictions. Similarly, Tatoglu et al (2003) analyses the 
determinants for foreign ownership in Turkish manufacturing (wholly owned 
enterprise, joint venture), to find that cultural distance, diversification of 
parent-affiliate, and concentration ratio of Turkish industry seem to be strong 
determinants of foreign ownership level. The authors recommend Turkish 
policy makers to continue pursuing structural transformation and privatization 
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processes, although they recognize the unavailability of data to evaluate the 
effects of different policy decisions regarding FDI regime as a shortcoming. 
Richards and Yang (2007) integrate transaction theory and national culture 
perspectives in order to explain the degree of equity ownership in R&D joint 
ventures. They find evidence that multinationals prefer to hold a higher degree 
of participation in its R&D joint venture when they come from a less risk-averse 
culture, and when the JV is oriented to the local market. This finding is in line 
with Demirbag et al (2007), whom draw from institutional and transaction cost 
theories to analyse ownership decisions by foreign multinationals in Turkey. It 
turns out that JV is the preferred choice when parent companies are located in 
countries with higher differences in political stability, corruption, culture and 
language (respect to Turkey). On the other hand, companies working in the 
most developed regions of Turkey, entering industries with higher degree of 
concentration of foreign capital, or being intense in research and development, 
show more propensity to opt for WOE. Demirbag et al (2007) discuss also the 
marginal effects of the different variables on the form of JV used (minority, 50-
50%, majority). Finally, York and Lenox (2013) argue that also socioeconomic 
norms and movements may influence new entrants in certain industries (such 
as green building supply) to a greater extent that host country economic and 
political conditions. 
Finally, a fourth strand of literature argues that the degree of ownership 
is better explained by the global strategic decisions taken by multinationals 
(MNE) than by transaction costs. In this fashion, Davis et al (2000) stand that 
most researchers have focused only on (external) host country institutional 
factors, while it is important to look also at << […]the internal arrangement of 
activities in the organization>>. They find that affiliates with shared advertising, 
equipment and R&D activities with the parent are usually constituted as WOE. 
On the other hand, cultural and product usage differences result in the choice 
of modes of entry with a lesser degree of control. Overall, parent company 
characteristics (internal isomorphism) are more important than host country 
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factors in determining entry-mode choice; at the same time, neither business 
unit level strategy nor experience had an impact on entry mode. 
  Cui and Jiang (2009) adopt a strategic behaviour framework to explain 
entry mode in foreign markets, which seems to fit better the case of Chinese 
internationals than traditional transaction costs theory. Their results show 
that Chinese enterprises usually opt for WOE in host countries with intense 
competition, when seeking strategic assets, and when pursuing a global 
corporate strategy. Joint Venture is preferred when entering in high growth 
emerging markets, to enjoy from early-mover advantages. The last finding 
seems to be in line with the traditional enterprise literature (see, for instance, 
Porter and Fuller, 1986); however, it is challenged by Richards and Yang 
(2007), whom find some evidence proving that managers from high uncertainty 
avoiding countries do also opt for a higher degree of controls in uncertain 
environments, probably because the potential payoff is high (e.g. in China, 
India).  Dikova and van Witteloostuijn (2007) distinguish between global and 
multi-domestic strategy13, but the proxy they use is found to be insignificant 
in determining the entry mode. Finally, it is also worth taking into account 
that multinationals learn from previous practises and they are faster in setting 
multiple subsidiaries when they use entry modes in which they already have 
experience (Gao and Pan, 2010). 
In general, it can be argued the strategic approach presents certain 
similarities with the ownership factors discussed within the OLI framework. 
In fact, the OLI framework was complemented by the Knowledge-Capital model 
(Helpman, 1984; Markusen, 1984; Krugman and Venables, 1995), which can 
be related to the strategic decisions taken by multinationals. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, this Knowledge-Capital model (Markusen and Maskus, 1999) 
allows for multiple production facilities, separating cross-support centralized 
services and disperse production in some cases. This model argues that there 
are three main types of FDI: that focused in serving demand in the host country 
  13.
A global marketing 
strategy assumes that 
consumers across the 
world have the same 
preferences (e.g. Coca 
Cola), whereas a 
multi-domestic strategy 
tries to adapt the 
product (and the rest 
of the elements of the 
marketing mix) to the 
different destination 
markets.
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(market seeking or horizontal FDI), that used as export platform (vertical FDI), 
and that seeking to exploit resources and raw materials (strategic asset seeking 
FDI). Horizontal multinationals tend to be established when the origin and 
destination economies of the investment are similar in size and total demand 
is high. Conversely, vertical multinationals will appear when economies are 
dissimilar in size and endowments, and would be prevalent in developing 
countries.  In principle, horizontal FDI is likely to be a substitute for trade, as 
firms use FDI instead of exports supply the market, and will probably compete 
with local industries. By contrast, vertical FDI is a complement to trade, it is 
export oriented and it does not normally compete with local industries. We 
will be thus seeing this as part of the strategic decisions the international 
investor face.
Summarizing, the transaction cost theory, the OLI eclectic framework, 
institutional theories and MNE strategic approach should be regarded non as 
exclusive but as rather complementary strands of literature aimed at explaining 
the complexity of foreign market entry mode.  This topic was mostly visited 
during the nineties, and few papers have assessed the factors influencing these 
decisions at the light of more current data and new available sources. It is also 
worth noting that most of the more recent studies draw from single country 
surveys and databases (Japanese firms, American firms), and/or have frequently 
focused in China and East Asia (Cui and Jiang, 2009; Gao and Pan, 2010; Chen 
and Chang, 2011; Chang et al, 2013). As abovementioned, this paper aims 
at contributing to the literature on the following ways: (i) by using recent 
worldwide World Bank Enterprise Surveys (firm level data); (ii) combining 
and testing the different existing theories on the topic, thus presenting a larger 
set of hypothesis and dimensions to be analysed; (iii) and assessing entry mode 
decisions for foreign companies in Latin America, ultimately trying to draw 
evidence-grounded implications for policy makers and entrepreneurs investing 
in the region. 
TESISrevision miguel1.2.indd   140 19/05/2014   22:07:01
141DO FOREIGN MULTINATIONALS PREFER SOLO OR JOINT VENTURES IN LATIN AMERICA?
Prior to discussing our econometric approach to the determinants of entry 
mode, in the next section we discuss of the idiosyncrasy of foreign owned firms 
in Latin America drawing from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. 
3.3. Distinguishing features of foreign owned enterprises in Latin 
America and the Caribbean
 
Do Latin American foreign owned firms face obstacles different than those 
of other regions? Using data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, this 
section presents some descriptive statistics that help us focusing the discussion 
on the characteristics of foreign firms in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC). We show the results of some “equality of means” tests comparing 
several FDI aspects between different sub-regions.
 
3.3.1. Which problems do foreign companies face in Latin America, 
respect to other regions in the World?
Which are the most salient distinguishing features of the average foreign 
owned company in LAC, compared to other regions? The following stylized 
facts are presented in Table 3.7-1, at Appendix C. In general, foreign affiliates 
in Latin America tend to be slightly smaller in size than those in East Europe 
and Central Asia (ECA), South Asia or East Asia. At the same time, they 
have been, on average, operating longer, and count with a more experienced 
manager than in other regions. The degree of ownership in the region seems to 
be on the world average (79% owned by the foreigners). They rely on foreign 
technology licenses as much as those of other regions (17% declare to do so), 
although they tend to fall a bit behind in quality certificates (41%, compared to 
47% in East Asia, ECA or South Asia). 
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A distinguishing feature of Latin American FDI is that it is mainly horizontal; 
the average affiliate exports only about 15% of total value, compared to 26% in 
ECA or 35% in East Asia and the Pacific. This may be related to both inward 
orientation and existing trade obstacles. For instance, for the average foreign 
affiliate it takes seven days to clear customs in Latin America, significantly 
longer than in ECA or East Asia. There is also a significantly higher number 
of entrepreneurs that find customs and trade regulations an obstacle in LAC, 
compared to other regions, and acquiring import licenses takes double (27 
days) than in other parts of the world. This may be a reason why companies 
with foreign capital in Latin America rely less on inputs of foreign origin for 
their production processes. Around 62% of the workers involved in production 
are skilled, compared to 80% in East Asia, which seems to point to less 
sophisticated production processes; compared to other regions, a significantly 
higher number of entrepreneurs declare to have problems finding adequate 
workforce, and that labour regulation is an obstacle. 
In what regards to access to basic infrastructures (electricity, water, phone), 
foreign companies in Latin America do not seem to face significantly more 
problems than in other regions. Only telecommunications seems to be a more 
serious obstacle. Foreign companies settling in Africa and Latin America report 
higher levels of informality and crime, and political instability and corruption 
are considered by entrepreneurs an obstacle. In Latin America, there are less 
entrepreneurs that consider that the interpretation of the law by public official 
is consistent, compared to other regions. Controls (or bureaucracy procedures) 
seem to be also an issue, and managers spend an average of 18 days a year 
dealing with regulation (compared to 9 in East Asia or 14 in ECA). A foreign 
affiliate needs an average of 64 days to obtain a business license (double than in 
Africa and ECA, triple than in Asia).
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3.3.2. Which are the distinguishing features of foreign affiliates in 
Latin America, respect to local companies? 
Companies established in Latin America with a share of foreign capital above 
10% of social capital are in general larger than the average local competitor in 
terms of number of workers. Even if the average age of the company is the same, 
FDI firms count with relatively less experienced managers. Skilled workforce 
levels are similar in both FDI and local companies. On the other hand, FDI 
firms tend to rely more in foreign technology licenses (17% compared to 7%) 
and quality certificates (41% compared to 17%). They also tend to export 
abroad a larger share of their products, and show more propensity to import 
inputs for the production process than local companies (see Table 3.7-2).
Companies with foreign capital generally report slightly longer periods to 
obtain import licenses and operating licenses, as well as more days dealing 
with regulation and more tax inspections. Interestingly, local companies seem 
to be a bit more severe in their assessment of the business environment than 
the affiliates of multinationals, as a higher percentage of them consider that 
informality, access to land, crime, corruption and restricted access to finance 
are an obstacle to operations. On the other hand, managers of companies with 
foreign capital are more critic with customs and trade regulation and obstacles 
to the transportation of goods. There do not seem to be significant differences 
in the perception of the obstacles posed by political instability or business 
licenses and permits.  
 
3.3.3. Have the distinguishing features of companies with foreign 
capital established in Latin America changed in the context of the 
international crisis?
In the World Bank Enterprise survey database we are using, Latin American 
TESISrevision miguel1.2.indd   143 19/05/2014   22:07:01
THE DETERMINANTS OF FDI IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES144
entrepreneurs were surveyed in 2006 (except for the Caribbean) and 2009-
2010. We would like to see whether the characteristics of companies with 
foreign capital installed in the region have changed in the International Crisis 
period. Foreign owned companies in Latin America are nowadays larger, they 
tend to rely more in foreign technology licenses and quality certificates and, at 
the same time, they employ a lower percentage of skilled workers than prior to 
the crisis. They export more to the rest of the world, in spite of the fact that 
the average number of days to clear customs seems to have increased (see Table 
3.7-3 at Appendix C). 
There does not seem to have been significant improvements in getting 
connection to basic services, and electricity and telecommunications seem 
to be nowadays even more of an obstacle. In 2009-2010 political instability, 
crime, corruption and informality seemed to be a less serious problem than 
in 2006, and the reported percentage of annual sales as informal payments has 
halved. The number of days dealing with regulation and the waiting time to get 
an operating license have also significantly decreased. On the other hand, the 
number of tax inspections has increased and entrepreneurs in FDI companies 
are nowadays more concerned about tax rates and tax administration. Access 
to finance seems to be more difficult than in the pre-crisis period.
3.3.4. Within Latin America and the Caribbean, are there 
differences in the characteristics of companies owned by foreigners?
 
Within LAC, Central American companies with foreign capital are the 
largest, and those in the Caribbean the smallest. Years of operation are similar 
across the region, and the differences on average manager experience are 
barely significant. There does not seem to be differences in the percentage of 
skilled workers employed across sub regions, although there are in technology: 
companies in the Caribbean possess less quality certificates and rely more 
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in foreign technology. All these stylized facts are presented in Table 3.7-2 at 
Appendix C. 
One of the most salient features is that foreign capital in the Caribbean 
seems to prefer JV as a mode of entry, whereas in other regions JV are not that 
frequent. As discussed in the literature, there is some evidence that companies 
with less ownership advantages (e.g. without a technology or a patent to 
protect) are more likely to embark in JV (Chen and Chang, 2011). We will test 
this hypothesis in section 3.4.1 (H1a, H1b). 
South America and Mexico (SAM) is the region where foreign owned 
companies are least opened to international trade, both in terms of exports 
and imports of foreign inputs. Since the average number of days to clear 
customs is similar across sub regions and there are not significant differences 
in entrepreneurs‘ perception about customs and trade barriers in LAC, it 
may be argued that inward orientation may have to do with serving larger 
size economies in South America and Mexico, and not with trade obstacles. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that obtaining an import license in SAM takes 
an average of 30 days, compared to just 21 in Central America and 15 in the 
Caribbean.  
A JV seems in principle to be a more flexible way to incorporate inputs from 
other companies to the production process, and counting with a local may help 
dealing with regulation (15 days on average for JV compared to 19 for WOE). 
Interestingly, the number of days needed to obtain an import and operating 
licenses for a JV in Central America and the Caribbean is significantly lower 
than for a foreign WOE, whereas in South America and Mexico JV spend more 
time to obtain operating licenses. 
With regards to the number of days needed to obtain basic services 
(electricity, water and phone connection), there are not significant differences 
across LAC sub regions, nor between JV and WOE. Once connected to the 
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grid, electricity does seem to be a more serious obstacle in Central America 
and the Caribbean than in South America and Mexico, regardless of the mode 
of entry selected. 
When looking at the environment for doing business, it is possible to 
observe that foreign entrepreneurs in the Caribbean report that informality 
is less of an obstacle (compared to Latin America), and they report a lower 
percentage of annual sales made as informal payments. There is also a larger 
number of entrepreneurs that believe that the court system is fair in the 
Caribbean, compared to the rest of the region. We explore whether foreign 
entrepreneurs receive better treatment than locals in the Caribbean, but 
there are not significant differences in the percentage of annual sales made 
as informal payment, or the number of days dealing with regulation. Survey 
respondents declare that corruption and crime is more of an obstacle in 
Central America. Political instability and tax administration are perceived as 
more serious problems in South America and Mexico, compared to other sub 
regions. Finally, access to finance seems to be more likely to hinder operations 
in the Caribbean. We test more formally the significance of some of these 
preliminary findings in the next section. 
3.4. Empirical estimation of foreign market entry mode 
determinants
3.4.1. Data and methodology
At the basis of this analysis is the World Bank – IFC Enterprise Surveys 
database14, which contains firm surveys conducted in more than a hundred 
countries, mainly developing and emerging markets, over the period 2002-
2010. The survey method follows a stratified random sample, taking into 
 14.
Data and information 
about these surveys 
available at http://www.
enterprisesurveys.org/
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account sector, firm size, and region differences. Questionnaires are consistent 
and responses are comparable across countries. A possible caveat is that, 
whereas <<[i]deally the survey sample frame is derived from the universe of eligible firms 
obtained from the country’s statistical office>>, it may not always be the case, and 
in a few cases the sample may not be fully representative at the business private 
sector or individual country level. Questions cover a broad range of business 
environment dimensions, including external trade and customs, access to 
finance, institutions, infrastructure, labour, competition, and performance. 
Due to the richness of its questionnaire, these surveys have been used in a 
large number of research topics, ranging from export determinants (Farole 
and Winkler, 2011) to informal competition (Friesen and Wacker, 2013), and it 
seems to serve well also to the purposes of this investigation. 
It is worth mentioning that only data collected from 2005-2006 onwards 
adheres to the Enterprise Surveys Global Methodology and was fully 
standardized to make it comparable since the survey design stage. For this 
reason, we discard previous years, and focus on a 2006-2010 dataset, which 
contains two data points for most Latin American countries. We treat 
data as a cross section of countries (panel interviews have not been fully 
implemented yet), but we do include a “InternationalCrisis” dummy in some of 
the experiments to distinguish between surveys conducted in 2006 and those 
undertaken in 2009-2010. As abovementioned, our regional focus is in LAC, 
given that in recent years the entry mode by foreign companies has been mainly 
assessed for host countries in East Asia (Richards and Yang, 2007; Cui and 
Jiang, 2009; Chen and Chang, 2011).
In order to test the determinants of the entry mode choice (JV vs WOE) by 
companies with foreign ownership in LAC, following the literature, we perform 
a Logit regression. For that purpose, the first thing we do is to drop all the 
observations for local companies (those with foreign participation under 10% 
of firm equity). Then, a whole ownership dummy (=1 when the ratio of foreign 
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participation in the subsidiary >95%) is created. The choice of 10% and 95% 
levels of foreign participation to differentiate between domestic company, JV 
and WOE, follows the most common standards in the literature (Cui and Jiang, 
2009), and results should not vary significantly when choosing other usual 
thresholds (5% and 90%, as discussed in Demirbag et al, 2007). Nevertheless, 
in order to confirm the robustness of results, we also estimate the regressions 
using the percentage of foreign ownership as alternate dependent variable (see 
Richards and Yang, 2007). 
As, in principle, we do not have any theoretical basis to claim that this 
dummy would be following a normal distribution, we opt for a logit model 
instead of a probit. The latter is frequently used in models where there are 
clear marked differences between the two values of the dependent variable, 
whereas in this case we are making an “ad hoc” division in the continuum of 
“share of foreign ownership” and, for instance, the entry mode motivations of a 
subsidiary with a 94.5% share of foreign capital (considered JV) and those of a 
firm with a share of 95.5% (treated as WOE) may not differ that much. Both 
the logit and probit models may in principle present some heteroskedasticity 
problems, but these are corrected by most statistical packages, as it is the case 
of STATA. 
The binary logit function varies between 0 and 1, frequently presents 
corner solutions, and is usually defined as shown in equation (i). In our case, 
the probability of opting for a WOE subsidiary, , Pi , is depending on a series 
of determinants of the foreign market entry choice, represented by vector Xi. 
Conversely, the probability of creating a joint venture is defined as (ii).
(i)
(ii)
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The observed values of our dependent variable (in this case, 0 and 1, since 
we use a WOE dummy) will constitute a Bernoulli event, conditioned by the 
occurrence of the different X: 
Following the empirical derivation presented by Gujarati (2003:623), we 
would need to find the parameters that maximize the following common 
density function: 
At this point, it is worth mentioning a series of caveats. First, this paper 
assesses only the entry mode determinants of foreign companies that are 
already established in LAC. Given the chosen dataset, we are simply unable to 
capture those multinationals that at some point were planning to invest in the 
region but, due to business obstacles, risks, or strategic reasons, in the end did 
not do it. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that this does not imply any kind of 
selection bias, we simply focus in the companies that are already in the region, 
and whose investment has materialized either in a JV or a WOE. 
Another challenge we face is the fact that these surveys have not been 
designed to look specifically at the factors influencing mode of entry on foreign 
markets, but rather at obstacles to daily business operations. Cui and Jiang 
(2009) or Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) administered specific questionnaires 
to address their research questions. We thus recognize that some of the proxies 
we choose for the analysis may not be the most accurate and, then, results 
should be interpreted with caution. In addition, Bloningen (2005) argues that 
using survey responses from officials or businessmen familiar with the country 
may not provide an accurate and comparable measure of institutions across 
(iv)
(iii)
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countries. We try to mitigate this caveat by drawing from a careful literature 
review and, according to it, selecting the most suitable proxies to test the 
different theoretical approaches.  
Finally, a strong assumption we are making is that multinational companies 
conduct a thorough assessment of the destination market when they opt for 
investing in a subsidiary/branch (as opposed to exporting), and when choosing 
between creating a JV or going for a WOE branch. This implies that most 
of the obstacles managers of foreign companies declare in the surveys were 
not unexpected, and did have a bearing when deciding the form of entry. In 
addition, in line with Chen and Chang (2011) this is a dynamic decision and 
the degree of foreign participation in the subsidiary may vary over time, with 
companies switching from WOE to JV and vice versa react to changes in host 
market and organizational conditions. 
3.4.2. Formulation of hypotheses and selection of variables
Drawing from existing theories, in this section we present a series of 
research questions or hypothesis to be tested, and we account for the variable 
selection process.
First, drawing from the literature review, we look at ownership factors 
inf luencing the entry mode choice (JV vs WOE). According to the OLI 
framework, instead of exporting or licensing, a company can minimize the 
risk of imitation or suffering reputational or strategic asset losses by directly 
locating in the target market (Dunning, 1973; 1980).  Similarly, a company 
counting with patents or comparative advantages in the production process 
respect to competitors would try to protect them from opportunistic 
behaviour, and, in principle, would be more inclined to opt for a WOE instead 
of a JV when investing in a foreign market. Although Brouthers (2002) did not 
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find conclusive evidence that asset specificity (measured as the percentage of 
sales invested in R&D) has significant impact on foreign market entry mode, 
we would like to test this contention again by using two variables related to 
intangible assets: foreign technology licenses and official quality certificates.
 
Figure 3.4-1. Selection of variables and proxies according to the existing strands of literature.
Source: Author´s elaboration based on the literature review
•	 H.1a Companies that have licensed foreign technology show 
more propensity to choose WOE when establishing an affiliate.
•	 H.1b Firms counting with quality certificates are more 
inclined to opt for WOE subsidiaries.
TESISrevision miguel1.2.indd   151 19/05/2014   22:07:02
THE DETERMINANTS OF FDI IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES152
Similarly, it can be also argued that foreign direct investment in high 
technology or research intense sectors would normally take the form of 
WOE, in order to maintain control over this processes and minimize the 
risk of reverse engineering by competing firms. Empirical evidence is, 
however, mixed: whereas some studies confirm the relevance of “R&D 
intensity” for the entry mode choice (Davis et al, 2000; Demirbag et 
al, 2007; Chan and Chang, 2011), in other cases it does not seem to 
be significant (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Dikova and van Witteloostuijn, 
2007). For the purposes of this research, we link the OECD (2011) 
mean Technology Intensity index15 with survey observations through 
the ISIC code, for the different sectors, in order to test the following 
contention: 
•	 H.2 MNE s´ competing in R&D intensive sectors prefer a 
higher degree of ownership in the affiliates. 
The empirical literature has often highlighted the impact of the 
manager or multinational experience, or the years of operation of the 
subsidiary on the ownership structure, although evidence if not always 
conclusive about the sign of this relationship. Tatoglu et al (2003) find 
some evidence about positive correlation between the age of the affiliate 
and the probability of being a WOE. On the other hand, however Chen 
and Chang (2011), following Anderson and Gatignon (1986), find that 
in China the most experienced multinationals are more efficient in 
operating through JV agreements. In this fashion, we would like to test 
this hypothesis in the case of Latin America: 
•	 H.3 The age of the affiliate is negatively correlated with the 
probability of maintaining a WOE structure.
Fourth, following the line of thought of the OLI framework, a 
multinational that needs to rely more on skilled labour to develop 
 15.
Calculated as the 
mean research 
and development 
expenditure as a 
percentage of total 
output, by ISIC chapter 
(2 digits level of 
aggregation).
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entrepreneurial processes with higher value added would have certain 
ownership advantages from opting for a higher degree of participation 
in subsidiaries, in order to be able to determine which staff (with 
differentiated abilities) is hired and kept, as they constitute a key factor 
in the production process. 
•	 H.4 The more a subsidiary relies in skilled labour, the higher 
the control the foreign parent wants to exert over it (WOE more likely).
Apart from thinking about the ownership of specific assets, the 
multinational investing in a foreign country faces also a series of strategic 
decisions, such as what is going to be the source of raw materials and 
other inputs. If the process of production requires from large amounts of 
local inputs, a JV would be more appropriate, in order to assure timely 
and quality supplies (Chen and Chang, 2011). 
•	 H.5 The higher the reliance on local inputs for the production 
process, the more probable the MNE will opt for a lower degree of 
ownership (WOE less likely). Subsidiaries which are more dependent in 
foreign inputs are more likely to take the form of WOE. 
When we look at the location determinants of foreign companies 
in the context of the OLI paradigm, it is argued that companies 
tend to export to or use lower degrees of ownership (JV) in markets 
characterized by instability. This has to do with uncertainty avoidance 
patterns, as discussed by Kogut and Singh (1998), and Richards and 
Yang (2007). In this context, we use the survey question <<is political 
instability an obstacle for conducting business?>> as a proxy for destination 
market uncertainty. At the same time, political instability seems to be 
also related to investment risk. Brouthers (2002) and Davis et al (2000) 
found some evidence that the higher the investment risk is, the lower is 
the probability for a WOE, whereas Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) do 
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not.
•	 H.6 Companies tend to choose JV when entering countries 
with higher levels of political instability. 
According to Transaction Costs Theory, companies will opt for 
internalizing processes when the costs of operating through the markets 
are higher than those of the hierarchical structure (Coase, 1960; 
Williamson, 1989). Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) argued that 
the preferred mode of entry will be WOE in countries with higher 
contractual risks, as the cost of drafting and enforcing a Joint Venture 
contract in a setting with weak rule of law would be unbearable; however, 
they did not find conclusive evidence confirming this hypothesis. We 
use entrepreneur perceptions about the fairness of the court system as a 
proxy to test this contention.
•	 H.7 In those settings in which the court system is perceived as 
fair, foreign WOE will be less likely. 
Even if we do not count with the country of origin to test for cultural 
distance between the international investor and the host country, we 
do include some institutional variables in our analysis. Dikova and 
van Witteloostuijn (2007) argue that a greater degree of institutional 
advancement (better governance, less corruption.) would be positively 
related to the choice of JV, but they find no conclusive evidence. 
Conversely, in line with Brouthers (2002), who finds that firms entering 
markets where investment risk is high tend to use JV modes, we argue 
that multinationals investing in countries with weaker institutions, 
poorer governance and corruption (see Demirbag et al, 2007), will be 
more likely to use a JV mode, given that counting with a local partner 
may help the subsidiary navigate the idiosyncrasy of host country 
institutions. We try to test this argument by developing three sub-
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hypothesis. 
•	 H.8a Companies tend to choose JV where corruption is more 
pervasive. Thus, companies working in environments characterized by 
higher control of corruption are more likely to opt for a higher degree of 
ownership. 
•	 H.8b Foreign owned firms are more likely to present JV form 
in countries in which informal payments are more frequent. 
•	 H.8c Companies tend to choose JV in countries where dealing 
with regulation takes more time. 
 Finally, according to the Knowledge-Capital model, derived and 
evolving from the OLI framework, it is possible to distinguish between 
horizontal, vertical and strategic asset seeking FDI (Markusen and 
Maskus, 1999). We argue here that the discussion between horizontal 
and vertical FDI can be linked to the Global Strategic Approach discussed 
in our literature review in the following way:  when multinationals are 
planning to sell domestically most of the production in the subsidiary 
(market seeking or horizontal FDI), they are more likely to opt for a 
JV, in order to quickly gain knowledge and information about the local 
market (Brouthers, 2002). On the other hand, when they are planning 
to sell to a third country (export oriented or vertical FDI), WOE would 
be preferred, as the company usually have to rely more on specific assets 
(Chen and Chang, 2011). Similar to Fukao and Wei (2008), we use the 
local sales ratio as a proxy to distinguish between vertical and horizontal 
FDI, and we test the following contention. 
•	 H.9 Foreign export platforms (with a higher percentage of 
sales directed to foreign markets outside the host country) are more 
likely to be wholly owned. 
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3.4.3. Regression results
In this section we present the outcomes of our empirical exercise, structured 
around the different hypothesis we have formulated. Hypotheses 1 to 4 have to 
do with distinguishing features of the multinational company and its subsidiary 
(“ownership”); hypotheses 6 to 8 relate to destination market characteristics 
(“location”, “transaction costs”, “institutions”); finally, hypotheses 5 and 9 
would test certain “strategic decisions” by the multinational company. This is, 
of course, just an informative distribution of hypothesis to guide the reader; 
it could be perfectly argued that some of the proxies chosen would fit better 
in a different set of factors, as the boundaries between the different theories 
presented here are often blurry. As previously argued, they should be seen as 
complementary rather than competing views. Results are presented in table 
3.4-1.
H1a seems to be fully supported, as the coefficient of the variable foreign 
licensed technology is robust (varying between 0.5 and 0.8), and it is statistically 
significant at the 1% level of confidence in most of the equations (see Table 
3.4-1). This implies that subsidiaries of multinational companies in Latin 
America that rely on foreign technology licenses normally take the form of 
WOE companies rather than JV. This way, the MNE can better protect the 
ownership of the distinctive technology, minimizing the risk of imitation or 
misuse. 
We find no conclusive evidence of H1b, as the confidence level for quality 
certificate is barely significant at the 10% level in specification I, but becomes 
insignificant when plays together with foreign licenses and other variables. This 
means that, contrary to what would be expected, owning a quality certificate 
does not necessarily result in a higher propensity for FDI to take the WOE 
mode. We decide to leave quality certificate aside in most of the specifications. 
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Thus, we find mixed evidence of the impact of the ownership of specific 
assets on the entry mode choice. Whereas Brouthers (2002) was not able to 
confirm the “ownership” hypothesis by asking for “specific assets” on their 
survey, we can affirm that at least certain intangible assets such as foreign 
technology licenses do have a positive impact on the probability of opting for a 
WOE.
Second, we do not find support for H2, as companies with foreign ownership 
competing in technologically intense sectors are not more inclined to choose 
WOE mode. Thus, for Latin America and the Caribbean in the period 2006-
2010 we are unable to confirm the findings by Demirbag et al (2007) and Chen 
and Chang (2011). 
Third, the contention that the age of the affiliate is negatively correlated 
with the chance of maintaining a WOE structure (H3) is moderately supported. 
The coefficient is negative, as expected, and the t-test for years of operation is 
significant at the 5% or 10% level in most of the equations, except when we 
include informal payments. This finding seems to be in line with Chen and Chang 
(2011), and contrary to Tatoglu et al (2003), who argued that companies with 
longer experience prefer a greater degree of control.
With regards to the quality of human capital, results compel us to reject 
H4, as companies relying on a higher share of skilled labour do not show more 
propensity to present a WOE form. 
We find some that companies relying on foreign inputs tend to opt for WOE. 
Thus, this tentatively confirms our hypothesis (H5) that firms  buying a larger 
set of local inputs for the production process show more propensity to take the 
form of JV (the coefficient is significant only at the 10% level in some of the 
regressions). An explanation is that foreign companies take advantage of the 
experience of the local partners when choosing a domestic supplier.  
As expected, the sign of the coefficient related to political instability is 
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negative, suggesting that foreign investors opt for joint ventures in the most 
uncertain contexts (H6). This seems to confirm also in Latin America and 
the Caribbean previous findings by Kogut and Singh (1998), Richards and 
Yang (2007), and Brouthers (2002). It is worth noticing, however, that the 
coefficient is barely significant at the 10% level of confidence, and results have 
to be interpreted with caution. 
Contrary to what would be expected, in countries in which the courts are 
perceived as fair, foreign entrepreneurs prefer to retain WOE instead of opting 
for JV; the coefficient is statistically significant, but has an unexpected positive 
sign. Thus, H7 is rejected. A possible explanation is that the selected variable 
may not be the best proxy for contract enforcement or contract negotiation 
(as defined by the theory). Alternatively, it may also be the case that in those 
Latin American countries in which foreign investors perceive there is a higher 
degree of discretion when applying law, they prefer to count with a local 
counterpart to better navigate the different legal and regulatory requirements 
they subsidiary may encounter (thus establishing a Joint Venture).
There is little evidence that companies opt for JV in countries with less 
developed institutions (H8). The coefficients for corruption is an obstacle and 
management’s days dealing with regulation are not significant in specifications 
IX and X.  The coefficient for percentage of sales made as informal payments is 
negative and significant at the 10% confidence level in equations XII and XIII, 
which may point to some weak causality between informality levels in the host 
country and JV choice by foreign entrants: multinationals would prefer to go 
hand in hand with a local company in the most informal environments, in order 
to benefit from their contacts and bargaining power.  
Finally, we find strong evidence for H9, meaning that the higher the 
percentage exports represent in total sales, the more probable is that subsidiary 
takes the form of WOE. Results are robust and significant at the 1% level in 
most of the equations. This result is related to the knowledge capital model 
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Table 3.4-2. Results from hypotheses testing.
Statistical Evidence Hypothesis from the theoretical review to be tested
Confirmed H.1a Companies that have licensed foreign technology show more propensity to choose WOE when establishing an affiliate.
Rejected
H.1b Firms counting with quality certificates are more inclined to opt for WOE subsid-
iaries.
Rejected
H.2 MNE´s competing in R&D intensive sectors prefer a higher degree of ownership in 
the affiliates. 
Confirmed H.3 The age of the affiliate is negatively correlated with the probability of maintaining a WOE structure.  
Rejected
H.4 The more a subsidiary relies in skilled labor, the higher the control the foreign 
parent wants to exert over it (WOE more likely).
Confirmed 
(at 10% level)
H.5 The higher the reliance on local inputs for the production process, the more prob-
able the MNE will opt for a lower degree of ownership (WOE less likely). Subsidiaries 
which are more dependent in foreign inputs are more likely to take the form of WOE.
Confirmed (at 10% 
level)
H.6 Companies tend to choose JV when entering countries with higher levels of 
political instability.
Rejected, contrary 
sign
H.7 In those settings in which the court system is perceived as fair, foreign WOE will be 
less likely.
Rejected
H.8a Companies tend to choose JV where corruption is more pervasive. Thus, com-
panies working in environments in which corruption is perceived as a more severe 
obstacle are more likely to opt for a higher degree of ownership. 
Confirmed (at 10% 
level)
H.8b Foreign owned firms are more likely to present JV form in countries in which 
informal payments are more frequent. 
Rejected
H.8c Companies tend to choose JV in countries where dealing with regulation takes 
more time.
Confirmed H.9 Foreign export platforms (with a higher percentage of sales directed to foreign 
markets outside the host country) are more likely to be wholly owned.
(Markusen and Maskus, 1999), and is in line with the findings of Chen and 
Chang (2011): market seeking FDI (when most of the sales of the subsidiary are 
directed to the local market) has a higher probability of taking the form of joint 
venture, as partnering with local companies is probably a good way of accessing 
relevant distribution channels and target groups of customers. On the other 
hand, foreign investors that locate abroad to establish an export platform are 
more likely to opt for a WOE, thus ensuring the control over production and 
international logistics (Change et al, 2013).
We summarize the results of hypothesis testing in the next table.
Source: Author´s calculations.
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In addition, it is worth mentioning that the coefficient of the control dummy 
“International Crisis” is positive and significant in some of the equations, 
suggesting a higher propensity of the WOE mode of entry in Latin America in 
2009 and 2010, compared to 2006. On the other hand, sub-regional dummies 
(CAM, SAM, CAR) are insignificant across the different specifications, 
meaning that the same foreign entry mode determinants are taken into account 
by multinationals investing in Central America, Caribbean or South America. 
Given that the endogenous variable in the Logit is the logarithm of the 
probability ratio, the interpretation of the coefficient is not straightforward. In 
order to correctly estimate to which extent does the probability ratio increases 
or decreases due to changes in the different explanatory variables, we need 
to calculate the exponential value of the coefficient (Table 3.4-3). Using this 
parameter, we could estimate the effect of an increase of 1 unit of an exogenous 
variable using the average of the mean of this one in the sample. As it is well-
know, it is just an approximate result because the intrinsic non-linear Logit 
function determines different impacts of the same change in an exogenous 
depending on its previous level.  
Thus, for example, each additional year of operation in the subsidiary 
decreases the WOE/JV distribution ratio by 0.61% (1-0.9939, in specification 
VII). Each percentage point increase of inputs of foreign origin and direct 
exports over total sales results in increases in this ratio of 0.34% and 0.61%. 
Significant institutional determinants influencing the foreign market entry 
mode decision are political instability (-10% change in the ratio per each point 
of change in the 1 to 5 scale) and courts are fair (+14%). Finally, the factor with 
a greater impact seems to be counting with a foreign licensed technology, as 
switching the dummy from 0 to 1 increases by 88% the ratio of wholly owned 
enterprises versus joint ventures (65% if we look at specification XV). 
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Table 3.4-3. Degree of impact of the significant determinants on the foreign market entry mode decision.
 Specification VII  (WOE/JV=1.59) Specification XV (WOE/JV=1.49)
Variable
Coeffi-
cient
Exp (coeff)
Mod. 
Ratio
Coefficient Exp (coeff)
Mod. 
Ratio
Subsidiary years of operation -0.0061 0.9939 1.5803 -0.0049 0.9951 1.4821
% of skilled labor as % total 0.2890 1.3351 2.1228 0.3160 1.3716 2.0429
foreign licensed technology 0.6350 1.8870 3.0004 0.5060 1.6586 2.4704
technological intensity sector -0.0467 0.9544 1.5175 -0.0703 0.9321 1.3883
% of inputs of foreign origin 0.0034 1.0034 1.5954 0.0053 1.0053 1.4974
% of direct exports over sales 0.0061 1.0061 1.5996 0.0073 1.0073 1.5003
Courts are fair 0.1320 1.1411 1.8144 0.2200 1.2461 1.8559
Political instability is obstacle -0.1060 0.8994 1.4301    
Caribbean dummy    0.2640 1.3021 1.9394
Central American dummy    -0.0145 0.9856 1.4680
International crisis dummy    0.2250 1.2523 1.8652
% of sales as informal payment    -0.0489 0.9523 1.4183
Source: Author´s calculations based in regression results 
With regards to the overall goodness of fit of the model, it is not advisable 
to calculate the variance of the endogenous variable, given its dichotomous 
nature. To assess the real usefulness of the model we look at its predictive 
capacity, contrasting the way it assigns 0 and 1 values with our observed sample 
distribution. As presented in Table 3.4-4, our logit model (specification X in 
table 3.4-1) predicts correctly in 62.1% of the cases, with greater accuracy 
to determine in which cases do a foreign multinational establishes a WOE 
subsidiary (74%) than the cases in which they opt for joint ventures (43%) –
under a success cutoff threshold of 0.56–. 
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Table 3.4-4. Expectation / prediction evaluation for binary specification.
   ACTUAL   
  WOE JV Tot  
WOE=1 if foreign ownership>=95% 1 603 290 893  
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .56 0 211 219 430  
True WOE defined as WOE =1 Tot 814 509 1323  
   TRUE   
  WOE JV Tot  
WOE=1 if foreign ownership>=90% 1 641 259 900  
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .6 0 221 202 423  
True WOE defined as WOE =1 Tot 862 461 1323  
   ACTUAL   
            WOE JV Tot  
WOE=1 if foreign ownership>=51% 1 795 196 991  
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .71 0 212 120 332  
True WOE defined as WOE =1 Tot 1007 316 1323  
  WOE>=95% WOE>=90% WOE>=51%
Sensitivity Pr( 1|WOE) 74.08% 74.36% 78.95%
Specificity Pr( 0|JV) 43.03% 43.82% 37.97%
Positive predictive value Pr( WOE|1) 67.53% 71.22% 80.22%
Negative predictive value Pr(JV|0) 50.93% 47.75% 36.14%
     
False + rate for true ~D Pr( 1|JV) 56.97% 56.18% 62.03%
False - rate for true D Pr( 0|WOE) 25.92% 25.64% 21.05%
False + rate for classified + Pr( JV|1) 32.47% 28.78% 19.78%
False - rate for classified - Pr(WOE|0) 49.07% 52.25% 63.86%
     
Correctly classified  62.13% 63.72% 69.16%
Source: Author´s calculations 
In any case, again, it is worth noting that the purpose of the experiment is 
not predicting the behaviour of the companies, but rather assessing the validity 
of certain theories and hypotheses; thus, it is for us more important to look at 
the significance of the explanatory variables. In order to confirm the validity 
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of our results, we have not only run our regressions using binary logit, but 
also under OLS, using foreign ownership over the percentage of total shares as 
the dependent variable (instead of the WOE dummy). As can be observed in 
Table 3.7-4 at Appendix C,  the coefficient for the following variables remains 
significant too in most of the equations: subsidiary years of operation, foreign 
licensed technology, % of inputs of foreign origin (barely significant), % of 
exports over total sales, courts are fair, and the % of annual sales that has to 
be made as informal payment. We have also recurred to Variable Inflation 
Factor (VIF) analysis after each of the regressions to account for potential 
multicollinearity. Results point to extremely low VIF values for all the variables 
(below 1.11) except for the sub-regional dummies, which are also at a reasonable 
levels (2.9, compared to the threshold of 5 that is commonly use, as a rule of 
thumb, to signal multicollinearity problems). Only the dummy for services has 
been omitted due to multicollinearity with skilled labor. 
In sum, empirical test results point to certain factors that are relevant in the 
foreign entry mode decision, such as subsidiary years of operation, counting 
with a foreign licensed technology, informality in the host country and the 
overall orientation of the FDI subsidiary (horizontal versus vertical). These 
findings have important implications for managers of multinationals and policy 
makers in Latin America and the Caribbean, as discussed in section 3.5. 
3.4.4. Do foreign entrants locating in Latin America and the 
Caribbean have to take into account different factors than in the 
rest of the world?
A legitimate question we need to address is to which extent the findings we 
have presented are specific to Latin America and the Caribbean, and to which 
extent they can be generalized and apply also to entrepreneurs investing in 
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other regions. If we compare the results in Table 3.4-1 with those of Table 3.7-5 
(Appendix C), it is possible to observe that subsidiary years of operations, the 
percentage of foreign inputs, political instability and the percentage of exports 
(vertical orientation), are also significant and preserve the expected sign when 
we look at foreign investments outside LAC, thus confirming hypotheses H3, 
H5, H6 and H9, respectively. Additionally, the technological intensity of the 
sector, the percentage of skilled labor, and the number of days to clear custom 
remain insignificant, endorsing the rejection of H2 and H4. 
When we look at institutional variables, it is possible to observe that foreign 
entrepreneurs investing in Latin America take into account different factors 
that those investing in other parts of the world when assessing the foreign 
entry mode decision. While in other regions entrepreneurs tend to opt for 
joint ventures in environments characterized by severe corruption and/or 
bureaucratic burdens, in LAC those factors do not seem to be significant, and 
foreign investors pay more attention to the fairness of the court system and, 
sometimes, the percentage of informal payments they have to make. 
Finally, strategic assets also seem to play a different role in foreign entry 
decisions in LAC and outside the region. When we look at foreign entrants 
in other countries, it seems that, contrary to what is predicted by ownership 
theories, companies holding quality certificates tend to opt more for joint 
venture formulas. It may be the case that MNE s´ holding a quality certificate 
agree to share it with the local partner in exchange for know how about the 
host market, or even that the international investor acquires part of a local 
company to get its local quality certificate (in line with resource “augmentation” 
motivations in Meyer et al, 2009); unfortunately, this is something we cannot 
test in our dataset. On the other hand, and more importantly, unlike in other 
regions, counting with a foreign licensed technology is a very inf luential 
determinant in LAC, noticeably increasing the probability that the foreign 
company goes for WOE to enjoy ownership advantages. In future research, it 
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would be interesting to try to understand the reasons behind the distinctive 
attention that foreign entrepreneurs pay to foreign licensed technologies 
when deciding on the entry mode of a subsidiary in LAC (but not in the rest 
of the world). A tentative explanation for this is that, according to the Index 
of Economic Freedom16, Latin America presents the widest intra-regional 
range of variation in the enforcement of property rights and thus, in line with 
Papageorgiadis, Cross, and Alexiou (2013), foreign entrepreneurs would be 
taking into account de facto enforcement of property rights to inform their 
entry mode decision more seriously than in other continents.
In sum, while, in general, the determinants of foreign entry mode in LAC 
are similar to those in the rest of the world, foreign entrepreneurs investing 
in the region seem to pay more attention to a different set of institutional 
arrangements.
3.5. Policy implications and conclusion
In this paper we have used World Bank Enterprise Surveys to empirically 
test the determinants of foreign market entry mode in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, in the period 2006-2010. Results suggest that international investors 
and multinationals take into account a wide range of factors (Ownership, 
Location and Internalization, institutional and strategic considerations) when 
they decide between establishing a joint venture or a wholly owned enterprise 
in the region. Thus, in line with Brouthers (2002), we argue that the different 
strands of theoretical literature should be seen as complementary rather than 
as competing views.  
Managers of foreign companies and multinationals willing to invest in 
developing countries may find our results useful to orient its foreign entry 
mode choice. Drawing from the Knowledge-Capital model (Markusen and Maskus, 
16.
 Data and metadata 
accessible at http://
www.heritage.org/
index/property-rights
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17 
 Ownership, location, 
internalization. 
1999), we look at whether certain strategic decisions, such as the objective and 
orientation of the subsidiary, have an impact on the foreign entry mode. One 
of these decisions is which market is the subsidiary going to serve. It seems 
that a joint venture is a more advantageous formula for foreign establishments 
selling to the local market (horizontal FDI), as counting with a local partner 
may help unlocking key distribution channels and reaching the targeted public. 
On the other hand, companies that have decided to establish an export platform 
(vertical FDI) in the region may find more efficient to opt for a higher degree 
of control over the subsidiary, in order to more closely manage the production 
and international distribution process of the product they are going to export. 
Related to this is the (also strategic) decision of obtaining supplies for the 
production process in the host country or abroad. Subsidiaries that rely to a 
greater extent on foreign inputs for the production process often take the form 
of WOEs, in order to retain more control over the choice of the supplier. On 
the other hand, when the subsidiary buys a larger share of supplies in the local 
market, it is better to count with a JV, as the local partner is experienced in 
identifying the best domestic vendors and the most efficient channels to timely 
get quality inputs. 
We have also tried to test whether the different components of the OLI17 
framework (Dunning 1980) have a bearing on the entry mode decision, using 
a series of proxies. If the potential investor is holder of foreign technology 
licenses, opting for full participation in the subsidiary (WOE) may help 
preventing reverse engineering and surrendering strategic information to 
potential competitors. In our experiment, this factor seems to be the most 
influential determinant of foreign market entry mode, which, at least partially, 
validates the theory arguing that multinationals will be prone to retaining the 
“ownership” of specific assets (such as technology). Interestingly, this is a finding 
that holds only in Latin America and the Caribbean, but not in the rest of the 
developing world, and may have to do with the greater degree of variability 
of property rights enforcement across the region. On the other hand, there is 
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some evidence that firms counting with quality certificates are more inclined 
to opt for WOE subsidiaries when entering this region.
“Location” advantages do not seem to have a bearing on the entry mode 
decision, as barriers to clear customs and the availability of skilled labor in the 
host market are not significant. 
At the same time, the institutional environment and the rules of the 
game (transaction costs) in the host country have certain impact in the entry 
mode and should be considered by international investors. In environments 
in which there is a higher perceived unfairness of the courts, a more instable 
political system, and the company has often to recur to informal payments as 
part of its regular operations, it may be useful to count with a local partner 
knowledgeable of the formal or informal channels through which the company 
can deal with potential obstacles to business. It is worth mentioning that not 
all the institutional variables matter, as corruption and regulatory complexity/ 
bureaucracy do not significantly influence the choice between WOE and JV in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (but they do seem to be influential in other 
countries). 
In sum, as contrasted by Davis et al (2000), both internal and external 
factors seem to have a bearing on the entry mode decision of foreign companies 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, although in our case it is difficult to 
prove that internal organizational isomorphism tends to dominate over host 
country factors. Nevertheless, as they argue, it may well be the case that, 
<<[a]s the quest to gain economic efficiency and maintain control encourages parent 
firms to replicate known organizational routines using wholly-owned subsidiaries as 
conduits…>>, companies opting for a higher degree of ownership may be 
losing some of the potential advantages of internationalization (country specific 
knowledge, easier access to distribution channels and customers under a locally 
tested marketing strategy). We find some evidence that, over time, subsidiaries 
are slightly more inclined to seek a higher degree of autonomy and more 
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flexible arrangements with local partners under the form of joint ventures (as 
argued by Chen and Chang, 2011). It is also worth noting that the determinants 
of foreign entry mode that we have found significant seem to be broadly similar 
in Latin America, Central America and the Caribbean.
Finally, a note for policy makers in the region. An intuition derived from the 
analysis is that by enhancing the legal framework for industrial property (and 
its effective enforcement) they will be ensuring foreign companies that their 
specific assets ownership will be respected when establishing a subsidiary in 
the country. This way, foreign investors would be more likely to rely on joint 
ventures, which could increase knowledge spillovers over local firms. Similarly, 
measures aimed at guaranteeing the quality and reliability local supplies (quality 
certificates, better supply contract enforcement) could help fostering backward 
linkages in the host economy. 
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3.7. Appendix C. Descriptive statistics and additional results
Table 3.7-1. Average response values for foreign owned companies (>10%), by region.
Variable AFR EAP ECA LAC SAR ttest  LAC vs rest
Total surveyed companies 15276 4952 13286 25587 477  
Number of observations (FDI) 2557 780 1301 3381 20  
Size of the company 1.843 2.254 2.301 2.176 2.292 0.0000 ***
% owned by foreigners 81.762 81.193 76.148 79.409 66.250 0.3274  
Manager experience (years) 14.578 15.173 14.843 18.921 15.996 0.0000 ***
Quality certificate 0.305 0.464 0.477 0.413 0.472 0.0369 **
Licensed foreign technology 0.138 0.255 0.209 0.174 0.285 0.4958  
Affiliate years of operation 16.577 14.602 15.561 23.383 20.745 0.0000 ***
Delay getting electricity connection 31.604 27.982 51.295 42.407 17.364 0.1305  
Monthly power outages 11.078 2.293 5.984 4.030 41.617 0.0000 ***
Delay in obtaining water con. 35.109 29.727 40.952 41.816 12.333 0.4588  
Delay in obtaining phone con. 23.955 10.532 18.687 22.707 29.357 0.1984  
Is electricity an obstacle? 2.127 1.321 1.529 1.783 2.394 0.0113 **
Are telecommunications an obst 0.988 0.705 1.364 1.519 1.179 0.0000 ***
% of national sales over total 88.593 58.288 68.922 80.531 70.686 0.0038 ***
% of indirect exports over total 2.947 9.377 4.149 4.326 6.607 0.9761  
% of direct exports over total 8.429 35.216 26.928 15.149 23.122 0.0005 ***
Average number of days to clear cus-
toms
8.233 6.055 4.460 7.363 8.696 0.0290 **
% of inputs of foreign origin 50.968 54.440 51.896 46.521 53.069 0.0000 ***
Obs. transportation of goods and inputs 1.509 0.952 1.199 1.474 1.362 0.0000 ***
Obs. Customs and trade regulation 1.427 0.977 1.190 1.501 1.169 0.0000 ***
Is informality an obstacle? 1.609 0.833 1.285 1.506 1.055 0.0015 *** c
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Variable AFR EAP ECA LAC SAR ttest  LAC vs rest
Is access to land an obstacle? 1.208 0.766 0.992 0.809 1.391 0.0000 ***
Is crime an obstacle? 1.690 0.781 1.231 1.660 1.394 0.0000 ***
The court system is fair 2.335 2.456 2.209 2.024 2.031 0.0000 ***
Interpretations of law consistent 2.445 2.437 2.230 2.337 1.714 0.0491 **
Days dealing with regulation (in a year) 9.807 9.350 14.334 18.155 5.504 0.0000 ***
% of annual sales as informal payment 2.315 0.971 2.335 0.749 0.520 0.0000 ***
Number of tax inspections 5.703 2.221 4.402 4.701 2.887 0.9848  
Import license (n days) 18.014 12.108 15.475 27.171 9.957 0.0000 ***
Operating license (n days) 35.957 18.189 31.514 64.703 14.964 0.0000 ***
Obs. Tax rates 1.714 1.070 1.930 1.716 1.482 0.1422  
Obs. Tax administration 1.481 0.913 1.498 1.542 1.396 0.0000 ***
Obs. Business licensing and permits 1.186 0.691 1.167 1.341 1.430 0.0000 ***
Obs. Macro instability 1.463 . . 2.099 . 0.0000 ***
Obs. Political instability 1.219 0.880 1.760 1.913 2.462 0.0000 ***
Obs. Corruption 1.722 1.174 1.641 1.989 1.931 0.0000 ***
Obs. Restricted hours of operation 0.554 . 0.875 1.274 . 0.0000 ***
Obs. Prices mark-ups 0.932 . 0.686 1.346 . 0.0001 ***
Obs. Restricted access to financing 1.645 0.820 1.275 1.301 1.117 0.0001 ***
% of workers with high school 53.571 . . 78.521 67.393 0.0000 ***
Obs. Labor regulation 0.939 0.755 1.105 1.432 0.825 0.0000 ***
Obs. Inadequate workforce 1.425 1.054 1.752 1.828 1.371 0.0000 ***
% skilled workers 0.601 0.807 0.699 0.629 0.687 0.0002 ***
Source: Authors´ calculations using WB-IFC Enterprise Surveys. Sample weights not considered. 
*, **, and *** s ignal a statist ically s ignif icant dif ference (at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of 
confidence, respectively) in the two sample t-test we have applied. The test compares the 
means of the Caribbean and he rest of the world, taking into account a pooled variance. 
Under the nul l hypothesis, both groups have equal mean. More information about the 
testand its application with STATA is available at http://www.stata.com/manuals13/rttest.pdf. 
→
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Table 3.7-2. Average response values in Latin America, by sub-region and mode of entry. 
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Table 3.7-3. Average response values for foreign owned companies (>10%) in Latin America. Pre 
and post-crisis periods.
Variable 2006 2009-10 2010 vs 2006
Number of observations 1604 1777 ttest (p)  
Size of the company 1.971945 2.359595 0 ***
% owned by foreigners 80.05616 79.00341 0.3351  
Manager experience (years) 18.60969 19.11629 0.2302  
Quality certificate 0.3410224 0.4772088 0 ***
Licensed foreign technology 0.1346633 0.2093416 0 ***
Affiliate years of operation 20.03664 26.40502 0 ***
Delay getting electricity connection 38.68502 45.61053 0.2709  
Monthly power outages 2.706537 4.986935 0.0099  
Delay in obtaining water con. 43.64103 41.28889 0.8354  
Delay in obtaining phone con. 24.89621 20.60994 0.1464  
Is electricity an obstacle? 1.725343 1.835023 0.0355 **
Are telecommunications an obst 1.03937 1.590643 0 ***
% of national sales over total 84.02939 77.36353 0 ***
% of indirect exports over total 2.803002 5.707483 0 ***
% of direct exports over total 13.1676 16.94448 0.0002 ***
Average number of days to clear customs 5.771429 8.349558 0.0003 ***
% of inputs of foreign origin 47.86903 45.71429 0.2327  
Obs. transportation of goods and inputs 1.275601 1.651215 0 ***
Obs. Customs and trade regulation 1.315644 1.655568 0 ***
Is informality an obstacle? 1.575193 1.443221 0.0067 *** c
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Is access to land an obstacle? 0.6845809 0.9203187 0 ***
Is crime an obstacle? 1.730457 1.596392 0.0024 ***
The court system is fair 1.91572 2.090376 0 ***
Interpretations of law consistent 2.350239 2.132353 0.0826 *
Management’s days dealing with regulation         
(in a year)
20.88071 15.6562 0 ***
% of annual sales as informal payment 1.162717 0.5433071 0.0015 ***
Number of tax inspections 3.987805 5.423406 0.0054 ***
Import license (n days) 24.44225 28.9558 0.1557  
Operating license (n days) 72.98438 58.78795 0 ***
Obs. Tax rates 1.62776 1.795119 0.0001 ***
Obs. Tax administration 1.474651 1.602966 0.0018 ***
Obs. Business licensing and permits 1.253846 1.41875 0.0001 ***
Obs. Macro instability 2.09872    
Obs. Political instability 2.197085 1.657745 0 ***
Obs. Corruption 2.140407 1.851873 0 ***
Obs. Restricted hours of operation 1.273684    
Obs. Prices mark-ups 1.345946    
Obs. Restricted access to financing 1.20727 1.384136 0 ***
% of workers with high school  78.52128   
Obs. Labor regulation 1.258675 1.587006 0 ***
Obs. Inadequate workforce 1.645649 1.992086 0 ***
% skilled workers 0.6521649 0.6136991 0.0424 **
Source: Author´s calculations using WB Enterprise Surveys, several years.
→
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Table 3.7-4. Results of alternative linear regression (Latin America and the Caribbean). 
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Table 3.7-5. Binomial logit results for FDI subsidiaries established in the rest of the world (non in Latin America and 
the Caribbean).
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HOW REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND 
TRANSNATIONAL ENERGY NETWORKS 
HAVE BOOSTED FDI IN TURKEY
(AND MAY CEASE TO DO SO)
4.1. Motivation
Turkey constitutes a very interesting case to study capital flows and, more 
concretely, foreign direct investment (FDI). The country counts with an 
enviable geo-strategic location both for business and international relations 
(Brzezinski, 1997). Additionally, it has traditionally enjoyed privileged 
relations with the United States and the European Union18. Turkey embraced 
structural adjustment programs in the eighties and capital account opening 
in the nineties. However, in spite of these reforms, if we compare to other 
emerging markets with similar levels of per capita GNI such as Mexico or Brazil, 
Turkey has been traditionally characterized by low levels of FDI (just around 
0.5% of the GDP for most of the 1980s and 1990s). In fact, during the 1990s 
and early 2000s, the country suffered several sudden stops associated to short 
18.
Turkey has been an 
associate state to the 
European Economic 
Community since 
1963, which implied 
progressive reduction in 
import tariffs (Ankara 
Agreement); in 1999 
the Helsinki European 
Council recognised 
Turkey as a candidate for 
EU membership; in 2005 
accession negotiations to 
the EU started officially. 
 A CASE STUDY
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term capital outflows. It will be necessary to understand the reasons behind 
this disappointing performance in attracting and keeping foreign capital. 
Most of the authors consider that macroeconomic instability has been the 
main deterrent of foreign direct investment in Turkey (e.g. Uctum and Uctum, 
2005; Basar and Tosunoglu, 2006). Faulty institutions and the slow pace of 
privatization have been also blamed (Erdilek, 2003; Dumludag et al., 2007). 
The question now is whether this explanation, which seems to fit well with the 
events of the 1990s, is sufficient also to account for the surge in FDI inflows 
experienced in the second half of the 2000s. 
In principle, one may think that increasing FDI inflows observed since 2005 
is just the product of the enhanced economic and political stability brought 
by	the	successive	governments	of	Erdogan s´	Adalet	ve	Kalkınma	Partisi	(AKP,	
assuming office in November 2002). However, in line with Sayek (2007), we 
will argue in this paper that enhanced macroeconomic and political stability is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition to attract FDI, and that EU accession 
negotiations (launched in 2005) have been more influential.  
Thus, it is the aim of this paper to understand how evolving relationships 
with the EU and the accession process have enhanced FDI attraction in 
Turkey (and may cease to do so). We try to contribute to existing research in 
the following ways: (i) by complementing with a country specific case study 
existing cross country analysis of FDI determinants; (ii) by bringing regional 
integration considerations to the literature discussing FDI in Turkey; and 
(iii) by presenting a geostrategic perspective to help explaining the relevance 
foreign investment in energy has lately acquired. 
Drawing from the qualitative framework elaborated by Blomstrom and 
Kokko (1997), our analysis suggests that the EU-Turkey Customs Union 
Agreement of 1996 did not help significantly expanding FDI inflows because 
implementation considered a 5 year grace period for the alignment of certain 
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trade policy aspects, and it did not entailed free capital mobility (as that enjoyed 
by the members of the Common Market). On the other hand, the official start 
of EU Accession Negotiations in 2005 involved a wide set of accompanying 
reforms in 35 chapters of the acquis communitaire, including free movement of 
goods, right of establishment to provide services, competition policy, financial 
services, energy, regional policy or the Customs Union. Sustancial progress 
in the business environment associated to the accession process has helped 
enhancing Turkey s´ appeal for the foreign investor. We also find how, even 
when remaining significantly above the levels observed in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, FDI inflows to GDP have somewhat contracted since 2009, in 
the context of the global financial crisis resulting in a change in EU priorities 
and weaker accession prospects for Turkey. Only in the energy and electricity 
sectors FDI inflows have significantly expanded, probably due to European 
interests in creating transnational energy corridors involving Turkey. 
The remaining of this chapter is divided as follows. Section 4.2 presents 
a brief look at economic and political developments occurred over the last 
three decades in Turkey. Set the background, we move to summarize the main 
research findings contained in existing literature discussing FDI in Turkey (4.3). 
Section 4.4 presents the qualitative discussion on the effects of different EU 
integration stages on foreign investment. Section 4.5 looks at the concrete case 
of booming FDI in the energy sector, which needs to be explained by looking at 
trans-regional logistics and geopolitical factors. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2. Three decades of liberalization in Turkey
In the aftermath of 1979’s foreign exchange crisis, Turkey signed a 
“Structural Adjustment Loan” with the World Bank in March and a three year 
deal with the IMF in June. The recovery plan implied to transform an exhausted 
import substituting model into an export oriented open economy (see Önis, 
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1998). During the 1980s, Turkey experienced a relatively successful growth 
and export performance, but at the expense of real wages and increasing 
income inequalities (Botarav and Yeldan, 2001).
Economic liberalisation and the previously mentioned market-orientated 
measures, promoted by Turgut Özal’s government, did not enhance foreign 
investment attraction significantly. Önis (1994) argues that the orthodox 
approach of shifting incentives to foster FDI is insufficient if investors do not 
rely on the sustainability of the new regime. A large foreign debt stock, lack of 
trust between foreign companies and the government, and the persistence of 
subsidies and protectionist measures in certain sectors were probably some of 
the reasons why inward FDI continued to be low during the 1980s. 
Figure 4.2-1. Capital flows and sudden stops in the Turkish economy.
Source: Central Bank of Turkey and IMF Article IV estimates (December 2013)
In 1989 Turkey took a step ahead in its liberalisation process by fully 
opening its capital account to foreign flows (Önder, 2007). This measure 
has been subject of controversy, as macroeconomic instability increased and 
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the country was exposed to several sudden stops in the following decade 
(1994, 1998 and 2000-2001). Moreover, the country was not able to increase 
significantly FDI attraction, as most of the inward capital flows were driven by 
short term speculative purposes. 
Demir (2004) summarizes the different explanations given to the 
unsatisfactory performance of Turkey during the 1990s. On the one hand, 
existing bureaucracy and domestic institutional inefficiencies could have had a 
negative impact on the outcome of the reforms (see, for instance, Celasun et al., 
1999). On the other hand, while recognizing disturbances introduced by the 
government, most of the Turkish economists (Önis, 1998; Botarav and Yeldan, 
2001) attribute the problems to deficiencies, such as insufficient consideration 
of the distinguishing features of the Turkish economy during the adoption of 
liberalization. A third view is that of a timing-failure in the execution of the 
different reforms.
The mentioned decade of political and economic instability ended up with 
Turkey suffering from twin crises in November 2000 (mainly of financial nature) 
and February 2001 (currency and balance of payments crisis). Interestingly, 
the economic slump would be the turning point leading into a new era. The 
fact that the collapse was severe and widespread across sectors and economic 
actors, the figure of Kemal Dervis as a coordinator of government’s dialogue 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), and 
EU membership prospects are some of the factors identified by Arpac et al 
(2008) as helpful to overcome the pressures of interest groups and start the 
implementation of an ambitious set of reforms in the aftermath of the crisis.
Erdogan’s AK party succeeded at General Elections in November 2002. 
Despite some fears that the new inexperienced government could re-initiate 
the adoption of populist measures and fiscal indiscipline, in fact they fully 
committed to continue the ambitious reform program set up by the previous 
coalition (led by Kemal Dervis). Moreover, the AKP has been continuously 
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pursuing an increase in market orientation and adoption of European standards, 
facilitating this way an improved investment framework. 
New FDI regulation came into force in 2003, removing the requirement 
of obtaining a permission to create new companies with foreign capital and 
easing the investment process. In addition to that, reforms included a new 
capital markets law, enhanced corporate governance measures and accelerated 
privatization. In October 2005 negotiations with the EU regarding Turkey’s 
accession officially started. This process helped to accelerate economic and 
institutional reforms, which reinforced stability and business expectations until 
the outbreak of the world financial crisis in 2008 (see Uckun and Doerr, 2010). 
The country suffered a severe net portfolio outflow in 2008, as the economy 
started to head into recession, which was perceived in advance by the markets. 
However, unlike the crises of 1998-99 and 2001, portfolio flight was moderate 
(0.7% of GDP, compared to more than 2% of GDP in the previous crises), and 
this time it was compensated by large FDI inflows.  Economic growth bounced 
back well in 2010 and 2011, and large portfolio inflows have returned to Turkey. 
However, vanishing EU accession prospects combined with a more shaky 
growth and exchange rate instability seem to have undermined FDI attraction 
potential, since yearly inflows are less than half those observed prior to the 
global economic slowdown. The Turkish Central Bank introduced in 2012 a 
new prudent monetary framework aimed at attaining macroeconomic stability, 
mitigating the variability of capital flows and reducing the current account gap 
(Kara, 2012), but this may not be enough per se to anchor the expectations of 
foreign investors considering the establishment of long term subsidiaries (FDI). 
4.3. A literature review on the determinants of FDI in Turkey
Existing literature dealing with foreign direct investment in Turkey is 
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heterogeneous, presents different focuses and draws from dissimilar theoretical 
approaches and methodological tools (see Table 4.8-1 in the Appendix D). In 
order to synthesize existing empirical evidence, we group the studies depending 
on the determinants of FDI they discuss and the methodology applied.
A first set of articles departs from OLI’s eclectic paradigm (see Dunning, 
2001), and tries to determine the location, ownership and internalization 
factors that influence the establishment of multinational enterprises in Turkey. 
Collection of survey data at the firm level is usually the method adopted by 
these studies.  
Tatoglu and Glaister (1998) conducted a survey on motivations for foreign 
direct investment in Turkey on a purposive sample of 316 foreign equity 
ventures. There is evidence that among the most relevant factors influencing 
location in Turkey are its market size (and the related growth rate) and certain 
government policies such as the possibility to repatriate profits.
In a similar fashion, Tatoglu and Glaister (2000) examine the location, 
transaction and firm related factors in the establishment of foreign companies 
in Turkey. For this purpose, they adopt a managerial approach, drawing mainly 
from industrial organization models, internalization theory and the eclectic 
paradigm. Erdilek (2001) has criticised this research for being <<narrowly 
focused>> and providing <<no in-depth analysis of the economic, political and social 
factors that determine Turkey’s attractiveness as a host country to foreign investors>>. 
Tatoglu et al (2003) analyze the determinants for foreign ownership in Turkish 
manufacturing (wholly owned enterprise or joint venture form). Their findings 
suggest that there are country-related factors that influence the formula of 
foreign investment access to the host economy. The authors recommend 
Turkish policy makers to continue pursuing structural transformation and 
privatization, but these suggestions do not seem to be clearly derived from the 
empirical results.
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Deichmann et al (2003) use a conditional logit model in order to identify 
the location patterns of multinational enterprises in Turkey. The location 
decision will depend more on the characteristics of the industry (productivity, 
agglomeration of similar firms) and on local conditions (coastal access, 
infrastructures, etc.). The share of public investment in the GDP of each 
region does not seem to be an influencing factor.  Another group of scholars 
has looked at the geographical distribution of FDI within Turkey, highlighting 
increasing regional divergences (Berkoz, 2001; Erkut and Baypinar, 2003; 
Berkoz and Turk, 2009). 
Lenger and Taymaz (2007) study innovation and technology transfer 
activities in Turkey and observe that foreign owned firms are on average 
more innovative that domestic ones. They also find that the main channel of 
spillovers is workers’ acquired knowledge. There does not seem to be much 
evidence of significant horizontal or vertical spillovers at the industry level. 
Therefore, not all the alleged benefits of FDI may be easily and unconditionally 
achieved in reality. 
Whether these studies usually contain useful guidance from a managerial 
perspective, they do not always provide hints for the policy maker.  As it is 
acknowledged by some of the authors, this approach needs to be complemented 
with a macroeconomic perspective to fully understand the determinants of FDI 
in Turkey (Tatoglu et al, 2003).
A second strand of literature has a wider focus which normally considers 
macroeconomics and policy determinants of FDI. Their aim is varied, but they 
have in common the use of a quantitative analytical approach, often in the form 
of cross country regression.   
Erdilek (2003) analyses the causes for the low levels of both inward and 
outward FDI in Turkey. He blames internal factors such as 
<<chronic high inflation, increasing economic instability, inward 
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However their derived 
conclusion that an 
improved institutional 
framework should be 
the priority is at best 
tentative and should be 
tested, since most of the 
factors considered in 
the questionnaire have 
a similar average mark 
(between 3.5 and 4). It 
is therefore very difficult 
to discriminate the most 
relevant causes from 
the rest. 
orientation until 1980, lack of protection of intellectual property rights, 
lack of inflation accounting and internationally acceptable accounting 
standards, failure of privatization, insufficient legal structure and 
inadequate infrastructure>>. 
Erdilek (2003)
Similarly, Basar and Tosunoglu’s (2006) conclude that Turkey seems to be 
attracting less FDI than expected (given the size of its economy), and this is 
probably a result of high inflation rates and macroeconomic instability. 
During the 1980s and 1990s it was believed that capital account liberalization 
would result in increased foreign investment attraction (see, for instance, Desai 
et al, 2006). This resulted to be a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
enhance FDI inf lows. Apart from counting with reliable macroeconomic 
management, a stable investment framework and efficient institutions seem to 
be necessary to appeal the foreign investor. Dumludag et al (2007) perform 
cross country regression to find that lack of corruption, transparency, rule of 
law or security of property rights contribute positively to FDI attraction. In the 
second part of the paper the authors present the results of a survey which seems 
to confirm that, in Turkey, macroeconomic instability, inflation and deficient 
institutions are perceived as barriers to FDI attraction19. 
Uctum and Uctum (2005) look at Foreign Porfolio Inf lows (FPI) and 
Foreign Direct Investment flows in Turkey with a different methodology: by 
plugging data into a model in order to understand how punctual crises have 
affected capital f lows in Turkey. They conclude that <<institutional factors, 
structural reforms and crises affect both components asymmetrically. FPI is vulnerable to 
regional contagion (Russian crisis) and responds negatively to financial risk, while FDI 
is sensitive to economic risk but is not affected by contagion>>. This result seems to 
confirm that FDI inflows were deterred during the 1990s due to economic risk, 
whereas during 2002-2008 foreign investors were attracted by the more stable 
economic situation. 
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A recent study by Bilgili et al (2012) employs Markov Regime-Switching 
Models to study the determinants of FDI in Turkey from a non-linear approach. 
They conclude that FDI inf lows are positively correlated with economic 
growth in Turkey, decreasing country risk and expansion in exports, whereas 
labor costs, imports and currency depreciation expectations have a negative 
impact on FDI in Turkey. Results point to non-linearities and and significant 
structural breaks in 1988, 1996, 2001, and 2005-2006. While 1988 and 2001 
are clearly identified as years in which there was a mayor crisis in Turkey, this 
is not the case in 1996, and 2005-2006, and the authors attribute this breaks to 
temporary increases in the risk perception indicator for Turkey due to political 
developments such as uncertainty under elections and the announcement of 
the opening of a nuclear reactor. In the next section we will argue that, while 
the temporal sudden stop in FDI inflows observed in certain quarters in those 
years may be attributed to the perception of political risk, the underlying reason 
behind the observed change in trends observed after 1996 and, especially, after 
2005 may have also to do with regional integration prospects.  
Summarizing, it is possible to affirm that these studies point to economic 
and political unsteadiness during the 1990s as the main obstacle to inward FDI 
in Turkey. Therefore, it might be thought that better FDI figures in Turkey 
since 2005 are just the natural consequence of improved macroeconomic and 
political stability. A weakness of these multi country exercises is that, while 
they are useful to identify generic determinants behind variations in FDI trends, 
they do not assess the impact of concrete reforms in the Turkish investment 
framework, which may be needed to fully explain the recent amelioration of 
foreign investment figures in the country.
The third approach differs from previous strands of literature in the 
sense that they do not attribute fully explanatory power to macroeconomic 
and institutional factors, as they usually consider a third relevant force: EU 
accession prospects. 
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Loewendahl and Ertugal-Loewendahl (2000) concluded that << Turkey has 
under-performed in attracting FDI due to the slow pace of privatization and political-
institutional obstacles, of which chronic inflation is a manifestation>>. This view is 
according to previously mentioned studies. Additionally, the authors introduce 
the regional dimension by providing an interesting explanation to the low 
impact of 1996 Customs Union Treaty with the EU on FDI. They observe 
that, even when announced FDI increased significantly in the aftermath of 
the agreement, effective investment remained low. This suggests that the 
government did not address efficiently the interest shown by foreign investors. 
Even when Turkey was supposed to improve competition law and to introduce 
industrial and technical standards, the necessary reforms were not always 
efficiently implemented (Francois, 2005:124)
Another important milestone from the regional integration perspective 
is the beginning of accession negotiations to the EU in 2005. Zaman (2005) 
predicted an increase in inward FDI to Turkey in the aftermath of the deal, 
something that seems to have been confirmed. Similarly, Dutz et al. (2005) 
also argued that the opening of EU accession negotiations would be beneficial 
for inward FDI, given that Turkey committed to progress in the adoption of 
the common acquis. According to Uckun and Doerr (2010), the combination of 
improvements in the domestic investment framework (FDI law, capital market 
reforms, banking sector reforms), together availability of global financial funds 
during 2003-2008 facilitated the unprecedented increase of FDI inflows. 
As early as 2007, Sayek already concluded that the recent upsurge in FDI in 
Turkey has been mainly caused by the beginning of accession negotiations to the 
EU, whereas the success in inflation reduction has not had a relevant impact. 
Additionally, institutional variables are found to contribute positively to inward 
FDI flows, which confirms results by Dumludag et al (2007). 
More recent studies also highlight the relevance of regional integration for 
FDI in Turkey. Esiyok (2011) uses a gravity model based on the knowledge-
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capital theory and confirms most of the results obtained by previous authors 
like Sayek on macroeconomic and institutional determinants of FDI. In 
addition, he finds that foreign investors in Turkey are mainly motivated by 
market access purposes (horizontal FDI), as the costs of exporting to Turkey 
are relatively high (compared to other OECD countries). The results on 
market orientation are similar to those discussed by Çetin and Taban (2009) 
and Onaran (2009).  In addition, according to Esiyok (2011), FDI flows to 
Turkey respond positively to the EU accession process, as well as to bilateral 
trade treaties with third countries. Similarly, Gungor and Binatli (2010), when 
analyzing a panel data consisting of eleven countries involved in EU accession at 
different stages, including Turkey, conclude that progress in this process result 
in a significant increase of FDI inflows. According to Bosco (2011), Turkey still 
presents an unexploited potential in terms of additional FDI stock, ranging 
200% to 1000%; further progress in EU accession could help to take advantage 
of this potential.
In sum, this third set of articles generally recognizes the importance of 
macroeconomic instability and institutional and political obstacles to FDI 
during the 1990s. But, when the recent upsurge in inward FDI in Turkey is 
considered, almost all of them point to regional integration –and concretely 
EU accession negotiations- as one of the key factors. These studies usually 
introduce a dummy variable in their regression in order to try to capture the 
effect of regional integration on FDI, but this approach has the limitation that it 
operates as a black box that does not have explanatory power to understand the 
underlying motivations and determinants of the decisions made by international 
investors. In this sense, it is the aim of this chapter to complement this third 
strand of the literature with a deeper explanation of why and when regional 
integration processes motivate foreign direct investment. 
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4.4. Regional integration and FDI in Turkey: a qualitative 
framework analysis
It has been argued by most recent studies that regional integration and, 
concretely, the official start of accession negotiations with the European Union 
is one of the main factors explaining the significant increase in FDI flows to 
Turkey observed in the second half of the past decade. In this section, we discuss 
the role of regional integration in foreign investment in Turkey drawing from 
the qualitative analysis framework elaborated by Blomstrom and Kokko (1997). 
Concretely, we wonder why FDI did not start to flow earlier, considering that 
Turkey signed a Customs Union agreement for industrial products with the 
European Economic Community in 1996, which was a notable step towards 
regional integration. 
4.4.1. Regional integration: Customs Union agreement with the EU 
and inward FDI in Turkey
In principle, an increase of extra-regional FDI in Turkey in the aftermath of 
this 1996 Customs Union agreement on industrial products would be expected, 
since foreign multinationals could use the country as an export platform to 
serve the EU. Additionally, a raise in vertical European investment in Turkey 
would offset the theoretical decrease in the number of previously installed 
market seeking multinationals (which do no longer face tariffs and can serve the 
Turkish market from the country of origin).
By looking at the data, it is possible to observe that European investors were 
already dominating foreign investment in Turkey prior to 1996. Except for the 
Netherlands (+13%), the United Kingdom (-7%) and Switzerland (-7%), there 
are not significant variations in most of the countries’ share of contribution 
to FDI in Turkey if we compare the eighties and the nineties. Moreover, the 
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Customs Union agreement apparently did not alter the share hold by European 
Union investors (EU15) which stayed around 65% both before (1994) and 
after (1998) the agreement. Even if punctually in 1996 there was an upsurge 
in Turkish inward FDI dominated by EU investors (85%), it did not last; 
moreover, in relative terms, total FDI flows to GDP did not increase compared 
to the previous year. In addition to that, aggregate FDI inflows remained stuck 
around 0.5% of the Turkish GDP. This is unexpected according to the theory; 
in this case, a greater degree of regional integration did not lead to a significant 
boost on FDI from European or extra-regional investors. 
The Turkish authors mentioned in the previous section pointed mainly to 
macroeconomic and political instability as the major deterrents of foreign 
investment in the 1990s. Nevertheless, a more detailed look at the text of the 
Customs Union agreement reveals alternative explanations to why foreign 
investors did not react to the Treaty. The European Community-Turkey 
Association Council of 199520 decided on the implementation of a Customs 
Union (except for agricultural products and coal and steel), which was 
considered as the final stage envisaged in the Ankara Association Agreement 
of 1963. The decision encompassed free movement of goods (there are not 
specific provisions for services) and the alignment of Turkey with the European 
Community common customs tariff, including preferential arrangements 
with third parties and harmonization of commercial policy measures; it also 
suggested approximation to EU intellectual property, competition and taxation 
laws. 
The removal of technical barriers and the alignment of commercial policy 
with that of the EU was envisaged to be progressively applied over a five year 
period. This could partly explain that there was not an immediate surge 
of FDI following the signature of the Customs Union. Moreover, required 
accompanying reforms (e.g. competition, removal of subsidies) were not fully 
implemented and the large size of the state continued to drag on economic 
20.
 Decision No 1/95 of the 
EC-Turkey Association 
Council of 22 December 
1995 on implementing 
the final phase of 
the Customs Union. 
Official Journal L 035 
, 13/02/1996 P. 0001 – 
0047.
TESISrevision miguel1.2.indd   202 19/05/2014   22:07:07
203HOW REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRANSNATIONAL ENERGY NETWORKS HAVE BOOSTED 
FDI IN TURKEY (AND MAY CEASE TO DO SO)
21 
 Accessible at http://
ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/candidate-
countries/turkey/key_
documents_en.htm. 
development. Additionally, it is worth to remember that a Customs Union 
agreement does not imply full capital mobility, like that enjoyed by the members 
of a Common Market (Jovanovic, 1997). Therefore, introduced changes were 
not sufficient to strongly appeal investors, as Harrison et al (1997) had predicted. 
This view seems to be shared by Dutz et al (2005), whom put the blame of the 
Customs Union failure to attract FDI on a static bureaucracy, rent seeking 
activities and the lack of a stable investment framework. Utkulu and Seymen 
(2004) did not observe significant shifts in comparative advantages have shifted 
when Turkey joined the Customs Union with the European Community. 
4.2.2. Regional integration: the impact of EU accession negotiations 
on FDI
In the period beginning in 2003 -and especially from 2005 onwards- there 
has been an outbreak of FDI flowing to Turkey. Why has this phenomenon 
happened relatively late, and not before, when the EU and Turkey signed the 
Customs Union Agreement? Our tentative hypothesis is that, in the last decade, 
apart from improved economic and political stability, deeper reforms aimed at 
preparing Turkey towards EU membership has improved investment climate, 
and , increased expectations of a fast expansion in economic activity.  
Talks for the accession of Turkey to the European Union officially started in 
2005. The negotiating framework21  contains provisions regarding 35 chapters 
of the acquis communitaire. Thus, Turkey has been working to implement new 
commitments in areas such as free movement of goods, right of establishment 
to provide services, competition policy, financial services, energy, regional 
policy or the Customs Union (Council of Europe, 2008). Therefore, accession 
negotiations involve much more comprehensive reforms than the Customs 
Union Treaty (that basically dealt with just two of these chapters), which 
enhances the framework for doing business and investment. 
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Sayek (2007) presents some cross country evidence suggesting that <<…
it is in fact the signaling of the membership and the road to membership, rather than 
the final membership itself, that has the great effect [on FDI]>>. By taking a look at 
the evolution of foreign investment flows to Turkey over the past decade, it is 
possible to observe that the surge in capital started in 2005, when Turkey and the 
EU officially initiated accession conversations, and the momentum lasted until 
2008. In the context of the global economic slowdown, accession prospects 
for Turkey somewhat cooled down, as the European Union had to focus in 
finding a way out of the crisis, and enlargement conversations lost relevance in 
the agenda of priorities. At the same time, the latest reports by the European 
Union point to a slow and unequal implementation of reforms aimed at aligning 
Turkey with the acquis communitaire. So far, accession negotiations have been 
opened on 13 chapters22 out of a total of 33, and only one of them (science and 
research) has been provisionally closed (EU Commission, 2013). Even if EU 
authorities report an advanced stage of alignment in free movement of goods 
or intellectual property rights, other chapters such as free movement of capital 
present a more modest progress, and there are many areas in which reforms are 
still incipient. In addition, prevalent restrictions on the relationships between 
Turkey and Cyprus prevent since end 2006 the opening for negotiations of eight 
chapters23, including the right of establishment. Thus, slow developments and 
weaker membership prospects could partly help explaining why Turkey is not 
seeing nowadays the same level of FDI inflows observed in 2005-2008.  
Blomstron and Kokko (1997) provide an interesting theoretical framework 
to assess overall impact of regionalization on FDI attraction according to the 
location of the host country and the degree of environmental change derived 
from the agreement. From this perspective we could be able to explain the 
differences in performance between Spain and Greece (once they joined 
the European Community) or Mexico and Canada (most and least benefited 
respectively from NAFTA), as well as the advantages of Brazil and Argentina 
compared to Paraguay and Uruguay in Mercosur. 
22  
Science and research; 
Enterprise and industry; 
Statistics; Financial 
control; Trans-European 
networks; Consumer 
and health protection; 
Intellectual property 
law; Company law; 
Information society and 
media; Free movement 
of capital; Taxation; 
Environment; and Food 
safety, veterinary and 
phytosanitary policy,
23  
Free movement of goods, 
Right of establishment 
and freedom to provide 
services, Financial 
services, Agriculture 
and rural development, 
Fisheries, Transport 
policy, Customs union, 
and External relations.
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Portugal, Spain and Greece joined the European Community in 1986; 
however, whereas Portugal and Spain were able to double their average yearly 
FDI inflows to GDP in 1986-1990 compared to 1980-1985, Greece did not 
significantly increased its levels during the decade of the eighties. This could 
be explained by the fact that, even when membership encompassed similar 
environmental changes (and opportunities) for the three Mediterranean 
countries, Greece was by that time relatively isolated in terms of location 
from the rest of the European markets. Similarly, it is possible to observe that 
CUSFTA agreement has had a lower impact for Canada than the NAFTA treaty 
for Mexico. The reason is that NAFTA is an extended version of CUSFTA that 
consider deeper integration (stronger “environmental change”); additionally, 
Mexico has an advantageous location in the region with respect to Canada.
Figure 4.4-1. FDI flows as a % of GDP in selected countries.
Source: UNCTAD 
Drawing from this methodology, that classifies regional integration 
agreements according to its probable impact on foreign direct investment, 
we try to illustrate the Turkish case. The following diagram shows four blue 
ellipses, which corresponds with the position attributed by Blomstron and 
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Kokko (1997) to their four case studies.
In the same fashion, it might be argued that the Customs Union Agreement 
signed by the EU and Turkey in 1996 did not help the latter to attract FDI 
significantly because it did not imply a strong “environmental change”. As it 
has been mentioned previously, the scope of the agreement was limited, and 
technical barriers and obstacles to investment persisted. Therefore, despite is 
theoretically advantageous location to serve Europe, Turkey had problems to 
appeal foreign investors in the second half of the nineties.
Figure 4.4-2. Expected impact of regional integration agreements on FDI. 
Source: elaborated following Blomström an Kokko (1997a)
On the other hand, the beginning of EU accession negotiations in 2005 
was accompanied by a wider and deeper set of reforms in different fields such 
as business, economics, politics or even human rights. This wider and more 
Mexico
NAFTA
Brasil
Argentina
MERCOSUR
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credible “environmental change” has helped improving both the investment 
climate and business expectations in Turkey. Therefore, now it can be argued 
that the Turkey-EU accession partnership should be located in quadrant one, 
together with other regional agreements contributing positively to FDI. In 
addition, Turkey moved a little bit to the left hand side of the graph, reflecting 
increasing locational advantages, as ten Eastern European countries joined the 
EU in 2004. 
Furthermore, we will argue that, given that Turkey is not a member of 
the EU yet, the relative position of the Accession Partnership agreement may 
change dynamically over time, and weaker membership prospects would mean 
that the expected environmental and doing business change in Turkey could be 
narrower than initially expected. This could result in international investors 
aiming at serving the EU market less prone to establish their facilities in Turkey. 
How has the beginning of accession negotiations between Turkey and the 
EU affected the geographical origin of FDI flows? Even when it would very 
difficult to isolate the effects of regional integration on capital f lowing to 
Turkey, stylized facts lead to the intuition that it may have been a relevant 
factor. As shown in Figure 4.43, both intra and extra regional flows increased 
significantly since 2005, when the EU gave green light to the accession 
process. It is worth noting that these developments took place in the context of 
expansion in global capital flows; in fact, FDI flows declined sharply in 2009 
and 2010, in the context of global economic slowdown, and with cooling down 
EU accession perspectives for Turkey. 
Interestingly, even when FDI flows from EU members increased in absolute 
terms in 2005-2008, in relative terms, Middle Eastern and Other European 
investors were more avid in bringing capital to Turkey (f lows from these 
regions increased by 29 and 23 times respectively in 2005). This seems to 
conform to the theory, which predicts that FDI from third countries outside 
the region (in this case the EU) will increase more than intraregional FDI 
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when a regional integration treaty is signed. (te Velde and Bezemer, 2006; 
Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997; Stein et al., 2003). Indeed, European Union 
accession negotiations are accompanied by a series of improvements in the 
business framework and a series of positive externalities from which not only 
EU companies but also investors from other countries expect to benefit.  
Figure 4.4-3. Evolution of FDI flows to Turkey over the past decade.
Source: Author´s elaboration from OECD stats, WDI
By sector, following the beginning of EU accession negotiations, the largest 
foreign investments in Turkey have taken place in financial intermediation (47% 
of total FDI inflows in 2005-2008), transport, storage and communications 
(21%), and wholesale and retail trade (6%). This gives us the intuition that 
services and market oriented FDI dominates the recent inflow upsurge, which 
is in line with the findings in Esiyok (2011). 
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Table 4.4-1 Evolution of FDI flows to Turkey by sector over the last decade.
Average FDI flows by sector, % over total 2002-2004 2005-2008 2009-2013
Primary sector (including mining) 3.0% 1.2% 2.4%
Secondary sector 29.2% 17.2% 24.7%
Electricity, gas and water supply 8.6% 2.7% 24.7%
Construction 0.6% 1.5% 5.1%
Transport and communications 18.0% 21.1% 4.6%
Financial intermediation 15.6% 47.7% 26.3%
Other services 25.1% 8.5% 12.2%
Yearly average FDI flows in the period (US$ million) 905 11863 9921
Source: Author´s calculations based on Central Bank of Turkey and Ministry of the Treasury data
In 2009-2013 it is possible to observe a different sector distribution pattern, 
as FDI directed towards manufacturing in Turkey recovers some of its relative 
weight, financial intermediation and transport and communications contract 
sharply, and foreign investment in Turkish utilities and energy surges and has 
become nowadays the principal activity attracting foreign capital.  
At this point, one may wonder which part of the huge amounts of foreign 
funds invested in Turkish financial intermediation and communications have 
been attracted by the privatization process. If the weight of privatization 
operations was large, that would mean that the rise on FDI may be a transient 
phenomenon after which Turkey will return to inflow levels of 0.5% to 1% of 
GDP. Most of the papers on privatization in Turkey are from the early 2000s 
(Karatas, 2001; Simga-Mugan and Yüce, 2003), which does not allow us to 
clarify the effects of the acceleration of reforms after 2005.  Thus, we gather 
recent data and reports from the Turkish Privatization Administration and 
focus on operations involving FDI. According to the official statistics, except for 
2001, FDI through privatization seems to represent just a small proportion of 
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total inflows. For example, if we look at the top five FDI inflows in 2008, only 
the acquisition of Tekel Sigara by a British company is a privatization operation.
At the end of the 1990s, Loewendahl and Ertugal-Loewendahl (2000) 
argued that <<[a] key reason for Turkey’s overall under-performance is the minimal level 
of privatisation-related FDI>>. The sale of an increasing number of state-owned 
companies in 2005-2010 has not been the main contributor to the upsurge in 
FDI inflows, as most of them have been acquired by Turkish companies.
In our view, privatization has probably contributed to recent FDI upsurge 
in two ways: directly by selling some State Owned Enterprises to foreign 
investors; and indirectly by promoting the image of a more solid and liberalised 
Turkish economy around the world. But, overall, privatization has only played 
a secondary role in boosting FDI to Turkey (Tulug, 2004).  
Summarizing, the Customs Union Treaty of 1996 neither significantly 
enhanced investment nor changed the origin of inward FDI in Turkey. On 
the other hand, FDI boomed once Turkey’s accession negotiations to the EU 
officially started (2005). One can explain the different impact of both regional 
integration processes on foreign investment by looking at the provisions 
considered in the agreements, as well as their implementation. We have 
argued that the EU-Turkey Accession Partnership has a much wider scope 
than the Customs Union Treaty (which did not entail free capital movement). 
Additionally, the AK party – governing since 2002 – has shown commitment 
in the implementation of institutional reforms, whereas the Customs Union 
Treaty was agreed in a period of political instability and weak governing 
coalitions in Turkey. 
Recently, the global financial and economic crisis, coupled with weaker EU 
accession prospects has resulted in net FDI to GDP inflows to Turkey losing 
some steam (1.2% on average in 2009-2013, compared to 2.7% in 2005-2008). 
As observed in Table 4.4-1, large foreign investment in electricity and energy 
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have prevented the collapse of FDI inflows. The next section discusses some 
potential explanations behind this trend. 
4.5. Case study: the energy sector in Turkey
In this section we adopt a narrower focus to try to obtain a deeper 
knowledge on how EU accession negotiations and the acquisition of the 
communitarian acquis may have facilitated the increase of FDI flows to Turkey, 
especially in 2009-2013. This is related to our hypothesis that prospects of EU 
accession are one of the main motivations causing the FDI upsurge observed 
since 2005. Energy is arguably a key for foreign investors in Turkey for three 
main reasons: recent legislative reforms, the relevance of Turkey for the energy 
security strategy of the European Union, and an accelerated privatization 
process (which does have a notable role in this specific sector).
4.5.1. Reforms and laws issued in the energy sector
The reforms in this field are still recent, which implies that liberalization 
and competition frameworks are under improvement. 
On the 3rd of March 2001, an Electricity Market Law (EML, No. 4628) 
was issued to set the framework for a more competitive and transparent 
electricity market. The old state owned giant, TEAS, was divided into three 
new companies, in order to separate electricity transmission, generation and 
commercialization activities. 
Similarly, on the 2nd of May 2001, a Natural Gas Market Law (NGML, No. 
4646) came into force with the ultimate purpose of liberalizing the sector. It 
includes provisions to force a progressive diminution of the gas import contracts 
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in the hands of BOTAS24 to 20% in 2009 (Hacisalihoglu, 2008). 
On the 19th of November 2001, the Energy Market Regulatory Authority 
(EMRA) was created. Its purpose is to regulate the markets, issue operating 
licenses in the different sectors (Electricity, Gas, Petroleum) and, ultimately, 
help to achieve the transition to competition25. Later, the Petroleum Market 
Law (PML, No. 5015, 20 December 2003) and the Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
Market Law (LPGML, No.5307, 13 March 2005) removed import quotas and 
liberalized market activities in the oil and LPG sectors. 
These and related reforms in the energy sector have not only been 
motivated by the need to meet future energy demand in the country, but also 
continuously encouraged by the dialogue between Turkey and the European 
Union. Following the European Council of Helsinki (December, 1999), a 
first Accession Partnership for the new candidate state was issued (Council of 
Europe, 2001). The document already emphasized the need of improvements 
in the energy chapter, with the progressive acquisition of the EU acquis, the 
establishment of an independent regulatory authority and the implementation 
of the electricity and gas Directives. Since then, the EU has been issuing 
regular progress reports, as well as updating the Accession Partnership, always 
monitoring the developments of the energy sector. 
When the implementation of reforms is slow or insufficient, the EU 
will reflect it in its documents and ask for a strengthen dedication to match 
requirements. For example, the EU Commission (2008) denounced in 2007 
that BOTAS still imported 86% of the natural gas consumed in Turkey, when, 
according to the law, by 2009 the share of the company should be of only 
20%. This example illustrates the fact that in some areas competition remains 
limited. Yet, it also proves EU commitment to monitor the liberalization of 
the energy sector in Turkey. Thus, we argue that the pace of this process will 
clearly remain linked to progress made in European integration.  
24.  
BOTAS is the Turkish to 
Pipeline Corporation. 
During the 1990s the 
company officially 
enjoyed the right to 
monopolize natural gas 
distribution. The Natural 
Gas Market Law of 2001 
abolished this right.
25.
EPDK, 2007. “Manual 
For Energy Investors”. 
Republic of Turkey, 
Energy Market 
Regulatory Authority.
May, 2007.
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4.5.2. The Geo-strategic relevance of Turkey as an energy hub
 
The role of Turkey as an energy bridge between East and West has been 
widely studied from a geostrategic and energy security perspective (Ozturk et 
al, 2011; Akdemir, 2011; Tagliapietra, 2012, 2013). In addition, even if, with a 
consumption of 58 million BTU26 per capita in 2007 Turkey was below world 
average, natural gas demand is expected to growth at a yearly average rate of 
4.9% between 2010 and 2020, with manufacturing facilities and power plants 
as the main customers (Hacisalihoglu, 2008). The dependency on foreign 
energy sources caused a severe crisis in Turkey during the seventies, as oil 
prices surged, and with it balance of payments deficit and inflation. Since then, 
and given the lack of significant oil and gas reserves, Turkey has tried to take 
advantage of the geographical position in order to be part of different energy 
corridors that can help diversifying supplies. An the attraction of foreign direct 
investment depends also on market conditions, as discussed by Bilgili et al 
(2012), who find that in fast FDI growth periods (such as 2005-2010), FDI 
inflows to Turkey are negatively correlated to the price of electricity and the 
prices of oil and gas in the domestic market.   
In addition, strategic decisions in the energy field are intimately interlinked 
to foreign policy and the relationships with energy-rich neighboring 
countries (Russia, Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, etc.). 
Approximately three quarters of world s´ proven natural gas and oil resources 
are located in Russia and the Middle East and Caspian Regions.  According 
to Ozturk et al (2011), Turkey s´ national energy policy involves reducing 
dependency and diversifying geographically the sources, ensuring sustainable, 
high quality and cheap supplies, and functioning as a transmission hub.  
The key role of Turkey in natural gas and oil distribution is formally 
recognized in the Trans European Energy Networks project (TEN-E) and the 
Energy Security Strategy of the European Union (see European Commission, 
26.  
Source: www.eia.com. 
British Thermal Unit, 
equivalent to 1.055 
kilojoules. 
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2006). Even if oil and natural gas deposits in Anatolia are scanty and national 
production is low (EIA, 2009), Turkey is very relevant as a transit country, and 
it is considered a potential alternative route to diminish EU dependency on 
Russian natural gas27.
Turkey counts with two main oil pipelines to import crude from Azerbaijan 
and Iraq. Both routes end at Ceyhan, one of the main crude export seaports 
in the Mediterranean sea, together with Izmir and Istanbul. All of them count 
with refineries in their proximities; Turkey exports part of their production 
of refined oil and derivatives to different countries such as Italy, Singapore or 
even the United Arab Emirates. Still, it is important to bear in mind Turkish 
dependence on Russia and Iran, its main oil suppliers, which complicates 
Turkey’s political alliances and regional strategy. On the other hand, Turkey has 
some leverage on the transit of ships through the Bosphorus, and has recently 
limited the size and the number of tankers going through the straits. This is 
one of the reasons why Russia is considering several projects to by-pass the 
Bosphorus.
In what regards natural gas, Turkey is being supplied through ground 
routes coming from Russia (Blue Stream and West Pipeline), Iran (Shah 
Deniz pipeline) and Azerbaijan (Shah Sea pipeline). Turkey is also purchasing 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to Nigeria and Algeria, and has recently started 
to export gas to Greece through an inter-connector that crosses the South 
straits of the Marmara Sea, and could eventually be used to transport natural 
gas to Italy (see Özturk et al, 2011).
Looking ahead, Turkey is willing to take advantage of its strategic 
geographical position to become an energy hub in between the Middle East, 
Central Asia and Europe (Saivetz, 2009; MFA, 2009). At the same time, the 
European Union has manifested an interest to build trans-national energy 
networks and, more concretely, alternative routes to diminish its dependency 
on Russian gas. 
27.
On European Energy 
security see the 
INOGATE Network, 
European Energy 
Strategy.
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In this context, on July 2009 four EU members and Turkey reached an 
intergovernmental agreement to allow the construction of a large pipeline (31 
Bcma28) called Nabucco, which would transport Azeri gas to Austria29. This 
flagship European project was for some time one of the best bets by Turkey to 
eventually become a full EU member. However, Nabucco faced the problem 
that Azerbaijan itself cannot supply enough gas to fill the pipe, there was 
international controversy with Iran, and the project of a Trans-Caspian link to 
access Turkmenistan is blocked by legal disputes over Caspian waters (Cornell 
and Nilsson, 2008:141-154). According to Erdoğdu (2010), the problems in 
securing guaranteed supplies of gas for the project would ultimately result in 
lack of sufficient financing.   
In addition, Russia announced a South Stream pipeline, which plans to 
go from the Russian Caucasus directly to Bulgaria and Central Europe, to 
challenge the Nabucco project (see Baran, 2008). In the end, Turkey conceded 
to participate also in this South Stream, allowing the pipeline to go through 
its territorial waters, as per an agreement with Moscow signed in December 
2011. At the same time, in December 2011, Turkey signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding with Azerbaijan, aimed at building a larger Trans Anatolian 
Pipeline to transport gas from the Shah Deniz field through Georgia. This 
ultimately resulted the likely defeat of Nabucco in favor of this BP-SOCAR 
project to develop a Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), with capacity to transport 
10-20 Bcma. TAP is planned to be connected to the Trans Anatolian Pipeline and 
the existing Turkey-Greece interconnector. The Shaz Deniz consortium opted 
in June 2013 for supplying Europe through a Trans Adriatic Pipeline instead of 
waiting for an eventual Nabucco pipeline (Roncero and San Martín, 2013). 
In sum, there is an authentic geo-strategic chess battle taking place around 
Turkey in the energy field. In this context, delayed EU accession and recent 
tensions with Israel may well cause that Erdogan’s AK party turns the back 
on the traditional allies of Turkey just to get closer to old rivals like Iran or 
28.
Billion cubic meters per 
annum.
29.
Euroactive (2009) 
EU countries sign 
geopolitical Nabucco 
agreement, 14th July.
TESISrevision miguel1.2.indd   215 19/05/2014   22:07:08
THE DETERMINANTS OF FDI IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES216
Russia (see Bhadrakumar, 2008). In fact, delays and indecision in Europe 
around has resulted in Turkey supporting other pipelines with Russia and 
Azerbaijan, which has de facto killed the Nabucco project; the last EU’s energy 
infrastructure vision is characterized by its short-sightedness, and does no 
longer consider a flagship corridor such as Nabucco (Escribano, 2013). 
We will argue that, depending on policy choices and regional integration 
decisions in the following years, gas and oil will be more likely to flow one 
way or the other, affecting both trade flows and multinational establishments 
in the energy sector. For instance, as we discuss in the next subsection (4.5.3), 
companies such as Austrian OMV, which had already been investing in Turkey 
to set the stage for Nabucco, are likely to have suffered a severe downturn 
when Ankara opted to support other pipelines. Even if, in the end, Azeri 
gas is still likely to f low to Southern Europe through Anatolia, (Central) 
European energy investors are likely to have seen damaged their prospects by 
this alternative, smaller-scale pipeline, which in the end could imply a lower 
potential of energy-related FDI flows to Turkey in the following years.   
4.5.3. Foreign Direct Investment and Privatization 
Which are the links between this geopolitical game and FDI in the energy 
sector in Turkey? Even when it is difficult to identify clear and obvious 
relationships, a look at the main merge and acquisition operations in the 
sector shows that Austrian OMV and German RWE, both participants on 
the construction of Nabucco, were among the most active actors in utility 
deals in 2008-2010. At the same time Gazprom was taking positions with the 
acquisition of Bosphorus Gas. On the other hand, SOCAR (Azerbaijan) has 
increased its presence in Turkey following the signature in December 2011 of 
the Memorandum of Understanding for the construction and operation of the 
abovementioned Trans-Anatolian Pipeline. 
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Table 4.5-1. Recent mergers, acquisitions and other operations by foreign investors in the utilities, 
gas and oil sector in Turkey.
Date an-
nounced
Company
Stakes 
%
Acquirer
Investor 
nation
Sector
15-Mar-08  Baskentgaz 90%
 Global - Energaz - ABN 
Amro
 Turkey - 
Netherlands
Utilities
23-Apr-08  Kayserigaz 40%  EWE AG  Germany Utilities
1-Jul-08  Baskent Elektrik Dagitim 100%
 Sabanci - Verbund - 
EnerjiSA
 Turkey - 
Austria
Utilities
1-Jul-08  Sakarya Elektrik Dagitim 100%  AkCEZ
 Turkey - 
Czech R.
Utilities
11-Jul-08  Bares Elektrik Uretim 100%  Italgen SpA  Italy Utilities
28-Jul-08 Akpet 100% Lurkoil Russia Oil and gas
30-Jul-08  Tasyapi Enerji Grubu 50%  Cogentrix Energy USA Utilities
15-Aug-08  Izgaz 90%  GdF Suez  France Utilities
28-Sep-08 Borasco 60% OMV  Austria Utilities
8-Oct-08  Ak Enerji Üretim 37%  CEZ
 Czech 
Republic
Utilities
23-Oct-08  Kayserigaz 40%  EWE AG  Germany Utilities
23-Oct-08  Bursagaz 40%  EWE AG  Germany Utilities
9-Dec-08  Polat Enerji 50%  EdF Novelles  France Utilities
4-Mar-09  Borusan Enerji 50%  EnBW  Germany Utilities
9-Mar-09  Palmet Enerji 13%  Manitoba Hydro Int.  Canada Utilities
19-Mar-09  Yesil Enerji 95%  Statkraft  Norway Utilities
23-Mar-09  E.ON Turcas Kuzey Elektrik 70%  RWE  Germany Utilities
23-Mar-09  E.ON Turcas Güney Elektrik 70%  RWE  Germany Utilities
13-Apr-09  Enerco Enerji 40%  OMV  Austria Utilities
11-Jun-09  EWE Dogalgaz 100%  EWE  Germany Utilities
17-Jun-09  Borasco Elektrik 15%  OMV  Austria Utilities
20-Aug-09  Bosphorus Gaz 31%  Gazprom  Russia Utilities
1-Oct-09 Toreador Turkey 100% Tiway Oil Norway Oil and gas
12-Oct-09  Power Station 100%  RES  UK Utilities
24-Mar-10 Six local hydro projects 75% Reservoir Capital Canada Utilities
30-Apr-10 Five local hydro projects 100% Energo-Pro
Czech Re-
public
Utilities
5-May-10
Amity Oil and Zorlu Petro-
gas 
100% TransAtlantic USA Oil and gas
3-Jun-10 Anel Enerji 5% Ralos New Energies Germany Utilities
2-Aug-10 Aves - S-OIL JV 75% NuStar USA Oil and gas
23-Oct-10 Petrol Ofisi 54% OMV Austria Oil and gas
TESISrevision miguel1.2.indd   217 19/05/2014   22:07:09
THE DETERMINANTS OF FDI IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES218
1-Dec-10 Entek Elektrik 50% AES USA Utilities
10-Feb-11 Thrace Basin Natural Gas 100%
TansAtlantic (35%), 
Valeura Energy (40%), 
Pinnacle (25%)
USA, 
Bahamas, 
Canada
Oil and gas
21-Apr-11 Arar Petrol and Gas 5% Niche UK Oil and gas
24-Jul-11 Yeni Elektrik Uretim 40% Ansaldo Energia Italy Utilities
28-Oct-11 Aksa Enerji 15% Goldman Sachs USA Utilities
23-Dec-11 Enda Enerji 100% Hot Rock Germany Utilities
28-Dec-11 SOCAR & Turcas Enerji 25% SOCAR Azerbaijan Oil and gas
12-Mar-12 Avrasya Gaz 60% Prima Energy Trading Russia Oil and gas
9-May-12 Petkim 10% SOCAR Azerbaijan Oil and gas
29-Jun-12 AkCez 23% CEZ
Czech Re-
public
Utilities
17-Jul-12 Trakya Elektrik Üretim 90% Inter RAO Russia Utilities
10-Sep-12 Karasular Enerji 40%
Aquila Hydropower-
INVEST
Germany Utilities
27-Nov-12 Petgaz & wholesale LPG 100% Rus Oteko Russia Oil and gas
4-Dec-12 EnerjiSA 50% E.ON AG Germany Utilities
12-Dec-12 Petrol Ofisi Petrol Arama 100% Tiway Oil Norway Oil and gas
12-Feb-13 Aksa Enerji 3% Goldman Sachs USA Utilities
14-Mar-13 Karasular Enerji Uretimi 60%
Aquila Capital Was-
serkraft 
Germany Utilities
12-Jun-13 Benal Danismanlik 100% Aswar National Kuwait Utilities
16-Aug-13 Bagistas II Hydro Plant 100% Globtec Germany Utilities
25-Sep-13 Alpay Enerji 75% San Leon Energy U.K. Utilities
18-Dec-13 Global enerji Elektrik Uretim 15%
Emkaan In+D2:D53vest-
ment
U.A.E. Utilities
Sources: Pricewaterhousecoopers. Turkey Energy Deals (2008-2014). 
→
Pricewaterhousecoopers (2009) referred to some of these interesting deals 
in this fashion:
<<[…] the deal wheels in the natural gas sector were lubricated by 
interest from foreign utility companies in the midstream zone. Gazprom 
increased its shares in Bosphorus Gaz, a Turkish company holding a licence 
to import 750mcm of gas per year from Gazprom itself. Another private 
natural gas importer, Enerco, licensed to import 2.5bcm of gas per year 
also from Gazprom, got to be a deal subject and sold its 40% share to 
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OMV. In this way, the Austrian company added gas import to its existing 
operations in fuel retail and power generation markets in Turkey […]>>
Strategic movements in electricity, natural gas and oil distribution has been 
facilitated by liberalization in these sectors. Privatization effectively started 
around year 2000, and has been accelerated in the past five years in what 
regards electricity supply and gas distribution; however, upstream industries 
are not fully opened to international competition yet. 
The ongoing liberalization and full privatization of the monopoly held 
by BOTAS, the Turkish Pipeline Corporation (Erdogdu, 2007:14; EPDK, 
2007:15), is probably one of the events most anticipated by foreign investors. 
Turkish legislation obligates BOTAS to sell distribution branches, as well as 
to separate commercialization and transportation activities. These measures 
are considered by the experts as very favorable to the creation of competition 
within Turkish energy sector (Mazzanti and Biancardi, 2005). 
However, it seems that cooling down EU accession prospects and recent 
economic and political instability have resulted in a recent decline on foreign 
involvement in energy merges and acquisitions in Turkey, from 42% participation 
in total deals in 2011 to 25% in 2012 and 1% in 2013 (Pricewaterhousecoopers, 
2008-2014). Local companies are nowadays dominating energy deals and 
privatization-related acquisitions In addition, European companies such as 
RWE and OMV have not been active in the acquisition market for a while, as 
the prospects for the completion of Nabucco have almost vanished.
Overall, this brief geopolitic and geoeconomic analysis shows how laws 
(legislative level), international relations (state level) and FDI decisions (firm/
private level) are intimately related. The energy sector in Turkey has been 
experiencing privatization and liberalization processes at its different sectors 
(electricity, natural gas, oil, renewable sources…) and levels (generation, 
distribution, commercialization, etc.). These reforms are partly motivated by 
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Turkey’s accession negotiations with the European Union, who is at the same 
time interested in counting a safe energy corridor through Anatolia. Therefore, 
we argue that the evolution of relations with the EU will affect decisions taken 
by foreign investors in the energy sector in Turkey. Worsening EU membership 
prospects may delay domestic reforms and difficult the way to European 
multinationals trying to participate in the Turkish energy market in the future. 
4.6. Conclusion
The Turkish economy has been characterized by suffering from difficulties 
to attract foreign direct investment. Net FDI inflows averaged 2.7 % of the 
Turkish GDP in 2005-2008, and 1.2% of GDP in 2009-2013, compared to less 
than 0.5% of GDP in 1990-2004. According to the literature, macroeconomic 
and political instability were probably discouraging foreign investors, as sudden 
stops will frequent in the nineties in a context of capital account liberalization. 
How can the boost in FDI inflows observed in 2005 be explained? A recent 
and increasingly predominant strand of studies argue that, apart from improved 
economic and political stability achieved under the AK Party, the beginning of 
accession negotiations with the EU in 2005 has significantly contributed to 
boost FDI. Most of the existing literature tries to “capture” this “EU accession” 
effect using a dummy variable in cross country regression or gravity models. 
This paper, in turn, complements existing empirical evidence by opening this 
“black box” and trying to understand which factors and which concrete policy 
actions explain the recent increase in FDI. 
Following a qualitative discussion framework to assess the potential 
implications of free trade agreements on FDI (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997), 
we argue that the Customs Union Treaty for industrial products, signed 
between Turkey and the EU in 1996, did not entail a significant increase in 
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FDI inflows because it did not imply strong environmental and policy changes 
for investors, and there was a five-year margin for implementation. In turn, the 
official start of EU accession negotiations in 2005 encompassed a wide set of 
reforms in a number of chapters of the acquis communitaire that were directly or 
indirectly affecting business climate.
In addition, we argue that both developments in accession talks and foreign 
policy decisions assumed by Turkey will dynamically shape the impact of 
EU integration on FDI attraction: the same way the beginning of accession 
negotiations with the EU functioned as a market signal that helped to achieve 
yearly FDI to GDP inflows six time higher in 2005-2008 than in previous year 
(Sayek, 2007), the global economic slowdown starting in 2009 and increasing 
Euro-skepticism may mitigate this “EU effect” in the following years. In fact, in 
the past five years we have already seen a contraction of FDI inflows, and only 
growing foreign investment in the energy sector has prevented a collapse. 
The marked increase in foreign presence in the Turkish electricity, gas and 
oil sectors can be explained by reforms aimed at liberalization, an accelerated 
privatization process, and the relevance of Turkey for the energy security 
strategy of the European Union, as well as its geostrategic importance for 
energy suppliers such as Russia and Azerbaijan. The agreement between 
Azerbaijan and Turkey (June 2013) to transport gas from the Shah Deniz field 
to Europe through a Trans Adriatic Pipeline sidelines Nabucco, a project that has 
been at the center of the EU energy corridors strategy. This is likely to result 
in diminishing presence of European investment in eventual FDI inflows to the 
energy sector in Turkey. 
In sum, qualitative analysis of the Turkish case shows how, beyond 
macroeconomic and political stability, state-level decisions such as regional 
integration processes and the choice of allies from a foreign policy / geopolitical 
perspective are likely to have an impact on actions taken by foreign investors. 
This has a series of policy implications.
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First, a delayed EU accession or the possibility of being marginalized in an 
eventual EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Invest Partnership (Chislett, 2013) 
are likely to deter European FDI to Turkey in the future. Thus, Turkish policy 
makers could continue working on the enhancement of the relationship with 
other neighboring countries, and the pursuit of other regional integration 
initiatives should not be ruled out. Here, the Organization of the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (Cornell and Jonsson, 2006), different Middle East and 
Central Asia countries, Russia and Iran may be considered as potential partners. 
Working in alternative regional initiatives, Turkey would be able to reduce the 
dependency on EU investments, continue enhancing its role as regional actor, 
and improve its bargain power with traditional allies (Onder, 2007). 
Second, from the point of view of the foreign investor, it can be argued that 
Turkey will remain relatively attractive as a country to establish subsidiaries. 
Turkey counts both with a large and quickly growing internal market (for 
horizontal FDI) and the possibility of serving as an export platform to serve 
manufacturing products to the EU (vertical FDI), thanks to the Customs 
Union agreement. Even if progress in some areas of the acquis communitaire 
is slow (free movement of goods, right of establishment and freedom to 
provide services…), the continuation of EU accession talks is a guarantee of 
progressive improvement in the business framework. Moreover, the ongoing 
privatization of utilities and energy transmission in Turkey should appeal the 
foreign investor; even if the massive Nabucco pipeline is not finally built, Turkey 
continues to be at the center of important international oil and gas corridors, 
and has a stake in new projects aimed at transporting gas to Europe: the Trans 
Adriatic Pipeline and the South Stream. 
Finally, an implication for both policy makers and researchers around the 
world is that, apart from macroeconomic, political and institutional stability, 
regional integration matters for foreign direct investment attraction. But not 
any regional integration initiative may be sufficient to appeal to the foreign 
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investor. In line with Blomstrom and Kokko (1997), we find some evidence 
that the deeper the environmental change the agreement encompasses, the 
more powerful it will be in enhancing FDI inflows. Most Accession Partnership 
Agreements signed by the EU and candidate countries seem to have boosted 
FDI, whereas it has not always been the case in simpler Free Trade Agreements 
or Customs Unions.   
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Table 4.8-1. Literature review summary. Studies on foreign direct investment in Turkey.
Authors Year Topic
Methodol-
ogy
Theoretical 
Approach/ 
Determinants
Focus
Conclusions - relevant results for 
our study
Tatoglu and 
Glaister
1998
Drivers of FDI 
in Turkey - Lo-
cational Spe-
cific Factors
Micro - Sur-
vey (factor 
analysis)
Location, 
Ownership 
and internal-
ization (OLI)
Determinants
Low cost inputs and geographi-
cal proximity are more important 
for European investors than 
for the USA/UK multinationals. 
Following Turkey’s accession to 
the Customs Union with the EU 
in January 1996 the number of 
FEV formations with firms from EU 
countries is expected to increase.
Tatoglu and 
Glaister
2000
Dimensions 
of Western 
Foreign Direct 
Investment in 
Turkey
Micro - 
Survey
Location, 
Ownership 
and internal-
ization (OLI)
Determinants
They specify some of the location, 
transaction and firm related 
factors that are influenctial in the 
establishment of foreign compa-
nies in Turkey. Still, they recognise 
the need to complement with a 
macroeconomic approach
Tatoglu 
et al
2003
Determinants 
of Foreign 
Ownership in 
Turkish Manu-
facturing
Micro - Sur-
vey (Logit 
regression)
 (OLI) Determinants
Country-related factors influence 
foreign ownership choice (WOE 
vs JV). Turkey should continue 
liberalisation.
Deichmann 
et al
2003
Location - 
distributional 
patterns of FDI 
within Turkey
Quantita-
tive (Logit 
regression)
Location 
spec ificfac-
tors + Policy
Determinants
Location decision depends 
on the industry (productivity, 
agglomeration) and on region-
al conditions (coastal access, 
infrastructures, etc.).  Public 
investment’s share on regional 
GDP does not seem to be an influ-
encing factor. 
Lenger and 
Taymaz
2007
FDI and spill-
overs in Turkish 
Manufactur-
ing
Micro - 
Survey
(OLI)
Consequenc-
es of FDI
Foreign owned firms are on 
average more innovative that 
domestic ones. They also find that 
the main channel of spillovers is 
labours acquired knowledge.
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Theoretical 
Approach/ 
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Focus
Conclusions - relevant results for 
our study
Erdilek 2003
Compara-
tive study of 
inward and 
outward FDI 
flows in Turkey
Political 
economy 
analysis + 
Survey
Macro-
economic 
determinants 
+ Policy 
Performance
The author blames internal fac-
tors such as economic instability 
and lack of willingness among 
politicians to attract FDI as the 
cause of Turkey’s dismal perfor-
mance in attracting FDI. 
Tulug 2004
Drivers of FDI 
in Turkey
Micro - 
Survey
Macro de-
term. + Policy
Performance
The results indicate that econom-
ic and political instability is the 
main deterrent to FDI.
Uctum and 
Uctum
2005
 Portfolio 
Flows, Foreign 
Direct Invest-
ment, Crises
Quan-
titative 
(model)
Macroeco-
nomic
Other (struc-
tural breaks)
 FPI is vulnerable to regional 
contagion (Russian crisis) and 
responds negatively to financial 
risk, while FDI is sensitive to eco-
nomic risk but is not affected by 
contagion. They detect structural 
breaks for Turkey in 1998 and 2000.
Basar and 
Tosunoglu
2006
Turkish prob-
lems to attract 
FDI
Quantita-
tive (multi-
variable)
Macroeco-
nomic
Performance
Turkey seems to be attracting less 
FDI than expected, probably a 
result of high inflation rates and 
macro instability.
Dumludag 
et al
2007
Determinants 
of Foreign 
Direct Invest-
ment from an 
institutional 
perspective
Quantita-
tive (cross 
country) 
and ques-
tionnaire 
Macroeco-
nomicde-
terminants + 
Policy (institu-
tional)
Determinants
Institutional improvement is need-
ed in order to increase inward FDI. 
In Turkey political and macroeco-
nomic instability (related to a lack 
of strong institutions) are seen as 
the most significant facts that 
hinder higher inflow of FDI.
Onaran 2009
Changes in 
the wage 
share in the 
manufactur-
ing in Mexico, 
Turkey and 
Korea 
Quanti-
tative (3 
countries)
Other
Consequenc-
es of FDI
FDI inflows have not brought the 
expected improvement on work-
er’s real wages.
Cetin and 
Taban
2009
impact of FDI 
on trade with 
the EU
Quatitative 
(multivari-
able)
Other
Consequenc-
es of FDI
FDI contributes positively to 
foreign trade. Japanese and EU 
FDI are export-oriented and thus 
contribute to the rapid growth of 
Turkish exports, while US FDI is an-
ti-export-oriented and thus leads 
to decreases in Turkish exports.
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Authors Year Topic
Methodol-
ogy
Theoretical 
Approach/ 
Determinants
Focus
Conclusions - relevant results for 
our study
Bilgili et al 2012
Non linear de-
terminants of 
FDI in Turkey
Quantitia-
tive (single 
country, 
Markov)
Macroeco-
nomic and 
institutional
Determinants
FDI is  positively correlated with 
economic growth in Turkey, 
decreasing country risk and 
expansion in exports, whereas 
labor costs, imports and currency 
depreciation expectations have 
a negative impact on FDI in 
Turkey. The relationship of energy 
costs with FDI shows a significant 
non-linearity.  
Loe-
wendahl, H. 
B. and E. Er-
tugal-Loe-
wendahl
2000
EU’s enlarge-
ment and Tur-
key’s position 
in attracting 
FDI
Political 
economy 
analysis 
+ Micro 
Survey
Mixed mac-
roeconomic 
+ Location + 
Policy
Perfor-
mance/Re-
gional
Late accession to the EU will 
cause that Turkey continues to 
fall behind Central and Eastern 
Europe countries. Policy options: 
privatize, improve human capital, 
infrastructures, telecom and 
develop an active FDI attraction 
agency.
Dutz et al 2005
Turkey’s 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
Challenges: 
Competition, 
Rule of Law 
and the EU 
Accession
Political 
economy 
analyis 
(+3 case 
studies)
Macro-
economic 
determinants 
+ Policy
Perfor-
mance/Re-
gional
Lags behind in its energy infra-
structure, its level of computer-
ization, and the availability of 
credit for the private sector.  EU 
accession process should provide 
Turkey with significant FDI inflows 
helping to ease  rule of law and 
competition constraints.
Zaman 2005
Impact of 
accession 
negotiations 
on FDI and 
trade
Political 
economy 
analysis
Not clear
Consequenc-
es of FDI
Predicts boost in FDI inflows in the 
aftermath of accession negotia-
tions. Caveat: subjective analysis.
Sayek 2007
Determinants 
of FDI in Turkey, 
and the 
impact of EU 
accession
Quantita-
tive (cross 
country)
Location spe-
cific factors 
+ Macroeco-
nomic
Determinants
The author attributes the recent 
increase in FDI inflows mainly to 
integration prospects. The reduc-
tion in inflation does not seem to 
have played a major role in this 
late sucess.
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Authors Year Topic
Methodol-
ogy
Theoretical 
Approach/ 
Determinants
Focus
Conclusions - relevant results for 
our study
Gungor 
and Binatli
2010
Determinants 
of FDI in Easter 
Europe and 
Turkey, and 
the impact of 
EU accession
Quantita-
tive (cross 
country)
Macroeco-
nomic
Determinants
Analyze a panel data consisting 
of eleven countries involved in 
EU accession, including Turkey, 
and conclude that progress in 
this process result in a significant 
increase of FDI inflows. 
Uckun and 
Doerr
2010
Turkish reforms 
post 2001
Political 
economy 
analysis
Macroeco-
nomic + 
policy
Other (re-
forms)
Both reforms in the investment 
framework and availability of 
global financial funds during 
2003-2008 facilitated FDI upsurge. 
Esiyok 2011
Determinants 
of FDI in 
Turkey, a capi-
tal-knowledge 
approach
Quantita-
tive (cross 
country)
Macroeco-
nomic + 
Policy
Determinants
Esiyok (2011) finds that FDI in Tur-
key is mainly horizontal. FDI flows 
to Turkey respond positively to 
the EU accession process, as well 
as to bilateral trade treaties with 
third countries.
Bosco 2012
FDI in Turkey, 
unexploited 
potential
Quantita-
tive (cross 
country, 
gravity 
model)
GDP, dis-
tance, EU
Determinants
GDP per capita and distance, 
but not human capital availabil-
ity, are significant determinants 
of FDI. Turkey has an unexploited 
potential in terms of FDI stock of 
200% to 1000%.
 
Source: Author´s elaboration
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5.1. Motivation for the analysis and research objectives
Most developing countries embraced liberalization and opened their 
capital account during the nineties, as that was alleged to help them attracting 
international capital flows and deepening their financial markets. However, high 
income economies continued attracting approximately three quarters of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) flows in 1990-2008. Only after the global economic 
slowdown of 2008-2009 developing countries were able to noticeable increase 
their share in global capital flows, although most of it has been concentrated 
in large emerging economies (China, India, Brazil…), whereas lower income 
5.1. Motivación del análisis y objetivos de la investigación
La mayoría de los países en desarrollo adoptaron la liberalización económica 
y abrieron su cuenta de capital a los flujos internacionales durante los años 
noventa, ya que se suponía esto conllevaría una mayor atracción de fondos e 
inversiones, así como un mayor desarrollo de sus mercados financieros. Sin 
embargo, las economías desarrolladas continuaron atrayendo aproximadamente 
las tres cuartas partes de la inversión extranjera directa (IED) a nivel mundial 
entre 1990-2008 . Sólo tras la crisis económica y financiera de 2008-2009 los 
países en desarrollo han sido capaces de incrementar su participación en los 
RESUMEN Y CONCLUSIONES
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
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economies continue struggling. 
It is the main aim of this thesis to help identifying the determinants of FDI 
flows to developing nations, as well as understanding which are the conditions 
under which these flows can be maximized, and which public policies are more 
influential in this sense. The idea is not only to contribute to existing literature 
on the determinants of FDI, but also to inform public policy making and 
international entrepreneurs.
The papers included in this thesis try to answer four main sets of research 
questions:
1. To what extent has better macroeconomic management helped certain 
countries attract more FDI? This is one of the reasons why we focus on Latin 
American countries and Turkey, as most of them opened their capital account 
to foreign flows during the late eighties or early nineties and suffered marked 
flujos globales de capital, si bien la mayor parte de ellos se han concentrado en 
grandes economías emergentes (China, India, Brasil, etc.), mientras que las 
economías de bajo ingreso continúan teniendo problemas para atraer al inversor 
extranjero.
El objetivo de esta tesis doctoral es ayudar a identificar los factores que 
determinan los flujos de inversión extranjera directa a naciones en desarrollo, 
así como llegar a entender mejor bajo qué condiciones dichos flujos pueden ser 
maximizados y qué políticas públicas pueden ser útiles a este respecto. La idea 
es, además de contribuir a la literatura sobre los factores determinantes de la 
IED, tratar de informar también las decisiones de empresarios y de políticas 
públicas relacionadas.
Los artículos incluidos en esta memoria de tesis tratan de responder a cuatro 
grupos de preguntas de investigación:
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economic instability that resulted in countries not experiencing significant 
increases in FDI inflows. Over the past decade, as macroeconomic management 
in these countries improved, it seems that, in general, they became more 
attractive to the foreign investor. In Chapters 2 and 4 we try to identify which 
macroeconomic factors (growth rates, inflation, current account balance, debt 
levels…) are significant determinants of FDI in our countries of study. 
2. What has been the role of improved and more transparent institutions 
in enhancing FDI attraction?  Economic institutions in Latin America have 
been quickly mutating and, even when an overall noticeable improvement has 
been observed over the past two decades, still nowadays the rules of the game 
widely differ across countries in the region. We want to assess in this thesis to 
which extent institutions matter for FDI attraction, and which are the most 
influential dimensions, for policy makers to take them into account (rule of 
law, accountability and transparency, investor protection, etc.). We discuss 
1. ¿Hasta qué punto ha ayudado la mejor gestión de macroeconómica 
a que algunos países atraigan más IED? Decidimos centrarnos en el caso de 
Turquía y también en el de países latinoamericanos, ya que la mayoría de 
ellos abrieron su cuenta de capital a los flujos internacionales a finales de los 
años ochenta o principios de los noventa, y sufrieron una mayor volatilidad 
macroeconómica que resultó en que la IED no aumentó tanto como cabría 
esperar. Durante la última década, a medida que la gestión macroeconómica 
mejoró en estos países, parece que, en general, se volvieron más atractivos para 
los inversores internacionales. En los capítulos 2 y 4 de esta memoria de tesis 
tratamos de identificar qué factores macroeconómicos (tasa de crecimiento, 
inflación, resultado de cuenta corriente, niveles de deuda, etc.) influyen de 
manera significativa los flujos de IED en nuestros países de estudio.
2. ¿Cuál ha sido el rol de instituciones mejores y más transparentes a 
la hora de incrementar la atracción de IED? Las instituciones económicas en 
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institutional issues in chapter 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis.
3. What are the factors influencing the degree of foreign ownership 
in FDI subsidiaries? Chapter 3 in this thesis focuses in understanding the 
determinants of foreign market entry mode in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Although this is intimately related to FDI determinants, the focus 
here is the choice between wholly owned enterprises (WOE) or joint ventures 
(JV) when investing in a country. Within FDI, opting for a joint venture is 
expected to help mitigating certain risks (given the presence of a local partner 
with experience in the host economy and lower initial investment), but may 
have associated lower returns (as potential profits are shared). On the other 
hand, whole ownership is usually a higher return, higher risk alternative. At 
the same time, those companies that have a comparative advantage in the 
form of unique production processes or a differentiated technology (respect to 
competitors) would in principle be less prone to establishing joint ventures (to 
Latinoamérica han mutado rápidamente. En general, se observa una mejora 
notable en la capacidad institucional a lo largo de las dos últimas décadas, si 
bien es cierto que aún hoy en día las “reglas del juego” difieren notablemente 
de unos países a otros. En esta tesis tratamos de valorar hasta qué punto las 
instituciones influyen la atracción de IED, y cuáles serían las dimensiones más 
relevantes a tener en cuenta (estado de derecho, transparencia y rendición de 
cuentas, protección al inversor, etc.). Discutimos aspectos institucionales en 
los capítulos 2, 3 y 4 de esta tesis. 
3. ¿Cuáles son los elementos a considerar a la hora de decidir el grado de 
participación extranjera en una filial? El capítulo 3 se centra en la decisión de 
entrada en Latino América y el Caribe por parte de compañía multinacionales e 
inversores extranjeros. Este tema está íntimamente relacionado con los factores 
determinantes de la IED, si bien en este caso se trata de decidir entre entrar 
de la mano de un socio local (joint venture, JV) o de retener una participación 
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avoid potential imitation or reverse engineering), especially in those countries 
where there is weaker enforcement of property rights. Thus, country risk 
factors (including macroeconomic stability) and the nature of institutions are 
also taken into consideration here; in addition, the distinguishing features and 
the strategy of the multinational company have also a bearing on this decision. 
4. Do regional trade agreements help increasing FDI flows to member 
countries? A final question is whether regional integration processes may 
help countries increasing their appeal to the foreign investor, both from other 
member countries or from third countries. As we discuss in the next section, 
according to the literature, FDI inflows to the region are expected to increase, 
although the distribution across member countries may be uneven. In addition, 
not every kind of regional integration agreement, ranging from a free trade 
agreement to a common market, are expected to have the same influence. 
en la filial cercana al 100% (wholly owned enterprise o WOE, por sus siglas 
en inglés). Optar por una JV puede ayudar a mitigar ciertos riesgos, dada la 
presencia de un socio local con experiencia en la economía de destino de la 
inversión y el menor nivel de inversión inicial; al mismo tiempo, esto a menudo 
implica menor potencial de beneficios (que tienen que ser compartidos). Por 
otra parte, optar por WOE generalmente implica mayor potencial de beneficios 
(y riesgos). También hay que tener en cuenta que aquellas empresas que gozan 
de una ventaja comparativa en forma de procesos de producción o tecnologías 
diferenciadas respecto a los competidores en principio se inclinarían menos 
por la joint venture por el riesgo de imitación o replicación de la tecnología, 
especialmente en aquellos países con un menor nivel de estado de derecho 
y el cumplimiento de la ley. Por tanto, aquí tenemos en cuenta factores de 
riesgo país (incluyendo la estabilidad macroeconómica), la naturaleza de las 
instituciones, y también las características y estrategia de la multinacional 
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In sum, along the different chapters of this thesis we try to consistently 
address four different sets of research questions. At the same time, all of 
them are related to the common objective of identifying the determinants of 
foreign direct investment in developing countries. In order to respond to these 
research questions, we initially draw from a literature review, select and apply 
an appropriate study framework and methodology, and try to draw a series of 
policy implications from the results. 
5.2. Identifying the determinants of foreign direct investment 
through the literature
The departure point for the different chapters of these thesis is always 
a comprehensive literature review on the research question. Through the 
inversora. 
4. ¿Ayudan los acuerdos de integración regional a incrementar los flujos 
de IED a los estados miembros? Una última cuestión es si los procesos de 
integración regional pueden servir de catalizador  de la IED, procedente tanto 
de estados miembros como de terceros países. Tal y como discutimos en la 
sección siguiente, de acuerdo a la literatura, se espera que aumenten los flujos 
de IED a la región en la que se firma el tratado de libre comercio o de asociación, 
si bien la distribución de éstos entre los diferentes estados miembros puede ser 
desigual. Además, puede que no todos los tipos de acuerdo de integración 
regional (desde acuerdo de libre comercio hasta mercado común) tengan la 
misma influencia.
En definitiva, a lo largo de los diferentes capítulos de esta tesis tratamos 
consistentemente de responder a cuatro grupos de preguntas de investigación. 
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different literature reviews we have performed for the papers on determinants 
of FDI in Latin America (macro-country level analysis), determinants of foreign 
ownership in Latin America (enterprise level), and factors influencing FDI in 
Turkey (case study), we have identified a series of theoretical approaches that 
are intimately related. Overall, it can be argued that there are six main sets of 
factors influencing foreign investment: 
First, initially, it was argued that the decision to invest in foreign markets 
was mainly taken following an assessment of transaction costs. If the costs 
of operating through markets (transport, customs, arranging commercial 
contracts) are low, exporting would be the preferred option to serve demand 
at destination. This may also be the first choice for high risk or unknown 
foreign markets, as the company bears less sunk costs by exporting instead of 
investing. On the other hand, if contractual risks are high, investment modes 
would be preferred over exporting or licensing, as the company can save 
Todas ellas están interrelacionadas y tienen el objetivo en común de identificar 
los factores determinantes de la inversión extranjera directa en países en 
desarrollo. En todos los casos, partimos para nuestro análisis de una revisión de 
la literatura que después nos permite la selección y aplicación de un marco de 
estudio y una metodología adecuados; por último, tratamos de destilar de los 
resultados y de la evidencia encontrada una serie de implicaciones para la toma 
de decisiones.
5.2. Identificación de los factores determinantes de la inversión 
extranjera directa a través de la literatura
El punto de partida de los diferentes capítulos de esta tesis es siempre un 
análisis de la literatura existente relativa a esas preguntas de investigación. 
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transaction costs and minimize the risk of imitation or suffering reputational 
losses by directly locating in the target market (Dunning, 1973; Agarwal and 
Ramaswami, 1992).
Within FDI, opting for a joint venture is expected to help mitigating 
certain risks (given the presence of a local partner with experience in the host 
economy and lower initial investment), but may have associated lower returns 
(as potential profits are shared). On the other hand, whole ownership is usually 
a higher return, higher risk alternative. 
Second, companies decide on their ultimate location (not only at the 
country level, but also at the regional or even local level) considering the 
endowments they want to reach (Dunning, 1998). Access to local demand 
(market size) is one of the most obvious location-related determinants of 
FDI.  Also, existing managerial capabilities, human capital, access to land, 
Partiendo de las diferentes revisiones de la literatura que hemos llevado a cabo 
para los artículos sobre los factores determinantes de la IED en Latinoamérica 
(a nivel macro-país), los factores determinantes de la participación extranjera 
en filiales en Latinoamérica (nivel de empresa), y los factores influyendo la 
IED en Turquía (caso de estudio), hemos identificado seis enfoques teoréticos 
íntimamente relacionados. Cabría afirmar que estos seis enfoques se refieren 
a seis grandes grupos de factores que influyen la inversión extranjera directa:
Primero, en un principio se sostenía que las decisiones de inversión en 
mercados extranjeros se tomaban fundamentalmente de acuerdo a un análisis 
de los costes de transacción. Si los costes de transacción a través de los 
mercados (transporte, aduanas, preparación de contratos comerciales) son 
bajos, exportar será la opción preferida para atender la demanda en el país de 
destino. Esta también puede ser la primera opción en mercados desconocidos 
o con un alto riesgo percibido, ya que la compañía o inversor internacional 
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or agglomeration economies are relevant factors to take into consideration. 
According to Deichmann et al. (2003), in the case of multinationals investing 
in Turkey, the ultimate location decision depends on the characteristics of the 
industry (productivity, agglomeration of similar firms) and on local conditions 
(coastal access, infrastructures, etc.). With regards to the foreign entry market 
mode choice, the larger the demand and the richer the endowments of the host 
economy, the more likely is that international investors opt for a higher degree 
of ownership in the subsidiary.  
Thirdly, even if theoretical contributions relating macroeconomic 
conditions and FDI inflows are scanty, the empirical literature, in general, 
argues that poor macroeconomic management and instability contributes 
negatively to foreign direct investment attraction. When we look at Latin 
America, there is evidence that maintaining large current account deficits 
is positively related to FDI inf lows (Montero, 2008). There is also some 
soporta menos costes hundidos al exportar en lugar de invertir. Por otra 
parte, si los riesgos contractuales son altos, se preferirá invertir directamente 
en destino en lugar de exportar o contratar licencias de comercialización, ya 
que la empresa inversora puede ahorrarse costes de transacción y minimizar el 
riesgo de sufrir imitación o ver dañada su reputación (por un comercializador 
inadecuado en destino) mediante la implantación directa (Dunning, 1973; 
Agarwal y Ramaswami, 1992). 
Dentro de la inversión extranjera directa, optar por una joint venture se 
supone ayudará a mitigar ciertos riesgos asociados al nuevo mercado, dada la 
presencia de un socio local con experiencia y al menor desembolso inicial; al 
mismo tiempo, sin embargo, esto puede significar menores tasas de retorno 
(ya que las ganancias se comparten). Por otra parte, un grado de participación 
del 100% en la filial generalmente es una alternativa de mayor retorno, pero 
también de mayor riesgo.
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evidence that high inflation and debt service have negative effects on foreign 
investment (Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2002), although these findings are 
not always consistent in the literature. In the case of Turkey, there is consensus 
in the literature, pointing to high inflation and macroeconomic volatility as 
the principal reason why the country was not able to attract significant FDI 
inflows during the nineties, in spite of capital account liberalization (Erdilek, 
2003; Basar and Tosunoglu, 2006). In sum, macroeconomic stability would be, 
at least, a necessary (but perhaps not sufficient) condition to attract FDI. It is 
also worth noticing that exchange rate volatility and institutional uncertainty 
could result in hysteresis effects, slowing or reducing the response of foreign 
investors to FDI determinants (Dixit, 1989). 
Fourth, we point out in the introductory chapter that this thesis is 
motivated by the fact that some developing economies are underachieving 
in FDI attraction, and they are competing among themselves to get more 
Segundo, las empresas deciden la localización de la filial (no sólo elección 
de país, sino también a nivel regional o local) considerando los recursos a los 
que quieren acceder (Dunning, 1998). El acceso a la demanda local (tamaño 
de mercado) es uno de los factores más obvios detrás de cada decisión de 
localización. También, las habilidades de gestión de los managers, el capital 
humano, el acceso a tierra, o las economías de aglomeración son factores 
relevantes a tener en cuenta. Según Deichmann et al (2003), en lo que se 
refiere a multinacionales invirtiendo en Turquía, la decisión de localización 
depende tanto de las características de la industria o sector (productividad, 
aglomeración de empresas) como de las condiciones locales (acceso costero, 
infraestructuras, etc.). En lo que respecta a la elección de la forma de entrada 
en mercados extranjeros, cuanto mayor es la demanda y más ricos los recursos 
de la economía de destino, más probable es que los inversores internacionales 
opten por un mayor nivel de participación en las filiales. 
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flows. According to the new institutional economics, institutions matter and 
countries with good governance are alleged to be more attractive to the foreign 
investor (Rodrik et al, 2004; Kang and Jiang, 2012). It is argued that foreign 
entrepreneurs and multinationals prefer countries with stable property rights, 
an adequate legal framework and the capacity to enforce it, since this will help 
mitigating investment risks. 
In many cases, in this “race to the top” for FDI, countries tweak institutions 
to increase their appeal to foreign investors: policy makers may alter property 
rights, grant tax exemptions, use targeted industrial policy, enhance 
intellectual property right protection (Awokuse and Yin, 2010), try to increase 
transparency and reduce corruption and informality, or modify the terms 
of the repatriation of dividends and other aspects of the legal and regulatory 
framework (see, for example, Busse and Hefeker, 2007). For instance, in our 
literature review about the determinants of FDI in Turkey we find evidence 
Tercero, aunque no abundan las teorías que relaccionan condiciones 
macroeconómicas e IED,  la literatura empírica, por lo general, sostiene que 
una pobre gestión macroeconómica contribuye negativamente a la atracción 
de inversión. En el caso concreto de Latinoamérica, hay evidencia de que 
mantener grandes déficits por cuenta corriente resulta en un mayor influjo de 
IED (Montero, 2008). También hay cierta evidencia de que una alta inflación y 
servicio de la deuda afectan negativamente a la IED (Bengoa y Sánchez-Robles, 
2002), si bien ésta no es concluyente. En el caso turco sí que hay consenso en la 
literatura, que señala a la alta inflación y la volatilidad macroeconómica como 
las razones principales por las que el país no ha sido capaz de atraer flujos de 
IED más significativos durante los años noventa, a pesar de la liberalización de 
los flujos de capital (Erdilek, 2003; Basar y Tosunoglu, 2006). En definitiva, 
la estabilidad macroeconómica sería, al menos, una condición necesaria (pero 
quizás no suficiente) de cara a la atracción de IED. También cabe destacar 
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that lack of corruption, transparency, rule of law or security of property rights 
contribute positively to FDI attraction (Dumludag et al, 2007). At the same 
time, a “race to the bottom” may be observed, especially among developing 
countries, since they often offer reductions in taxation, fiscal exemptions, 
more loose environmental and social safeguards (Hecock and Jepsen, 2013), 
and lower salaries, in order to be able to attract the foreign investor via lower 
costs (Olney, 2013). 
The literature on the determinants of foreign entry mode (discussed in 
chapter 3) also argues that institutions matter. In this case, many authors have 
focused not only in the “usual suspects” of good governance (rule of law, lack of 
corruption, accountability, etc.), but also in cultural distance. The underlying 
reasoning is that managers and owners from different countries of origin may 
approach a similar foreign market entry decision from diverse perspectives 
(and with dissimilar degrees of risk aversion). The concept of cultural distance 
que la volatilidad del tipo de cambio y la incertidumbre institucional podría 
resultar en un efecto de histéresis, que reduciría o ralentizaría la respuesta de 
los inversores extranjeros a los factores determinantes de la IED (Dixit, 1989).
Cuarto, señalamos en el capítulo 1 que esta tesis está motivada por el hecho 
de que algunas economías en desarrollo están teniendo problemas para atraer 
FDI, y tienen que competir entre ellas para conseguir mayores flujos de capital. 
De acuerdo con los enfoques denominados de Nueva Economía Institucional, 
hay que tener a las instituciones muy en cuenta; así, los países con mejor 
gobernabilidad y transparencia serán más atractivos para el inversor extranjero 
(Rodrik et al., 2004; Kang y Jiang, 2012). Se argumenta que los empresarios 
extranjeros y las multinacionales prefieren países con derechos de propiedad 
estables, un adecuado marco legal y capacidad para implementarlos, dado que 
esto ayudará a mitigar los riesgos asociados a la inversión.
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relates not only to the legal framework but also to socioeconomic norms, 
common language and tradition. There is some evidence that the more different 
the country of origin and the host of FDI are in terms of culture and institutions, 
the more likely is that the foreign investor opts for a lower degree of ownership 
in the subsidiary branch, in order to minimize exposure and take advantage 
of local partner knowledge (Demirbag et al., 2007; Richards and Yang, 2011). 
Ultimately, multinationals may be reluctant to enter countries in which a high 
institutional risk is perceived. 
In addition, it is also worth bearing in mind ownership and strategic 
considerations. On top of host country factors (endowments, transaction 
costs, macroeconomic and institutional), a series of considerations relating to 
the distinguishing features of the parent firm or the strategy pursued by the 
multinational company and its management, have an important bearing on 
direct investment decisions in foreign countries. 
En muchos casos, en esta “carrera de mejora” del clima de inversión, los 
países modifican sus instituciones, alteran los derechos de propiedad, otorgan 
exenciones fiscales, incrementan la protección de la propiedad intelectual, y 
otorgan incentivos a ciertas industrias, siempre con la intención de incrementar 
la IED (Awokuse and Yin, 2010). Del mismo modo, tratan de incrementar la 
transparencia institucional, reducir la corrupción y la informalidad, o modificar 
los términos de la repatriación de dividendos, u otros aspectos del marco 
regulatorio (Busse y Hefeker, 2007). Por ejemplo, en nuestra revisión de la 
literatura sobre los factores determinantes de la IED en Turquía encontramos 
evidencia de que la menor corrupción, la transparencia, el cumplimiento de la 
ley y la seguridad de los derechos de propiedad contribuyen positivamente a la 
atracción de IED (Dumludag et al, 2007). Por otro lado, sin embargo, también 
se observa que hay una “carrera de empeoramiento” en otras dimensiones, como 
es el caso de minimización de las salvaguardias sociales y medioambientales 
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For example, ownership advantages refer to the existence of firm-specific 
assets and knowledge-based assets such as patents, differentiated management 
formulas, marketing organization and others that provide multi-national 
companies with advantages over local companies in foreign markets (see the 
discussion in Meyer et al, 2009).  For example, a company with a distinctive 
brand may not want to license production and distribution under its name 
in a foreign market, since there are risks that the local partner does not have 
the capacity to do an optimal marketing mix; in this context, establishing 
a subsidiary (FDI) in that foreign market would be the preferred option. 
Similarly, when a multinational is deciding on the mode of foreign entry, it has 
to consider whether it counts with highly specific knowledge (such as patents) 
or production processes (and related quality certificates) over which retain 
ownership; if so, opting for wholly owned subsidiaries would be preferred over 
joint ventures with local partners (on firm characteristics and FDI, see Davis 
(Hecock y Jepsen, 2013), y los menores salarios que algunos países establecen 
para tratar de incrementar los flujos de IED con menores costes (Olney, 2013). 
La literatura sobre los factores determinantes del modo de entrada 
en mercados extranjeros (capítulo 3) también sostiene que los arreglos 
institucionales son relevantes en este tipo de decisiones. En este caso, muchos 
autores se han centrado en analizar los efectos de la distancia cultural (además 
del imperio de la ley, la falta de corrupción, la rendición de cuentas, etc.). El 
motivo es que  managers y dueños de diferente procedencia pueden afrontar una 
decisión similar de inversión en mercado de destino desde perspectivas diversas 
(y con diferentes grados de aversión al riesgo). El concepto de distancia cultural 
se refiere no sólo al marco legal, sino también a las normas socioeconómicas, 
a un lenguaje o una tradición común. Se ha demostrado que cuanto más 
diferentes son los países de origen y de destino de la IED en términos culturales 
e institucionales, más probable es que el inversor extranjero opte por un menor 
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et al., 2000). In the case of Turkey, Tatoglu et al (2003) have studied foreign 
entry mode at the light of Dunning s´ (1980) eclectic OLI paradigm, considering 
ownership, location and internalization factors. 
In addition to ownership of strategic assets, it is worth highlighting other 
strategic decisions that may shape FDI location and foreign entry mode choices. 
For instance, multinationals have to choose between maintaining a global or a 
multi-domestic strategy (Dikova and van Witteloostuijn, 2007), and may be 
affected by the inertia of certain business expansion model that has worked in 
the past but may not be the best choice in the new market. Gao and Pan (2010) 
discuss about the role of experience in sequential entries.
Another strategic dimension international managers and multinationals 
consider when investing in a new country is the role the subsidiary they are 
establishing is going to have in the business structure of the holding. The 
nivel de participación en la filial, para así tratar de minimizar su exposición 
al riesgo y también para tratar de aprovechar el conocimiento del socio local 
(Demirbag et al., 2007; Richards y Yang, 2011). Por último, las multinacionales 
pueden ser reticentes a entrar en países en los que se percibe que hay un alto 
riesgo institucional. 
Además, también se deben tener en cuenta consideraciones de propiedad y 
de estrategia. Además de factores relacionados con el país de destino (acceso 
a recursos, costes de transacción, macroeconómicos e institucionales), una 
serie de consideraciones que se refieren a los rasgos distintivos de la empresa 
matriz y a la estrategia perseguida por la corporación multinacional y su consejo 
directivo tienen gran relevancia para las decisiones de inversión en países en 
desarrollo.
Por ejemplo, las ventajas de propiedad se refieren a la existencia de activos 
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Knowledge-Capital model (see, for example, Markusen and Maskus, 1999; 
Davies, 2008) allows for multiple production facilities, separating cross-
support centralized services and disperse production in some cases. According 
to this approach, there would be three main motivations for FDI: addressing 
the demand in the host country (market seeking or horizontal FDI), using the 
host country as a production facility to then export a cheaper product to third 
countries (vertical FDI), and seeking to exploit resources and raw materials 
(strategic asset seeking FDI). In principle, horizontal FDI is likely to be a 
substitute for trade, as firms use FDI instead of exports to supply the market, 
and will probably compete with local industries, whereas vertical FDI is a 
complement to trade, it is export oriented and it does not normally compete 
with local industries. The motivations for FDI are likely to influence foreign 
investment and foreign market entry mode decisions, although they are usually 
difficult to measure. In chapter three, using enterprise survey data, we focus in 
específicos, como es el caso de patentes y de estructuras de gestión, fórmulas 
de marketing o procesos diferenciados de los de la competencia, que le pueden 
dar al inversor extranjero una ventaja comparativa (véase la discusión en Meyer 
et al., 2009). Por ejemplo, una compañía con una marca distintiva puede no 
querer otorgar licencias de fabricación y distribución bajo su nombre en un 
mercado extranjero, ya que hay riesgos de que el socio local no tenga capacidad 
de escoger e implementar un marketing-mix efectivo; en este contexto, el 
establecimiento de una subsidiaria o filial (IED) en un mercado extranjero es la 
opción preferida (sobre licencias y exportación directa). De igual modo, cuando 
una empresa está decidiendo su forma de entrada en mercado extranjero, tiene 
que considerar si cuenta con conocimiento (patentes) o procesos de producción 
(y certificados de calidad) altamente específicos, sobre los que debe retener (y 
no ceder) propiedad; si esto es así, optar por el grado máximo de participación 
(100%) será preferible a entrar con una joint venture (Davis et al, 2000). En 
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analyzing certain (imperfect) proxies for vertical FDI, such as the percentage of 
indirect exports, as well as the percentage of inputs in the production process 
that have foreign origin.  
Finally, according to some authors, regional integration processes have an 
impact on FDI. This could arguably be a sixth category of determinants of FDI, 
although it is intimately related to transaction costs (customs) and location 
considerations, as well as to the abovementioned Knowledge-Capital model. 
The impact of integration on intra-regional FDI inflows seems to indeterminate; 
on the one hand, a negative impact of a regional trade agreement (RTA) on 
horizontal FDI could be theoretically expected, as reduced tariffs makes “tariff-
jumping” horizontal investment less necessary; on the other hand, the RTA may 
positively influence vertical FDI, since relocation of part of the production 
chain within the region is easier (lower cost to re-export back). Also strategic 
asset seeking FDI is expected to expand following regional integration. In what 
el caso turco, Tatoglu et al (2003) estudian la forma de entrada partiendo del 
paradigma ecléctico OLI de Dunning (1980), teniendo en cuenta factores de 
propiedad, localización e internalización. 
Además de la propiedad de activos específicos, cabe destacar el peso que 
otras decisiones estratégicas tienen en las decisiones de inversión y participación 
en la filial. Por ejemplo, Dikova y van Witteloostuijn (2007) sostienen que las 
multinacionales tienen que elegir entre mantener una estrategia global o multi-
país (diferenciada por economía de destino). Además, puede ser el caso de que 
se vean afectadas por la inercia derivada de decisiones de internacionalización 
que adoptaron en el pasado (y que pueden no ser las mejores en nuevos 
mercados de destino). Gao y Pan (2010) discuten el rol de la experiencia en 
entradas sucesivas en mercados extranjeros. 
Otra dimensión estratégica que los managers y empresas internacionales 
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regards extra regional flows, both the tariff-jumping and internalization models 
predict an increase in investment. Extra-regional FDI is, in general, expected 
to increase; for instance, countries in Eastern Europe saw an increase on FDI 
from outside the European Union when they became members. It is also worth 
noticing that, apart from modifying tariffs and bringing in other trade-related 
measures, RTA s´ often encompass also investment provisions, intellectual 
property clauses, rules of origin, etc. (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997; Te Velde 
and Bezemer, 2006; Medvedev, 2012). For these reasons, regional integration 
processes are likely to result in higher investment attraction (to the region) 
and diversion of flows away from neighboring countries that are not part of 
the region. In Turkey, the mere signaling created by the official start of EU 
accession conversations in 2005 is argued to have significantly boosted FDI 
flows (Sayek, 2007). 
Summarizing, we have performed a comprehensive literature review to 
consideran cuando invierten en un nuevo país es el rol que la empresa filial que 
están estableciendo va a tener en la estructura de negocios de la corporación. 
El Modelo Capital-Conocimiento (Markusen y Maskus, 1999; Davies, 2008) 
considera la existencia de múltiples factorías de producción, dispersas en 
muchos casos y separadas de los servicios centrales. De acuerdo a este modelo, 
hay tres motivaciones principales para la inversión extranjera directa: satisfacer 
la demanda en la economía de destino (IED horizontal, u orientada al mercado), 
implantar una planta de producción para después exportar un producto más 
barato a terceros países (IED vertical), o bien tratar de explotar recursos y 
materias primas (IED orientada al acceso a recursos estratégicos). En principio, 
la IED podría usarse para reemplazar al comercio exterior, dado que la empresa 
utiliza IED en lugar de exportaciones para satisfacer al mercado de destino, 
compitiendo probablemente con empresas locales; por el contrario, la IED 
vertical complementa al comercio exterior, está orientada a la exportación 
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prepare the papers in this thesis, drawing from many different theories. We 
argue that it is possible to synthesize the determinants of foreign direct 
investment in six main sets of factors: transaction costs, location-related, 
macroeconomic, institutional, ownership and strategic, and those related to 
regional integration. The boundaries among these sets of determinants are 
not always clear-cut, as some of the underlying theoretical approaches are 
complementary. And this is the departure point in this thesis: drawing from 
existing literature, we have defined the universe of theoretically influential FDI 
determinants, and we focus on testing their significance in the Latin American 
context through cross country regressions, and in the Turkish context through 
a case study.  
5.3. The selection of research methods
y no suele competir con las industrias locales. Se espera que los diferentes 
objetivos de la IED influyan de distinta manera en las decisiones de inversión 
y participación en filiales, si bien esto es algo difícil de medir. En el capítulo 3, 
usando datos de encuesta de empresas, tratamos de aproximar este concepto 
de IED vertical a través de ciertas variables, como el nivel de exportaciones 
indirectas y el nivel de insumos que una empresa compra en el extranjero.
Finalmente, de acuerdo a algunos autores, los procesos de integración 
regional tienen un impacto en la IED. Podría argumentarse que esta sería una 
sexta categoría de factores determinantes de la IED, si bien estaría íntimamente 
relacionada con los costos de transacción y los factores de localización, así 
como con el ya mencionado Modelo Capital-Conocimiento. El impacto de la 
integración en los flujos de IED intra-regionales parece difícil de determinar; 
por un lado, cabría esperar que un acuerdo de integración regional reduzca 
la IED horizontal, dado que reduce la necesidad de implantarse directamente 
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The strands of literature we have reviewed help us identify a suitable range 
of research methods to address the different questions. However, since we 
decided to focus in developing economies, soon we realized that we would 
be facing certain data constraints. For example, while it is relatively easy to 
apply a gravity model to understand the difference between current levels and 
potential FDI flows to OECD countries, a similar analysis cannot be done 
in Latin America since, to our knowledge, we do not count with a bilateral 
investment matrix accounting for flows between countries in the region. Thus, 
we could not rely on the gravity approach and have to opt for a unilateral look 
(disregarding the country of origin of funds).
It is worth noticing that, in order to avoid the risk of presenting a myopic 
analysis, we have approached the determinants of foreign direct investment 
using multiple lenses. 
en destino para evitar aranceles; por otra parte, el acuerdo de integración 
regional puede tener una influencia muy positiva en la IED vertical, dado que 
la deslocalización de parte de la cadena de producción se hace más fácil (hay 
menores costos para re-exportar dentro del área integrada). También se espera 
que la IED que busca obtener acceso a recursos estratégicos se incremente. 
En lo que se refiere a flujos de IED procedentes de terceros países fuera de la 
región, se espera que aumenten; por ejemplo, los países de Europa del Este 
vieron incrementarse notablemente la IED procedente de terceros países fuera 
de la Unión Europea cuando se convirtieron en miembros de pleno derecho 
de la misma. También hay que tener en cuenta que, además de conllevar una 
reducción de tarifas y mejoras en las preferencias comerciales, los acuerdos 
de integración regional a menudo conllevan también cláusulas de inversión, 
derechos de propiedad intelectual, reglas de origen, etc. (Blomstrom y Kokko, 
1997; Te Velde y Bezemer, 2006; Medvedev, 2012). Por estas razones, los 
TESISrevision miguel1.2.indd   260 19/05/2014   22:07:11
261RESUMEN Y CONCLUSIONES - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
First, a cross-country comparison exercise from a macro perspective is 
adopted in Chapter 2, Do changes in the rules of the game affect FDI flows in Latin 
America? In this case, we build a database with yearly observations for 19 Latin 
American countries between 1990 and 2010. The source for FDI flows and stock 
data is coming from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), whereas most macroeconomic variables in the dataset come 
from World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI), and institutional 
variables are from the International Country Risk Guide (PRS Group). We also 
create a dummy variable that tries to capture the influence of the DR-CAFTA 
Agreement between Central American countries and the US on FDI. 
With regards to the cross country regression method employed, we 
present results both under Generalized Least Squares Fixed Effects (once the 
Hausman test has confirmed this is preferred to Random Effects approach), 
and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), as requested by peer reviewers 
procesos de integración regional suelen resultar en una mayor atracción del 
inversor extranjero, así como en la desviación de fondos que podrían haber ido 
destinados a otros países vecinos que no son parte del tratado. En Turquía, las 
meras expectativas creadas por el inicio oficial de las conversaciones de acceso 
a la Unión Europea en 2005 parecen haber sido suficientes para incrementar 
significativamente la IED (Sayek, 2007).
En definitiva, hemos elaborado una exhaustiva revisión de la literatura para 
preparar cada uno de los artículos contenidos en esta tesis, repasando muy 
diferentes teorías. Somos de la opinión que es posible sintetizar los determinantes 
de la inversión extranjera directa en seis grupos de factores principales: costos 
de transacción, localización, macroeconómicos, institucionales, de propiedad 
y estratégicos, y aquellos relacionados con la integración regional. Los límites 
entre estos grupos no siempre están claramente definidos, dado que muchos de 
los enfoques estudiados son complementarios. Y precisamente este es el punto 
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during the publication process of this article. Nonetheless, as we discuss in 
detail in the chapter, there does not seem to be theoretical foundation to use 
GMM in a model in which we use the stock of FDI as a proxy of the initial 
level of foreign investment. GMM is justified only if we understand that FDI 
inflows in a given year depend on the amount of FDI received in the previous 
year, a case in which we would need to include the lagged FDI flows among 
explanatory variables; however, unlike GDP growth, for example, FDI flows 
do not necessarily depend on previous investment levels, and they are usually 
relatively unpredictable, with volatility caused by the presence or absence of 
large operations. In the context of the fixed effects model, we first conduct 
a series of unit root tests and co-integration analysis to control and correct 
for non-stationary data; then, once we have the first results, we analyze 
non-linearities, which do not seem to be a problem in our dataset; finally, 
we introduce a series of robustness checks and test the validity of results for 
de partida de esta tesis: a partir de la revisión de la literatura existente hemos 
definido el universo de factores que teóricamente determinan la IED, para 
después tratarnos de centrar en probar si son significativos o no; en el caso de 
Latinoamérica, mediante regresiones econométricas sobre datos multi-país; en 
el caso de Turquía, a través de un caso de estudio.
5.3. La selección de métodos de investigación
Las corrientes de literatura que hemos revisado nos han ayudado a identificar 
un rango de métodos adecuado para contestar a las diferentes preguntas de 
investigación. Sin embargo, al decidir centrarnos en economías en desarrollo, 
pronto nos dimos cuenta de que nos enfrentaríamos a ciertas limitaciones en 
cuanto a datos. Por ejemplo, la inexistencia de una matriz que contenga los 
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different subsamples. 
Second, in Chapter 3, Do foreign multinationals prefer joint or solo ventures in 
Latin America?, we adopt a microeconomic perspective using firm level data from 
the The World Bank Group Enterprise Surveys, for the years 2005-2006 and 
2009-2010. Even when our focus is on Latin American and the Caribbean, we 
contrast also whether observed results are similar to those in another hundred 
countries. In this case, the preferred regression method is through a binary 
logit, with the dependent variable taking value 1 for wholly owned enterprises 
and 0 for joint ventures. A logit model is preferred over a probit, given that the 
latter is normally used in models where there are clearly marked differences 
between the two values of the dependent variable; in this case we are making 
an “ad hoc” division in the continuum of “share of foreign ownership”, since the 
entry mode motivations of a subsidiary with a 94.5% share of foreign capital 
(considered JV) and those of a firm with a share of 95.5% (treated as WOE) 
flujos bilaterales de capital entre los distintos países latinoamericanos nos ha 
impedido la aplicación de un modelo gravitacional para calcular el potencial de 
inversión. Es por ello por lo que nos hemos visto obligados a utilizar un enfoque 
unilateral, que atiende únicamente al destino de los fondos (y no al origen de la 
inversión).
También cabe notar que, para no correr el riesgo de llevar a cabo un análisis 
miope, de corto recorrido, hemos abordado los factores determinantes de la 
inversión extranjera directa con múltiples enfoques.
Primero, en el capítulo 2, con título ¿Afectan los cambios en las reglas del juego 
a los flujos de IED en Latinoamérica?, llevamos a cabo un ejercicio de comparación 
multi-país desde una perspectiva macro. En este caso, construimos una base 
de datos con observaciones anuales para 19 países latinoamericanos, entre 
1990 y 2010. La fuente de datos para flujos y stock de IED es la Conferencia de 
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may not differ that much. It is also worth noticing that we include a series of 
dummies to see whether the determinants of foreign entry mode differ across 
sub regions (South America, Central America, Caribbean), or if we look before 
and in the aftermath of the global crisis of 2008. 
Finally, we complement the cross country quantitative approaches with a 
case study titled How regional integration and transnational energy networks have 
boosted FDI in Turkey (and may cease to do so).  In this case, we draw from the 
qualitative framework formulated by Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) to try to 
assess the effects of different Regional Trade Agreements on FDI, depending 
also on the signing country. 
In sum, the works contained in this thesis entail a multi-tier look at FDI that 
draws from different quantitative and qualitative methods. Results from these 
approaches have to be regarded as complementary, as we discuss in the next 
Naciones Unidas sobre el Comercio y el Desarrollo (UNCTAD), mientras que 
la mayoría de las variables macroeconómicas en el set de datos provienen de los 
Indicadores de Desarrollo Mundiales del Banco Mundial (WDI); las variables 
institucionales provienen de la Guía Internacional de Riesgo País (Grupo PRS). 
También creamos una variable instrumental que trata de capturar la influencia 
en la IED del tratado RD-CAFTA entre países en Centroamérica y Estados 
Unidos.
En lo que se refiere al método de regresión empleado, presentamos los 
resultados tanto con Método de Mínimos Cuadrados Generalizados y Efectos 
Fijos (una vez que el test de Hausman ha confirmado que esto es preferible a 
usar Efectos Aleatorios), como con el Método de Momentos Generalizados 
(GMM, por sus siglas en inglés), de acuerdo a la solicitud que nos hicieron 
los revisores en el proceso de publicación de este artículo. No obstante, tal 
y como discutimos en detalle en el capítulo, no parece que haya fundación 
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section. 
5.4. Empirical evidence about the determinants of foreign direct 
investment in developing economies
In order to synthesize the results we obtain in the different chapters, we 
structure them around the six groups of determinants of FDI we have identified 
in the literature review, although in slightly different order.
Firstly, a good macroeconomic management seems to be a necessary 
condition to attract FDI flows, but may not be sufficient. In addition, not all 
the macroeconomic dimensions are equally relevant, and determinants may 
vary over time. We find significant evidence that trade openness, low short-
term debt levels, and balance of payment deficits are significant in explaining 
teórica para usar GMM en un modelo en el que incluimos el stock de IED como 
aproximación del nivel inicial de IED. GMM sólo se justifica si entendemos 
que los flujos de IED en un año determinado dependen de la cantidad de IED 
recibida el año anterior, de modo que tendríamos que incluir el retardo de 
los flujos de IED entre las variables explicativas; sin embargo, al contrario 
que en el caso del crecimiento de GDP, por ejemplo, los flujos de IED no 
necesariamente dependen de los niveles de inversión previos, y suelen ser 
poco predecibles, con grandes operaciones de adquisición causando a menudo 
volatilidad. En el contexto del modelo de Efectos Fijos, primero realizamos un 
análisis de co-integración para identificar y ajustar variables no estacionarias; 
más adelante, cuando ya tenemos los primeros resultados, analizamos posibles 
relaciones no lineales, lo que parece no ser un problema en nuestro panel de 
datos; finalmente, introducimos una serie de test de robustez y comprobamos 
la validez de los resultados para diferentes sub-muestras. 
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foreign capital flowing to Latin America over the period from 1990 to 2010. 
The coefficient for current account balance is negative, highly significant and 
robust among the different specifications; this implies that countries with 
larger external financing needs seem to appeal to long-term foreign investors, 
which is in agreement with the existing literature on FDI in Latin America 
(Montero, 2008; Trevino et al, 2002).  At the same time, interest rates and 
GDP per capita growth levels do not seem to be significant determinant of 
FDI. The latter result contrasts with the arguments of the theoretical literature, 
although is in line with the findings of Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006) also for 
Latin America in 1980-1996. Finally, inflation does not seem to have been a 
significant determinant of FDI in Latin America in 1990-2010. In Turkey, most 
authors point to high inflation as a deterrent of FDI, although Sayek (2007) 
does not find the variable significant. Overall, empirical findings on inflation 
are inconclusive. 
Segundo, en el capítulo 3, ¿Prefieren las multinacionales extranjeras joint 
ventures o inversiones en solitario en Latinoamérica?, adoptamos una perspectiva 
microeconómica, al emplear datos a nivel de empresa proveniente de las 
Encuestas de Empresas del Banco Mundial, para los años 2005-2006 y 
2009-2010. Si bien nos centramos en Latinoamérica y el Caribe, también 
contrastamos si los resultados obtenidos son similares a los de otros cien 
países. En este caso, el método de regresión preferido sigue un modelo logit 
binomial, en el que la variable dependiente toma valor 1 cuando la participación 
extranjera en la filial es superior al 95% del capital social, y valor 0 en el caso 
de joint ventures. El modelo logit es más adecuado que el probit en este caso, 
dado que el segundo se usa cuando hay una marcada diferenciación entre los dos 
valores que adopta la dicotómica. En este caso, nosotros estamos haciendo una 
distinción “ad hoc” en el continuum de los diferentes niveles de participación 
extranjera, ya que las motivaciones de una filial con una participación 
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Second, there is some evidence that institutions affect foreign direct 
investment decisions. At the macro level, we find that government stability 
and its capacity to implement programs and reforms appears here as a highly 
significant and positive determinant of FDI. Foreign companies are also highly 
interested in avoiding countries with higher expropriation risks, as reflected 
by the positive and significant coefficient of the investment profile variable; 
these findings are in line with those in Staats and Biglaiser (2012), also for Latin 
America. The law and order variable, accounting for the impartiality of the legal 
system and the effective enforcement of the law, is barely significant at the 10% 
level of confidence; foreign entrepreneurs investing in Latin America may take 
the quality of the legal system in the various countries into account, but this is 
not the main factor motivating their decision. The quality of bureaucracy and 
control of corruption have insignificant effects in the different specifications. 
Corruption is equally insignificant when we look at the microeconomic level. 
extranjera del 94.5% (considerada joint venture, JV) y las de una con 95.5% 
(considerada de participación total, o WOE por sus siglas en inglés) pueden 
no diferir mucho. También cabe destacar que incluimos una serie de variables 
instrumentales para comprobar si los factores que determinan la forma de 
entrada en mercados extranjeros (WOE versus JV) difieren entre las diferentes 
sub-regiones (Sudamérica, Centroamérica, Caribe), o cuando observamos el 
antes y el después de la crisis del 2008. 
Finalmente, complementamos los métodos cuantitativos multi-país con un 
caso de estudio titulado Cómo los procesos de integración regional y los corredores 
energéticos han incrementado la inversión extranjera directa en Turquía (y pueden 
dejar de hacerlo). En esta ocasión, utilizamos el marco de discusión cualitativo 
formulado por Blomstrom y Kokko (1997) para tratar de evaluar los efectos de 
los diferentes acuerdos de integración regional en la IED.
TESISrevision miguel1.2.indd   267 19/05/2014   22:07:11
THE DETERMINANTS OF FDI IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES268
It is worth noticing that, foreign entrepreneurs investing in Latin America 
take into account different institutional variables that those investing in other 
parts of the world when assessing the foreign entry mode decision. While in 
other regions entrepreneurs tend to opt for joint ventures in environments 
characterized by severe corruption and/or bureaucratic burdens, in LAC those 
factors do not seem to be significant, and foreign investors pay more attention 
the percentage of informal payments they have to make. A counterintuitive 
result is that, contrary to what would be expected, in those countries in 
which foreign entrepreneurs perceive that the courts are not fair, they opt for 
establishing Joint Venture in a higher proportion, probably to count with a 
local partner who may help them dealing with potential legal, idiosyncratic 
and regulatory barriers.  The last finding can be considered to be a proof of the 
influence of transaction costs and internationalization factors (Dunning, 1973) 
on foreign direct investment decisions. Transaction costs are intimately related 
En resumen, los artículos contenidos en esta tesis analizan a la inversión 
extranjera directa en países en desarrollo desde una perspectiva a varios niveles, 
e incluyendo métodos cualitativos y cuantitativos. Los resultados derivados 
del análisis en diferentes niveles han de entenderse desde una perspectiva de 
complementariedad, como discutimos en la sección siguiente.
5.4. Evidencia empírica acerca de los factores determinantes de 
la IED en países en desarrollo
Para sintetizar mejor los resultados obtenidos en los diferentes capítulos, los 
clasificamos de acuerdo a los seis grupos de determinantes de la IED que hemos 
identificado en la revisión de la literatura, aunque en un orden ligeramente 
diferente.
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to institutions, and the boundaries between both groups of factors are blurry.
We also observe that the so-called location factors do not seem to noticeably 
inf luence foreign direct investment decisions in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Tariffs (at the macro level) and days to clear customs (micro data) 
are statistically insignificant variables; this may be caused by the fact that 
during the past two decades, overall, global tariffs have been declining across 
the globe, at the same time that customs procedures have been standardized 
in a number of countries. In what regards the role of human capital on FDI 
attraction, secondary school completion and scientific articles per capita 
(macro level), as well as the percentage of skilled labor (micro level) are also 
found to be insignificant; a potential explanation is that multinationals investing 
in developing countries, in general, do not often put the emphasis on human 
capital, but rather on labor costs, with some exceptions (e.g. information 
technologies in India). In addition, proxies for physical infrastructure such as 
En primer lugar, una buena situación macroeconómica parece ser condición 
necesaria pero no suficiente para la atracción de flujos de IED. Además, no 
todas las variables macroeconómicas son igualmente relevantes, y las que lo 
son pueden variar a lo largo del tiempo. Encontramos evidencia significativa 
de que los niveles de apertura comercial, deuda de corto plazo, y déficit por 
cuenta corriente, son estadísticamente significativos a la hora de explicar los 
flujos de IED a Latinoamérica entre 1990 y 2010. El coeficiente relacionado con 
el resultado de cuenta corriente es negativo, altamente significativo y robusto; 
esto implica que los países con mayores necesidades de financiamiento externo 
apelan en lo posible al inversor extranjero que está pensando en inversiones 
de largo plazo; este resultado es coherente con la literatura sobre IED en 
Latinoamérica (Montero, 2008; Trevino et al,  2002). Al mismo tiempo, los 
tipos de interés y los niveles de crecimiento del ingreso per cápita no son 
significativos. Este último hallazgo contrasta con los argumentos de la literatura 
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the percentage of electricity losses in the country do not seem to play a role on 
investment decisions either, although the number of mobile phones is found 
significant in certain regressions (but he effect disappears when institutional 
variables are inserted in the macro model). 
Finally, certain distinguishing features of the foreign firm (ownership and 
strategic conditions) matter, at least regarding the degree of ownership in the 
subsidiary. On the one hand, contrary to what could be expected, companies 
selling products with higher technological content or counting with quality 
certificates do not seem to take them into account when taking entry mode 
decisions. Counting with a foreign licensed technology is a very influential 
determinant in Latin America and the Caribbean, noticeably increasing the 
probability that the foreign company goes for WOE to enjoy ownership 
advantages. Interestingly, this result does not hold in the rest of the world. A 
tentative explanation is that, according to the Index of Economic Freedom, 
teórica, si bien viene a reforzar las conclusiones de Biglaiser y DeRouen (2006) 
también para Latinoamérica, en 1980-1996. Por último, la inflación no parece 
haber influido los flujos de IED a Latinoamérica en 1990-2010. En Turquía, 
sin embargo, la mayoría de los autores señalan la inflación de los años noventa 
como la principal barrera para la IED, si bien Sayek (2007) no encuentra 
evidencia empírica. En general, los hallazgos empíricos sobre la inflación no 
son concluyentes.
En segundo lugar, se demuestra que las instituciones afectan las decisiones de 
inversión extranjera directa. A un nivel macro, encontramos que la estabilidad 
gubernamental, y la capacidad del  ejecutivo de implementar programas y 
reformas parece contribuir positivamente (y de manera significativa) a la 
atracción de IED. Las compañías extranjeras están además altamente interesadas 
en eludir países con altos riesgos de expropiación, como demuestra el hecho 
de que la variable perfil de inversión es también significativa; estos hallazgos 
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Latin America presents the widest intra-regional range of variation in the 
enforcement of property rights and, thus, in line with Papageorgiadis (2013), 
foreign entrepreneurs would be taking into account de facto enforcement of 
property rights to inform their entry mode decision more seriously than in 
other continents. We also find moderate support for the following contention: 
the age of the affiliate is negatively correlated with the chance of maintaining 
a WOE; this finding seems to be in line with Chen and Chang (2011), and 
contrary to Tatoglu et al (2003), who argued that companies with longer 
experience prefer a greater degree of control.
In addition, we find strong evidence that the higher the percentage exports 
represent in total sales, the more probable is that subsidiary takes the form of 
WOE. This result is related to the knowledge capital model (Markusen and 
Maskus, 1999), and is in line with the findings of Chen and Chang (2011): 
market seeking FDI (when most of the sales of the subsidiary are directed to 
corroboran los de Staats y Bligaiser (2012), también para Latinoamérica. La 
variable ley y orden, que trata de medir la imparcialidad del sistema legal y la 
efectividad de la implementación de la ley, es sólo significativa a un nivel de 
confianza del 10%; parece ser que los empresarios extranjeros que invierten 
en Latinoamérica tienen en cuenta la calidad del sistema legal en los diferentes 
países, pero este no es el factor más determinante en su decisión. La calidad 
de la burocracia y el control de la corrupción parecen no tener efecto sobre la 
IED, de acuerdo a las diferentes especificaciones econométricas que hacemos. 
También a nivel micro (encuesta de empresas), la corrupción aparece como un 
elemento no influyente. 
Cabe mencionar que, en lo que se refiere a variables institucionales, los 
empresarios extranjeros que invierten en Latinoamérica y el Caribe (LAC) 
parecen tomar en cuenta diferentes factores que aquellos que lo hacen en otras 
partes del mundo, a la hora de tomar la decisión de entrada. Así, mientras que 
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the local market) has a higher probability of taking the form of joint venture, as 
partnering with local companies is probably a good way of accessing relevant 
distribution channels and targeting certain groups of customers. Moreover, we 
also find some evidence that companies relying more on domestic inputs than 
in foreign inputs (for the production) tend to opt for joint venture formulas; the 
reason for this is that foreign companies take advantage of the experience of the 
local partners to choose the right domestic supplier.  
Lastly, we try to assess whether regional integration inf luences FDI 
attraction. In the context of cross-country macro level regression, the DR-
CAFTA dummy we create to capture the effects of the trade agreement is 
found insignificant. However, it may be argued that this may be related to the 
shortcomings of using this kind of limited “black-box” approach (Te Velde and 
Bezemer, 2006), as we may be missing some of the indirect effects related 
to regional integration processes. For example, the qualitative analysis we 
los gerentes que invierten en otras regiones tienden a optar por joint ventures 
en entornos caracterizados por corrupción y/o severas cargas burocráticas, en 
LAC estos factores no parecen ser significativos, y el inversor extranjero pone 
más atención al porcentaje de pagos informales sobre ventas totales que tiene 
que hacer para lidiar con regulación. Al contrario de lo que cabría esperar, 
en aquellos países en los que los empresarios perciben que los tribunales 
no son justos se opta en mayor proporción por establecer joint ventures, 
probablemente para contar con un socio local que pueda ayudar a lidiar con 
potenciales barreras legales, regulatorias e idiosincráticas. Este último hallazgo 
puede considerarse también una prueba de la inf luencia de los costes de 
transacción y los factores de internacionalización (Dunning, 1973) sobre las 
decisiones de inversión en el exterior. Los costes de transacción se relacionan 
íntimamente con las instituciones, de modo que delimitar la diferencia entre 
ambos grupos de factores no siempre es fácil.
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perform in the context of the case study about FDI in Turkey points to the fact 
that the signalling effect caused by the beginning of accession negotiations to 
the European Union in 2005 resulted in an upsurge of foreign investment to 
the Mediterranean country. We have argued that this EU-Turkey Accession 
Partnership has a much wider scope than the Customs Union Treaty of 1996 
(which did not entail free capital movement, among others), and for that reason 
FDI inflows to Turkey did not significantly increase in the late nineties. On 
top of that, a look at the energy sector in Turkey seems to suggest that large 
investments by European companies on gas and electricity may have been 
partly motivated by EU accession prospects. It is worth acknowledging that 
the last idea is just based in anecdotal evidence, presenting numerous caveats; 
nonetheless, should this intuition have to do with reality, this would mean that, 
as relationships between the EU and Turkey cool down, we are likely to see 
less investment by European countries in key energy assets and distribution 
También observamos que los llamados factores de localización parecen no 
influir de manera notable las decisiones de inversión extranjera directa en 
Latinoamérica y el Caribe. Los aranceles (en nuestro análisis macro) y los días 
necesarios para despachar en aduana (análisis con datos a nivel de empresa), 
no aparecen como variables estadísticamente significativas; esto puede ser 
causado por el hecho de que a lo largo de las dos últimas décadas los aranceles 
se han venido reduciendo en la gran mayoría de los países, al tiempo que los 
procedimientos aduaneros se han estandarizado y agilizado. En lo que respecta 
al rol del capital humano en la atracción de IED, ni los niveles de finalización 
de estudios de secundaria y el número de artículos científicos per capita 
(macro), ni el porcentaje de mano de obra cualificada (micro) son variables 
significativas; una posible explicación es que las multinacionales que invierten 
en países en desarrollo, por lo general, no suelen poner énfasis en el capital 
humano, sino más bien en los costes laborales, con algunas excepciones (por 
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channels in Turkey, who may need to bring in other players (such as Russia).  
Summarizing, developing economies may first need to ensure certain 
macroeconomic and institutional stability to attract significant foreign direct 
investment flows. Not all institutions matter: there seems to be a need for 
government stability and a good legal framework to protect foreign investment 
(and limit expropriation), whereas the quality of bureaucracy and corruption 
levels do not seem to be significant determinants of FDI. There is some evidence 
that rule of law and the fairness of the court system do influence to some extent 
direct investment decisions. Other country specific factors allegedly affecting 
the location decision, such as human capital, customs and infrastructure do 
not seem to be influential of FDI; as a precautionary note, it may be the case 
that the selected proxies are not capturing or representing the true nature and 
relevance of these dimensions. Certain firm specific factors, such as counting 
with a foreign licensed technology, the share of inputs that are acquired in the 
ejemplo, implantación de empresas de tecnologías de la información en India 
o Costa Rica). Además, las pérdidas de electricidad, variable a través de la que 
tratamos de aproximar el impacto de las infraestructuras, no parece jugar un 
rol relevante en las decisiones de inversión; sólo el número de teléfonos móviles 
por habitante resulta marginalmente significativo en algunas regresiones (si 
bien su efecto desaparece cuando se incluyen variables institucionales en el 
modelo macro).
Por último, ciertos rasgos distintivos de la empresa extranjera (propiedad 
de activos específicos y condiciones estratégicas) parecen ser relevantes a la 
hora de decidir sobre el grado de participación en la filial. Al contrario de lo 
que cabría esperar, las compañías que venden productos de mayor contenido 
tecnológico o cuentan con certificados de calidad no parecen tener en cuenta 
estos factores en la elección del modo de entrada en mercado extranjero. En 
cambio, el hecho de contar licencias para el uso de una tecnología específica es 
TESISrevision miguel1.2.indd   274 19/05/2014   22:07:11
275RESUMEN Y CONCLUSIONES - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
host economy, and the percentage of exports (as a proxy for export platforms) 
do have a bearing on foreign marked entry mode choice (between WOE and 
JV). Finally, qualitative anecdotal evidence suggests that regional integration 
processes that encompass noticeable reforms in member countries (beyond 
tariffs adjustments) result in an increase in foreign direct investment attraction. 
5.5. Implications for policy makers and international 
entrepreneurs
In line with these results, we argue that there are several sets of reforms and 
policy tools that developing economies may want to use in order to increase 
their appeal to foreign investors. 
•	 Firstly,	they	may	want	to	enhance	the	macroeconomic management 
un factor extremadamente influyente en Latinoamérica y el Caribe, afectando 
de manera notable la probabilidad de que la empresa extranjera opte por un 
mayor grado de control (WOE) sobre su propiedad. Hay que mencionar que, 
curiosamente, este fenómeno no se observa en otras regiones del mundo. Esto 
podría obedecer al hecho de que, de acuerdo al Índice de Libertad Económica, 
Latinoamérica presenta el mayor rango de variación intrarregional en lo que se 
refiere a implementación de los derechos de propiedad; por tanto, en línea con 
los argumentos de Papageorgiadis (2013), los empresarios extranjeros podrían 
estar considerando la dimensión de derechos de propiedad más en serio que 
en otros continentes, y prefieren no contar con un socio local para evitar un 
posible plagio tecnológico. Encontramos asimismo cierta evidencia de que el 
número de años que la empresa filial lleva en operación está negativamente 
correlacionado con las posibilidades de mantener una WOE; este hallazgo 
concuerda con los resultados de Chen y Chang (2011), y refuta el argumento 
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by minimizing perceived risk and mitigating volatility. For example, they may 
want to start by reducing their foreign currency denominated short term debt 
to reserve levels, as high ratios may be perceived as a signal that the economy 
may face at some point a sovereign debt crisis. This would probably entail 
fast currency depreciation, thus lowering the value of investments made by 
foreign entrepreneurs; for that reason, in a context of high short term debt to 
reserve levels, the managers of foreign multinationals may delay the investment 
decision, or could even opt for a different developing economy to establish a 
subsidiary. 
With regards to the balance of payments, the positive relationship between 
current account deficits and foreign direct investment flows is obvious, but 
at the same time it may not be sensible to advocate deterioration in the trade 
balance to call for FDI, as it could ultimately lead to depreciation, inflationary 
pressures and instability. On the other extreme there are commodity exporters 
de Tatoglu et al (2003) de que las compañías con mayor experiencia preferen 
mayor grado de control sobre la filial.
Además, encontramos también evidencia robusta de que cuanto mayor es el 
porcentaje que las exportaciones representan en las ventas totales, más probable 
es que la filial tome la forma de WOE. Este resultado se relaciona con el Modelo 
Capital-Conocimiento (Markusen y Maskus, 1999), y confirma los hallazgos 
de Chen y Chang (2011): la IED orientada el mercado (cuando la mayor parte 
de las ventas de la filial se dirigen al mercado en la que está implantada) tiene 
mayor probabilidad de tomar forma de joint venture, dado que asociarse con 
empresas locales es probablemente una buena vía para obtener acceso a canales 
de distribución relevantes y a ciertos grupos grupos de consumidores. Además, 
también vemos en los resultados que las empresas que dependen más de 
insumos domésticos que de insumos extranjeros tienden a adoptar fórmulas de 
joint venture; la razón es que las empresas extranjeras de este modo aprovechan 
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that generally present trade surplus resulting in currency appreciation, which 
may discourage foreign investors to a certain extent, given that investing there 
in a strong currency is likely to be relatively more expensive than in other 
neighboring economies. Under these circumstances, policymakers may need 
to try to guarantee credible and transparent monetary objectives, for instance 
through accurate inflation targeting (if the currency is floating) or through a 
predictable exchange rate path (if there is intervention or some kind of soft 
peg to the US dollar). This way they would be, at least, reassuring the foreign 
investor about the macroeconomic stability of the economy, thus reducing 
investment risk. 
•	 Second,	also	related	to	the	need	to	reduce	investment	risks,	developing	
states may want to use regulation in certain markets to play an insurance role 
in the context of switching investment costs (due to exchange rate variability 
or institutional instability, among other factors). For instance, capital market 
la experiencia del socio a la hora de elegir los proveedores más adecuados.
Por último, tratamos de evaluar si los procesos de integración regional 
influyen en las decisiones de IED. En el contexto de nuestro análisis multi-país 
a nivel macro, la variable instrumental que creamos para capturar los efectos 
del acuerdo de libre comercio DR-CAFTA no es significativa. No obstante, 
cabría argumentar que esto puede deberse a las limitaciones de utilizar este 
tipo  de análisis de “caja negra” (TeVelde y Bezemer, 2006), ya que podemos 
estar obviando algunos de los efectos indirectos relacionados con la integración 
regional. Por ejemplo,  el análisis cualitativo que desarrollamos en el contexto 
del caso de estudio sobre IED en Turquía apunta a que el efecto de señalización 
y expectativas causado por el comienzo oficial de las negociaciones de adhesión 
a la Unión Europea en 2005 resultó en un fuerte incremento de los flujos de 
inversión al país Mediterráneo. Entendemos que estas negociaciones de adhesión 
conllevan una serie de reformas mucho más abarcadoras que el anterior Tratado 
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imperfections in certain Latin American countries may increase the perceived 
cost of entry for multinationals investing in those countries because the firms 
may be unable to recur to domestic bond issuances to finance or expand their 
subsidiary. Additionally, high firing costs or limitations on profit repatriation 
may be perceived as higher costs that may result in the postponement of entry 
(investment) and exit (disinvestment) decisions. The first set of issues could 
be addressed by introducing unemployment subsidies and reducing private 
compensation payments (as suggested by Pissarides, 2001). In this sense, 
both institutions (rules) and public sector actors (e.g., regulators, investment 
attraction agencies) have important roles in addressing market imperfections 
and reducing uncertainty to prevent hysteresis in entrepreneurial decisions 
while simultaneously preserving a flexible business environment that appeals 
to foreign investors. Although non-linearities do not play a significant role in 
our fixed effects model, further research about the hysteresis of investment 
de Unión Aduanera de 1996 (que se centró en preferencias comerciales en 
productos manufactureros, y no trataba en detalle el movimiento del capital), 
y por esa razón la IED a Turquía no se incrementó de manera significativa en 
los años noventa. Además, el estudio del sector energético en Turquía parece 
sugerir que las grandes empresas europeas de gas y electricidad se han visto 
atraídas por el proceso de negociaciones de adhesión. Hay que reconocer 
que esta última idea se basa en un análisis cualitativo que presenta ciertas 
limitaciones; no obstante, si estuviéramos en lo cierto, lo más probable es que, 
a medida que las perspectivas de ingreso en la UE se enfrían, veamos cada vez 
menos inversión europea en activos energéticos y canales de distribución en 
Turquía, que puede que necesite aproximarse a otros actores (como Rusia).  
En suma, las economías en desarrollo parecen necesitar en primer lugar 
asegurar cierta estabilidad macroeconómica e institucional para atraer 
cantidades significativas de inversión extranjera. En este sentido, no todas las 
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decisions under uncertainty would be needed (to empirically test the theoretical 
constructs in Dixit, 1995; Pissarides, 2001).  
•	 Third,	 related	 to	 the	previous	point,	policy	makers	may	want	 to	
improve institutions in a broader sense, as well as rules of the game, to increase 
foreign direct investment attraction. This can be done by strengthening the 
investment framework, to ensure equal treatment to foreign investor and 
reducing the scope for expropriation of assets. There seems to be some 
evidence that the nationalization of Repsol YPF oil company (previously owned 
by a Spanish multinational) in Argentina is deterring foreign investment in the 
energy sector. In addition, enforcing and maintaining law and order may send a 
positive signal to foreign investors, but it is not per se a sufficient requirement 
to appeal to foreign investors. Similarly, the ability of the executive to remain 
in office (government stability) seems to positively contribute to FDI attraction 
in Latin America. However, if there are substantial changes to the rules of the 
instituciones son igualmente importantes: se necesita contar al menos con un 
gobierno estable y un buen marco legal para proteger al inversor (por ejemplo, 
de la expropiación), mientras que, por otra parte, la calidad del funcionariado y 
los niveles de corrupción no parecen ser factores determinantes de la IED. Hay 
también cierta evidencia de que el cumplimiento de la ley y la imparcialidad del 
sistema legal influyen de algún modo las decisiones de inversión. Otros factores 
específicos al país, como la disponibilidad de capital humano, las aduanas y 
la infraestructura no parecen influir en la práctica las decisiones de IED; no 
obstante, hay que tener en cuenta que las variables instrumentales seleccionadas 
como referencia para tratar de medir estas dimensiones, identificadas en 
la literatura teórica, pueden no ser las más adecuadas. En cambio, ciertas 
características específicas de la empresa inversora, como el hecho de contar 
con licencias tecnológicas, el porcentaje de insumo que se adquiere localmente 
una vez la filial está implantada, y el porcentaje de exportaciones (IED vertical) 
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game or if the policies implemented are not always investor-friendly, as may be 
the case of Venezuela, this may not be sufficient to appeal the foreign investor. 
Finally, the percentage of foreign ownership in FDI subsidiaries seems to be 
negatively correlated to the prevalence of informal payments and discretionary 
court ruling in the country, as foreign entrepreneurs prefer to make smaller 
bets in these uncertain contexts; host countries may want to address these 
issues by improving institutional controls, in order to make sure the prospects 
of multinationals and international investors are not damaged.
•	 Fourth,	 trade	policy	and	regional	 integration	can	be	used	as	a	 tool	
to channel foreign direct investment inflows. However, not every Regional 
Integration Agreement (RTA) may help substantively appealing FDI. Policy-
makers may want to sign RTAs that, beyond tariff modifications and trade 
preferences, encompass a wide set of reforms in some of the following 
areas: intellectual property rights, investment facilitation, rules of origin, 
sí que influyen de manera notable la elección entre JV y WOE. Por último, 
también concluimos de manera preliminar, y basándonos en una discusión 
meramente cualitativa, que los procesos de integración regional que conllevan 
reformas significativas en los países miembros (más allá de cambios en las 
preferencias comerciales), resultan a menudo en un incremento de la inversión 
extranjera directa. 
5.5. Implicaciones para los formuladores de políticas públicas y 
empresarios internacionales
En base a estos resultados, sostenemos en esta tesis que los países en 
vías de desarrollo tienen a su alcance una serie de alternativas de reforma y 
herramientas de política que pueden usar para mejorar su atractivo de cara al 
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infrastructure and connectivity, labor movement, etc. Even in those Free 
Trade Agreements that do not touch on these reforms, external tariff decreases 
are likely to contribute to increased trade flows and a greater degree of trade 
openness, thus indirectly helping attract foreign investors. 
It may be argued that, by enhancing the legal framework for industrial 
property (and its effective enforcement), they will be ensuring foreign 
companies that their specific assets ownership will be respected when 
establishing a subsidiary in the country. This way, foreign investors would 
be more likely to rely on joint ventures, which could increase knowledge 
spillovers over local firms. Similarly, measures aimed at guaranteeing the 
quality and reliability local supplies (quality certificates, better supply contract 
enforcement) could help fostering backward linkages in the host economy. 
These measures may be the result of regional integration processes, as well as 
they may be part of country-specific reforms to improve the regulatory and 
inversor extranjero.
•	 En	primer	 lugar,	pueden	tratar	de	mejorar	su	gestión	de	 la	política	
macroeconómica y mitigar la volatilidad para así minimizar el riesgo percibido 
por el inversor. Por ejemplo, pueden comenzar reduciendo su deuda a corto 
plazo en moneda extranjera como porcentaje de reservas en el Banco Central, 
dado que altos ratios en esta dimensión pueden ser percibidos como una señal 
de que la economía puede llegar en cierto momento a enfrentarse a una crisis de 
deuda soberana. Esto implicaría probablemente una fuerte depreciación, lo que 
afectaría al valor de las inversiones llevadas a cabo por empresarios extranjeros; 
por esta razón, en países con altos niveles de deuda a corto plazo como 
porcentaje de reservas en moneda extranjera, los gestores de multinacionales 
pueden retrasar sus decisiones de inversión, e incluso podrían llegar a optar por 
implantar su filial en otro país.
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institutional framework for investment.  
In addition, managers of foreign companies and multinationals willing to 
invest in emerging economies may find our results useful to orient its foreign 
entry mode choice. First, it seems that a joint venture is a more advantageous 
formula for foreign establishments selling to the local market (horizontal FDI), 
as counting with a local partner may help unlocking key distribution channels 
and reaching the targeted customers. On the other hand, companies that have 
decided to establish an export platform (vertical FDI) in the region may find 
more efficient to opt for a higher degree of control over the subsidiary, in order 
to more closely manage the production and international distribution process 
of the product they are going to export. Related to this is the (also strategic) 
decision of obtaining supplies for the production process in the host market or 
abroad, with the WOE as the preferred formula when the subsidiary relies to a 
greater extent on foreign inputs for the production process, in order to retain 
En lo que se refiere a la balanza de pagos, la relación positiva entre déficit 
por cuenta corriente e IED es obvia, si bien con esto no queremos decir que 
los países deben abogar por el deterioro de su saldo comercial, lo que podría 
conllevar depreciación, presiones inflacionarias e inestabilidad. En el otro 
extremo tenemos a los países que exportan commodities, que generalmente 
presentan un saldo positivo en la balanza comercial que acaba implicando una 
moneda más fuerte, lo que puede desalentar al inversor extranjero hasta cierto 
punto, dado que invertir en una moneda fuerte implica probablemente un 
desembolso inicial más alto que en países vecinos. En estas circunstancias, los 
formuladores de política pública necesitarían garantizar objetivos de política 
monetaria transparentes, por ejemplo recurriendo a un régimen de metas de 
inflación (si la divisa flota), o a una trayectoria de evolución del tipo de cambio 
predecible (regímenes de tipo de cambio intervenido o semiflexibles). De este 
modo se podría al menos ofrecer al inversor extranjero mayores garantías sobre 
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more control over the choice of the supplier. It is also worth noticing that, if 
the potential investor is holder of foreign technology licenses, opting for full 
participation in the subsidiary (WOE) may help preventing reverse engineering 
and surrendering strategic information to potential competitors. Interestingly, 
this is a finding that holds only in Latin America and the Caribbean, but not in 
the rest of the world, and may have to do with the greater degree of variability 
of property rights enforcement across the region. On the other hand, there is 
some evidence that firms counting with quality certificates are more inclined to 
opt for JV subsidiaries when entering other regions (not Latin America).
On a final note, it is worth mentioning that these findings have implications 
from a risk-management perspective, and risk-averse international investors 
would require guarantees to hedge from sovereign and political risks prior 
to making investment decisions.  In this context, the role of international 
institutions such as the Multinational Investment Guarantee Agency appears 
la estabilidad macroeconómica, lo que reduciría el riesgo percibido. 
•	 Segundo,	y	 también	relacionado	con	 la	necesidad	de	minimizar	 los	
riesgos de inversión, los estados en desarrollo pueden introducir regulación 
en ciertos mercados para así asumir un papel de asegurador en un contextos 
de costos de inversión cambiantes (debido a variabilidad en el tipo de cambio e 
inestabilidad institucional, entre otros factores). Por ejemplo, las limitaciones 
de los mercados de capital en los países Latinoamericanos puede incrementar 
el riesgo de entrada percibido por las multinacionales que tienen intención de 
invertir allí, dado que es improbable que puedan recurrir al mercado doméstico 
de bonos para financiar o expandir su filial. Además, altos costos de despido 
y limitaciones a la repatriación de beneficios pueden resultar en el retraso 
de decisiones de entrada (inversión) y salida (desinversión) en un mercado 
concreto. De acuerdo con Pissarides (2001), las rigideces introducidas en la 
toma de decisiones por altos costos de despido pueden solucionarse mediante 
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as extremely relevant when helping maximizing investment to developing 
countries. 
5.6. Conclusion and future research
In conclusion, in this thesis we have analyzed the determinants of foreign 
direct investment in developing countries from a fairly broad view, by 
presenting a multi-tier approach featuring complementary views on the topic 
(macroeconomic cross country analysis, microeconomic firm level analysis, 
and single country qualitative case study). For this purpose, we have drawn 
from existing literature, trying to empirically test well established theories. 
Beyond the contribution to the existing empirical literature, the ultimate 
objective has been to present policy makers and international entrepreneurs 
la introducción de un subsidio al desempleo, así como reduciendo los pagos de 
beneficios sociales por parte de agentes privados (empresarios, trabajadores). 
En este sentido, tanto las instituciones (normas y derechos) como los actores 
públicos (por ejemplo, organismos reguladores, agencias de inversión, etc.) 
tienen un papel importante a la hora de solucionar las imperfecciones de 
los mercados, así como de cara a reducir la incertidumbre; esto sirve para 
prevenir las rigideces (histéresis) en la toma de decisiones empresariales, al 
tiempo que se mantiene un marco de negocios flexible para atraer al inversor 
extranjero. Si bien en nuestro modelo de efectos fijos las relaciones no lineales 
no parecen jugar un papel significativo, sería conveniente investigar los efectos 
de histéresis sobre las decisiones de inversión en ambientes con incertidumbre, 
para así probar en mayor profundidad y de manera empírica los constructos 
teóricos de Dixit (1995) y Pissarides (2001).  
•	 Tercero,	y	relacionado	con	el	punto	anterior,	 los	 formuladores	de	
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with a series of pragmatic lessons and findings that would be applicable to their 
decision-making in the future.
At the same time, we acknowledge that this thesis has a series of limitations. 
While the concrete caveats of the different experiments are highlighted in 
each of the articles, it is worth mentioning again that the lack of a bilateral 
investment flows matrix in Latin America has prevented us from gaining a 
better understanding of FDI dynamics in the region. Also, in the context of 
Chapter 2, and even when we bring non-linearities into discussion, the macro-
level dataset we count with is not sufficient to fully test the hysteresis under the 
uncertainty approach (Dixit, 1995; Pissarides, 2001). To thoroughly assess this 
framework, it would be interesting to carry out additional research exploring 
the exchange rate volatility-FDI decision relationships from a micro point 
of view using customized surveys for a controlled sample of multinationals 
investing in developing economies. Finally, it is also worth mentioning that 
política pública pueden tratar de mejorar las reglas del juego, así como las 
instituciones en un sentido más amplio, para incrementar la atracción de 
inversión extranjera directa. Esto se puede lograr a través del fortalecimiento 
del marco de inversión, para asegurar un trato no discriminatorio al empresario 
extranjero, a la vez que se reduce la casuística legal que permite la expropiación 
de activos. Por ejemplo, la nacionalización en 2012 de la petrolera YPF 
en Argentina (previamente en manos de la multinacional española Repsol) 
parece haber ahuyentado a potenciales inversores internacionales en el campo 
energético, y la empresa nacionalizada ha sufrido durante un tiempo riesgo de 
descapitalización. De igual modo, la habilidad del ejecutivo para permanecer en 
el poder (estabilidad gubernamental) parece contribuir de manera positiva a la 
atracción de inversión en Latinoamérica. Sin embargo, si se producen cambios 
substantivos o excesivamente frecuente en la normativa, o si las políticas 
públicas no son amigables al inversor extranjero, como puede ocurrir en el caso 
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de Venezuela, la estabilidad del ejecutivo no es insuficiente para atraer IED. Por 
último, el porcentaje de participación extranjera en las filiales de IED parece 
estar negativamente correlacionado con la predominancia de pagos informales 
y arbitrariedad en los tribunales en el mercado de destino de la inversión, ya 
que los empresarios extranjeros prefieren “apostar menos” en estos contextos; 
los países en desarrollo pueden tratar de corregir estos problemas, mejorando 
los controles institucionales y eliminando incentivos a la informalidad, para no 
perjudicar las perspectivas de inversión.
•	 Cuarto,	 la	 política	de	 comercio	 internacional	 y	 los	procesos	de	
integración regional pueden utilizarse como herramienta para canalizar los 
flujos de inversión extranjera directa. No obstante, hay que tener en cuenta que 
no todos los acuerdos de integración regional apelarán al inversor internacional 
de igual manera. De cara a atraer IED, los países pueden tratar de firmar 
acuerdos que, más allá de las modificaciones en aranceles y preferencias 
some of the proxies and variables selected to test certain theoretical arguments 
may not be the most suitable, and that some authors have often criticized the 
reliability and comparability of institutional indexes. 
Limitations notwithstanding, and taking into account that data sources on 
FDI flows are scanty if we compare with those on trade flows, we are confident 
that we have been able to, at least, signal the main determinants of FDI, and 
to make a pragmatic and policy-oriented contribution to the literature. The 
articles in this volume have attracted a fair amount of interest; chapter 2 has 
been published in the European Journal of Political Economy, and has informed 
another publication at Elcano Royal Institute; chapter 3 is under revision at 
the Journal of World Business; chapter 4 is an upcoming World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper. 
With this thesis as a departure point, and looking forward, a series of topics 
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comerciales, conlleven además una amplia serie de reformas en alguna de las 
áreas siguientes: derechos de propiedad intelectual, facilitación de la inversión, 
reglas de origen, infraestructura y conectividad, movilidad de la mano de obra, 
etc. Incluso en aquellos Acuerdos de Libre Comercio que no incluyan este tipo 
de reformas, es probable que las meras reducciones en arancel resulten en un 
mayor grado de apertura y flujo comercial, lo que indirectamente puede ayudar 
a atraer a los inversores extranjeros.
Podría argüirse que, mediante la mejora del marco legal sobre propiedad 
industrial (y su implementación efectiva), los formuladores de políticas públicas 
asegurarían a las empresas extranjeras que la propiedad de activos específicos 
sería respetada cuando establezcan una filial en su país. De esta manera, los 
inversores extranjeros serían más propensos a adoptar fórmulas de joint venture, 
lo que puede facilitar la transmisión de conocimiento a las empresas locales. 
Del mismo modo, medidas encaminadas a garantizar la calidad y la fiabilidad 
appear as especially appealing for future research. First, it would be interesting 
to assess the role of export promotion and investment attraction agencies in 
developing economies as an FDI determinant, given that existing evidence is 
inconclusive. Second, it may be worth looking at the role of free trade zones 
and special economic zones in attracting foreign multinationals in the past, 
and how are they going to cope with the phasing out of export subsidies and 
other privileges agreed at the World Trade Organization (starting in 2015). 
Finally, we would like to assess to which extent multinationals settled in free 
trade zones do or do not bring backward and forward linkages with the rest of 
the host economy; this could be analyzed in a country such as the Dominican 
Republic, where exports from free trade zones represent more than half of total 
exports. This would ultimately imply leaving behind the determinants of FDI 
and the discussion about attracting foreign investment at any cost, to enter the 
FDI spillovers debate. It would be necessary to understand which kinds of FDI 
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(horizontal, vertical, asset seeking), and under which sectors and conditions, 
are more likely to help enhancing economic growth in developing economies. 
de los proveedores locales a las filiales extranjeras (mediante la introducción 
de certificados de calidad y mejor ejecución de contratos de suministro, por 
ejemplo), lo que ayudaría a fomentar los encadenamientos hacia atrás en la 
economía destino de la inversión. Estas medidas pueden ser el resultado de 
procesos de integración regional, del mismo modo que pueden simplemente 
ser parte de reformas específicas de cada país, encaminadas a mejorar el marco 
regulatorio e institucional de la inversión.
Además, los directivos de empresas extranjeras y de multinacionales que se 
estén planteando invertir en economías emergentes pueden encontrar útiles los 
resultados de nuestro análisis a la hora de elegir su nivel de participación en la 
filial. Primero, aparentemente la joint venture es una fórmula más ventajosa 
para las filiales extranjeras que tengan previsto vender principalmente en el 
mercado local (IED horizontal), del mismo modo que contar con un socio 
local parece ayudar a desbloquear canales de distribución clave e identificar los 

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clientes principales. Por otra parte, las empresas que han decidido establecer 
una plataforma de exportación (IED vertical) en la región pueden considerar 
más eficiente optar por un mayor grado de control sobre la filial, para así 
gestionar de manera más directa los procesos de producción y distribución 
internacional del producto que van a exportar. Muy relacionado con este 
último punto está la decisión (también estratégica) de obtener suministros para 
el proceso productivo en el mercado destino de la inversión o en el extranjero; 
WOE será la fórmula de entrada preferida cuando la filial vaya a depender en 
mayor medida de insumos provenientes del extranjero, para de este modo 
mantener un mayor grado de control sobre la selección de los proveedores 
internacionales. También hay que tener en cuenta que, si el potencial inversor 
cuenta con licencias para la explotación de una tecnología extranjera, optar por 
una participación total en el capital de la filial (WOE) puede ayudar a prevenir la 
replicación tecnológica, así como exponer información estratégica a potenciales 
···
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competidores (por ejemplo, el socio de una joint venture). Cabe señalar que 
este hallazgo sólo aplica a Latinoamérica y el Caribe, pero no al resto del 
mundo, y puede tener que ver con el mayor grado de variabilidad existente en 
la región en lo que a derechos de propiedad se refiere. Por otra parte, hay cierta 
evidencia de que las multinacionales poseedoras de un certificado de calidad se 
inclinan por fórmulas de joint venture al invertir en otras regiones (pero no en 
Latinoamérica).
Como nota final, hay que mencionar que estos hallazgos tienen implicaciones 
desde un punto de vista de gestión de riesgos, y los inversores internacionales 
adversos al riesgo pueden requerir garantías para protegerse de riesgos políticos 
y soberanos antes de invertir en nuevos mercados. De ahí que el rol de las 
instituciones internacionales, como por ejemplo la Agencia Multinacional de 
Garantías a la Inversión (MIGA, por sus siglas en inglés), tenga un papel muy 
relevante de cara a ayudar a los países en desarrollo a maximizar su IED.
···
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5.6. Conclusión, y vías de investigación para el futuro
En esta tesis hemos tratado analizado los factores determinantes de la 
inversión extranjera directa en países en desarrollo desde una perspectiva 
bastante amplia, presentando un enfoque a varios niveles que ofrece puntos de 
vista complementarios sobre el tema (análisis multi-país a nivel macroeconómico, 
análisis microeconómico a nivel de empresa, y un caso de estudio cualitativo). 
Para este propósito, hemos partido de la literatura existente, tratando de probar 
de manera empírica una serie de teorías bien establecidas. Además de contribuir 
a la literatura empírica existente, hemos querido ofrecer a formuladores de 
políticas públicas y a empresarios internacionales una serie de lecciones y 
hallazgos que en la práctica podrían aplicar a su toma de decisiones futuras. 
Al mismo tiempo, cabe reconocer una serie de limitaciones de las que adolece 
esta tesis. Las limitaciones propias de los diferentes experimentos ya se destacan 
···
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en cada uno de los capítulos. Además, hay que señalar que la inexistencia de una 
matriz de flujos bilaterales de inversión en Latinoamérica nos ha impedido llegar 
a entender mejor la dinámica de la IED en la región. Asimismo, en el capítulo 
2, y a pesar de que sí que hacemos un análisis en busca de relaciones no lineales, 
el set de datos a nivel macro no es suficiente para evaluar de manera íntegra el 
enfoque de histéresis en las decisiones de inversión bajo incertidumbre (Dixit, 
1995; Pissarides, 2001). Para probar este marco teórico, sería interesante 
desarrollar investigación adicional que explore la relación entre la volatilidad 
del tipo de cambio y las decisiones de IED desde una perspectiva micro, usando 
cuestionarios específicamente diseñados para encuestar sobre este aspecto a las 
multinacionales invirtiendo en países en desarrollo. Finalmente, también cabe 
destacar que algunas de las variables seleccionadas para probar los argumentos 
teóricos establecidos por la literatura pueden no siempre ser las más adecuadas; 
por ejemplo, algunos autores han criticado la fiabilidad y comparabilidad de las 
···
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variables institucionales.
A pesar de estas limitaciones, y teniendo en cuenta que las fuentes de datos 
sobre IED son escasas si comparamos con aquellas sobre flujos comerciales, 
hemos sido capaces de identificar los principales determinantes de la IED, así 
como hacer una contribución a la literatura pragmática y orientada al diseño de 
políticas. Los artículos incluidos en este volumen han levantado notable interés; 
el capítulo 2 ha sido ya publicado en el European Journal of Political Economy, y ha 
informado otra publicación en el Real Instituto Elcano; el capítulo 3 está siendo 
sometido a revisión en el  Journal of World Business; y un el capítulo 4 está en 
proceso de ser publicado como World Bank Policy Research Working Paper.
Con esta tesis como punto de partida, se nos ocurren una serie de temas 
relacionados que sería muy interesante investigar en un futuro. Primero, sería 
conveniente estudiar el papel de las agencias de promoción de exportaciones y 
···
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de atracción de inversión en los países en desarrollo, como factor determinante 
de la IED, ya que la evidencia empírica hasta ahora no ofrece resultados 
concluyentes. Segundo, cabría analizar el rol que las zonas francas especiales 
han tenido tradicionalmente en la atracción de inversión extranjera, y cómo 
van a adaptarse a la desaparición de los subsidios de exportación acordada 
por los miembros de la Organización Mundial del Comercio (y que se 
implementará a partir de 2015). Finalmente, nos gustaría indagar hasta qué 
punto las multinacionales establecidas en zonas francas establecen o no vínculos 
con el resto de la economía, dando o no lugar a encadenamientos hacia delante 
y hacia atrás; esta investigación podría llevarse a cabo para el caso de República 
Dominicana, en donde las exportaciones de zonas francas presentan más de 
la mitad del total, y son principalmente realizadas por empresas extranjeras. 
Esto implicaría ir más allá de la discusión sobre los factores determinantes de 
la IED y la atracción de inversión a cualquier precio, para entrar en el debate 
···
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sobre las externalidades derivadas de las IED. En este sentido, se hace necesario 
conseguir un mejor entendimiento de qué motivaciones de (horizontal, vertical, 
activos estratégicos), en qué sectores, y bajo qué condiciones, la inversión 
extranjera directa será más propensa a contribuir al crecimiento en las 
economías en desarrollo. 

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